Sunday, September 7, 2025

What’s Being Chinese – After Beijing’s September 3 Military Parade?

The hugely anticipated parade is finally over. I glued my eyes to the live telecast. I must confess I was a little disappointed, for I thought it would be grander. I suppose I was expecting too much.


Yes, the presentation appeared a little conventional to me – the uniformed services’ columns were as neat and tight as before, but the closeness of the weaponry did not exude the level of awe I had anticipated. The flow looked a little casual to me, never mind the more prominent and frightful ones from the US perspective – like the awesome DF61, DF-5C, and DF-31BJ ICBMs, the DF-21D “Carrier Killers”, the DF-26 “Guam Killers”, and the D-10 Cruise Missiles.

I do not propose to enumerate the 70-plus pieces of cutting-edge weaponry China displayed in the parade; readers have certainly been spoiled for choice from the podcasts streaming out these few days! But there is something that many might have missed – the introduction of three newly established formations: the Information Support Force, the Military Aerospace Force, and the Cyberspace Force, accompanied by their latest equipment. The debut signals Beijing’s drive to reshape its combat doctrine by integrating advanced technologies into cross-force joint operations.

Another weapon worth highlighting is its LY-1 laser system, which can intercept drones, cruise missiles, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft. It offers precise, yet low-cost-per-shot elimination of threats without physical destruction.

Noticeably absent was the display of China’s naval power and its 6th generation stealth fighters and bombers and formidable wholesome warfare and defence systems. Some visual effects should have been designed to project that during the parade, not to mention many of the weapons that are currently being developed with some of the “dark” technology the country already possesses.

Nonetheless, its intended message to the US and Japan was loud and clear: Don’t mess with us. We are more than ready and capable of defeating you if you try to be funny!

Strange, though: why am I talking about the US’s fears when the parade was a celebration to mark the 80th anniversary of the defeat of Japan and fascism?

The US was China’s strongest ally in World War II, and their common enemy in the Asia-Pacific theatre was Japan. (Strictly speaking, Taiwan was also a part of Japan then; many of the soldiers ravaging Southeast Asia were Taiwanese!)

Let’s be honest: Despite its efforts and sacrifices, China by itself did not defeat Japan.

This might be the reason Japan has never formally apologized. They have always thought Han Chinese were inferior beings – to them China has been ruled or ravaged by non-Hans several times over the last two millennia! And I suppose Japanese will always harbour this: Why can’t we ascend to be one too?

Even before the US formally entered the conflict, General Claire Chennault’s “Flying Tigers” played a dramatic and crucial role in helping China during the war. The Flying Tigers were composed of about 100 US volunteer pilots and around 200 ground crew. They were recruited by the Chinese Nationalist government to protect China’s vital supply routes, especially the Burma Road, defend Chinese cities from Japanese bombing raids, and provide direct combat support to Chinese ground forces. In just about seven months (Dec 1941 to July 1942), they achieved an extraordinary kill ratio. They intercepted Japanese bombers attacking Kunming, Rangoon, and other key cities, saving countless civilian lives. At a time when China was struggling and US fortunes were low after Pearl Harbor, the Flying Tigers gave a badly needed morale boost.

(In July 1942, this volunteer group disbanded and was absorbed into the US Army Air Force under Chennault’s continued leadership. He then commanded the 14th Air Force in China, extending American air support throughout the war.)

The Flying Tigers became a symbol of US-China wartime cooperation, remembered in both countries as a heroic example of solidarity against Japanese aggression.

Contrary to Trump’s criticism that Xi did not acknowledge US help during the war[i], their descendants had in fact been invited to attend the September 3 parade. (I thought Xi would mention the vital role of the US and the UK in fighting World War II and fascism, which was core object of the celebration; unfortunately, he did not. The magnanimity would certainly have neutralised the ill feelings of the leaders of these two countries who, in the first place, had opted to stay away from the celebration.)

Chennault’s daughter Cynthia and his granddaughter Nell Calloway were among those honoured. In addition, Elyn MacInnis, whose father-in-law was among the Flying Tigers, was also invited to witness the parade. Beyond the parade, the Flying Tigers' legacy continues to be actively commemorated:

  • Exhibitions honouring their wartime service have recently opened in Chongqing, Liuzhou, and Fujian—some timed with the 80th anniversary of WWII’s end. Descendants were invited to contribute materials and visit.
  • Delegations of veterans and family descendants have travelled to China repeatedly – laying wreaths, attending exhibitions, and strengthening the long-standing memory of cooperative wartime resistance.

And what a twist of events after the war – Japan became the darling of the US, and China, the bad guy!

Reaction in Taiwan

ChatGPT estimated that only about one million people in the island watched the Sept 3 parade live on news channels. However, I read somewhere that another five million Taiwanese watched it online via other media – YouTube, news sites, social media livestreams. The parade has certainly put paid to the DPP government’s propaganda that China is only a paper tiger. Recent feedback gives the impression that people in Taiwan are more receptive to the idea of becoming part of a unified China.

The Renaming of the Pentagon to the Department of War

Two days after the parade, Trump signed an executive order that officially rebrands the US Department of Defense as the Department of War, and the Secretary of Defense as the Secretary of War. Is this a coincidence? I say it is not. And I am afraid this vindictive man is going to come up with new ways to try to break China.

Let’s hear some of the other reactions:
Most western leaders are still in the state of denial or outright being hypocritical, even though they are still being bullied left, right and centre by Trump and his Sycophants.

EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, could only express concern over the growing alignment among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, characterising it as a potential threat to the rules-based international order. She is still sleeping! Her home country Estonia may become another Ukraine, if it continues to marginalise the ethnic Russians in the country.

• Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico – one of the few Western leaders to attend – encouraged the West to take the event seriously. He noted that Xi’s message emphasised a choice between peace and war, and he criticised the absence of EU leaders, suggesting they miscalculated by opting out.

• The Financial Times (via Western analyst commentary) warned that Xi and Kim Jong Un’s meeting amid the parade signals the emergence of an “autocratic alliance,” which has raised alarm across Europe. Another broken record?

• South Korea, Japan, and the US promptly announced renewed “Freedom Edge” defence drills, signalling pushback and alliance-strengthening in Asia. Let’s see how long they can talk tough, given the fact that US is losing steam on QUAD, etc.

• Former Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews’s attendance – especially alongside Putin and Kim – drew some silly domestic backlash, but in reality, he is one of the few Australian politicians who understands realpolitik. This is indeed a chance to engage with real regional leaders.

The official line from Japan

Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi said, “We will continue to gather and analyse information (on cooperation among Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang) with serious interest to assess its impact on regional security.” He further claimed that China’s increased assertiveness in the East and South China Seas raises concern, asserting that any unilateral change to the status quo by force is absolutely unacceptable. But at the same time, he expressed Japan’s desire to advance a strategic, mutually beneficial relationship with China—one that fosters stability through constructive dialogue.

Stop your rhetoric, Hayashi-san, the writing is on the wall. China today is no longer the China of mid-1800s. Unfortunately, Militarist Japan only understands if the sword is on the back of their necks.

(Readers might want to know that a former prime minister of Japan actually attended the parade: Yukio Hatoyama[ii]. He said, “I, as a Japanese, attended the commemoration with a sense of reflection and remorse. I am grateful to have been invited to take part in the ceremony; it was highly meaningful.” He further remarked that he was deeply struck by the conviction that Japan must learn from history in order to face the future.)

And from the Philippines

Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. described the event as an act of intimidation to smaller nations like theirs. He went on to criticise China’s attempt to “reshape” World War II history, warning that such revisionism could erase the atrocities committed under regimes like Mao’s in China and Stalin’s in Russia. Obviously, he has not read history.

He obviously does not know what the Japanese had done to the Filipinos during World War II. Also, does China need to use any of these new gears to fight the Philippines?

Be that as it may…

The message is clear:

        One: Militarily, China is already stronger than any country in the world.

The US has more nuclear warheads than China (so does Russia), but unless it is prepared to see the whole world destroyed, this numerical superiority, together with all its nuclear submarines, which are still believed to be technologically more advanced than China’s, is irrelevant. So are its mighty aircraft carrier strike groups; they are largely lame ducks now in the wake of China’s DF-21Ds now.

 

(A very common self-consoling, ostrich-like conclusion from many western armchair military analysts is that China’s military has not battle-tested. Long live their complacency!)

 

        Two: The Global South has accepted China as their champion.

With Trump shooting everyone and also himself in the foot, who can count on the US today? NATO is irrelevant to the Global South, so is much of EU, which is now totally pre-occupied with trying to prop up Ukraine in the name of defending Europe.

 

The only country that can help the Global South fight and uphold fairness in the world is China.

 

What’s meant to be Chinese today?
Much of what is going to be said below is my personal take and advocacy. Certainly, much of it will also not go down well with many readers. Do feel free to disagree!

First of all, is there a common definition of “Chinese”?

I think this is still a question that cannot be easily answered today.

Naturally, those who live in China are Chinese. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) officially recognises 56 ethnic groups (民族 mín-zú) as Chinese, and they are treated equally. Historically, after the 1911 Revolution, Sun Yat-sen and the early Republic of China (ROC) promoted the idea of a “Republic of Five Nationalities” (五族共和 Wǔ-zú Gòng-hé) – Han (), Manchu (), Mongol (), Hui (, Chinese Muslims), and Tibetan (). There were, of course, many others such as Zhuang, Uyghur, Miao, and so on. The republic’s flag (1912–1928) carried five stripes, each representing one of these nationalities.

Today Han Chinese account for about 91–92% of the population. I believe the majority of the minorities in China today are happy to identify themselves as Chinese. (I visited Xinjiang just a couple of months ago, and judging from what I saw, there is really no reason for me to believe otherwise.) Nonetheless, history, religion, culture, and mutual prejudices will always be exploited by the West to try to divide and weaken China. Therefore, the PRC government must always maintain the highest level of vigilance, hence the West’s persistent demonisation of China.

Outside mainland China, the definition becomes a little tricky.

Many non-mainland people of Chinese ancestry are still struggling with their identity. The question “Am I Chinese?” has often troubled them, especially to the descendants of early immigrants to the US, Canada, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as the younger generations in Southeast Asia and even in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Many in Hong Kong are still reluctant to identify themselves as Chinese, even though the former British colony has been returned to China in 1997, albeit under a one-country-two-systems manner; they rather call themselves Hong Kongers instead. About 30% of Taiwanese, though still practising Chinese culture, actually look up to Japan as their “fatherland”. To call them Chinese is a “please don’t insult me” no-no, for to them the name connotes backwardness and crudeness. CPC (the Communist Party of China)[iii] is an archaic ideology and represents everything they have been brought up to hate: Totalitarianism, autocracy, and what-have-you.

Distinguished historian and sinologist Wang Gungwu (赓武, b. 1930) has spent decades trying to define what it means to be Chinese. He has just released a new book titled Roads to Chinese Modernity: Civilisation and National Culture, which is basically a compilation of many of his speeches before. In this book he writes how China has struggled to earn its place in the world today – from a dying dynasty to an infant republic, to the chaos of the warlord years, to the atrocities committed by the Japanese, to Mao’s victory in 1949, to the madness of the Cultural Revolution, to Deng Xiaoping’s reawakening of China, and to what is China today under Xi Jinping. He argues objectively and quite persuasively how the CPC government has been trying to find modernity during all these years. To him international laws were new to the PRC, and the country might not have acted in a manner that was deemed “correct” to the international, meaning, western-centric, community. Corruption has been a key problem in China and Xi is now going all out to get rid of this cancer. To Wang, China needs a strong hand, and the CPC is China’s emperor today. Period.

Wang is genuine to this day; unfortunately, his views on China, I heard, have not always been well regarded by Chinese leaders. (Even to many alumni of the former Nanyang University, Wang is still being blamed for eroding the university’s Chinese identity.)

Wang was born in Surabaya (then Dutch East Indies) to Chinese scholar parents from Jiangsu. As a child, he moved with his family to Ipoh in the then British Malaya, where he spent most of his formative years. His parents instilled in him a strong grounding in both Chinese classics and English education.

In the aftermath of World War II, Wang was sent to study at the National Central University in Nanjing. However, he had to abort his studies there due to the escalating civil war. He returned to Malaya and enrolled at the University of Malaya in Singapore, graduating with first-class honours in History in 1953. He later earned his PhD in Chinese history from the University of London in 1957.

Wang began his academic career at the University of Malaya, later becoming Professor of Far Eastern History at the Australian National University (ANU). He also served as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Hong Kong (1986–1995). After that, he moved to Singapore, where he became Director (1996–2006) and later Chairman of the Board (2007–2019) of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He is now University Professor at NUS, though he has retained his Australian citizenship.

He is therefore most eminently qualified to speak about China, define “Chinese”, and talk about Chineseness, both the good and ugly sides of it.

“China” itself is a foreign term; nobody really knows for certain how it came about. Yet most of us have resigned ourselves to using “Chinese” to describe ourselves. We can also call ourselves Zhōngguó-rén (中國人), but technically, Zhōngguó-rén refers specifically to people of China.

We can also refer to ourselves as Huá-rén (华人), a term that emphasises cultural or ethnic identity over national citizenship.

Wang draws a key distinction between Huá-yì (华裔), meaning ethnic Chinese – someone of Chinese ancestry living outside China and who is a citizen of another country – and Huá-qiáo (华侨), which refers more accurately to overseas Chinese who retain their Chinese citizenship or nationality, which not too many Huá-rén do now.

Regardless of whether we consider ourselves Huá-yì, or Australian, or American, as long as we are ethnically Chinese, we should take pride in being Chinese, for our shared heritage and ancestry, regardless of our citizenship.


Conclusion

But will this September 3 watershed event change our concept of ourselves?

The parade has shown that the Chinese are a hugely patriotic, determined and disciplined people. They are tireless innovators, not the copycats that Western critics love to brand them. And do believe this: China does not seek to replace the US or exploit other countries; its leadership simply wants the Chinese people to live a better tomorrow. Take a deep look at Xi, and you will see how different he is from Trump and all the pseudo-leaders of the Western world.

Even though we may not share CPC’s ideology or concept of governance, we have to admit that it has done much for China and for “Chinese” all over the world. Minimally, you are no longer being seen or treated as a second-class being in any part of the world. You should stand tall as Hua-ren and use our DNA traits to help the world.

And let’s not forget; there are many aspects of Chineseness that are still deemed ugly even by our own kind. Let’s help to eliminate them.

 

End



[i] Trump described the spectacle as a “beautiful ceremony” and “very, very impressive.” He added, “But I understood the reason they were doing it … they were hoping I was watching—and I was watching.” However, he twitted this: “Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against The United States of America.” He also noted that China’s official ceremony omitted mention of the U.S.’s significant contributions to the Allied victory in WWII, stating that the U.S. “helped China very, very much.”

So, to sum it up: Trump’s off-the-cuff reaction was a mix of grudging admiration for the showmanship, a self-aware nod to its symbolic intent, and pointed criticism framed as historical grievance toward Xi’s narrative.

[ii] Hatoyama often frames his political outlook within a family tradition of advocating friendship with China:

  • Great-grandfather (Kazuo Hatoyama, 1856–1911)
    A prominent politician in the late Meiji era, he served as Speaker of the House of Representatives. Historical accounts note that he, unlike many contemporaries, believed in cultivating good relations with China rather than pursuing purely expansionist policies.
  • Grandfather (Ichirō Hatoyama, 1883–1959)
    Prime Minister of Japan (1954–1956) and founder of the Liberal Democratic Party. He worked toward postwar normalization of Japan’s diplomacy and emphasized reconciliation in Asia. Although normalization with China came later (1972), Ichirō’s foreign policy line leaned toward independence from U.S. dominance and greater engagement with Asian neighbour’s, including China and the Soviet Union.
  • Father (Iichirō Hatoyama, 1918–1993)
    Foreign Minister under Prime Minister Takeo Miki in the mid-1970s. He was instrumental in promoting Japan–China normalization after 1972 and actively pushed for economic and cultural exchanges with Beijing.
  • Yukio Hatoyama (b. 1947)
    As Prime Minister (2009–2010) and later as a private citizen, he continued this lineage, calling for an East Asian Community and repeatedly apologizing for Japan’s wartime aggression in China. His appearance at the 2025 parade was widely portrayed in Chinese media - as the type of remorse Japan should show to China. 
Across three generations (grandfather, father, and himself, plus even earlier family roots) the Hatoyamas have been associated with a relatively China-friendly orientation in Japanese politics.

 [iii] The correct acronym for the ruling party in China is “CPC”, which stands for the Communist Party of China. This is the official translation used by the party itself and by the Chinese government in English-language communications.

Why the confusion between “CPC” and “CCP”?

  • “CPC” is the party’s own preferred and official translation, used in all state publications, press briefings, and diplomatic communications.
  • “CCP” (Chinese Communist Party) is more commonly used in Western media, academia, and public discourse, especially in the U.S., but it’s technically not the official name.
  • The use of “CCP” is sometimes deliberate in political contexts — to emphasize “Chinese” over “Communist” or vice versa, depending on intent — and in some cases can carry ideological undertones or be perceived as pejorative by Beijing.

Scholarly Discussion

  • Scholars such as Kerry Brown, Timothy Cheek, and David Shambaugh have pointed out that using “CPC” shows precision and neutrality, especially in formal or diplomatic contexts.
  • Meanwhile, others argue that “CCP” reflects long-standing English usage and is not inherently biased unless used in specific rhetorical frames.

 

Tuesday, September 2, 2025

Why China’s September 3 Military Parade is Important to Chinese All Over the World?

 

On the eve of China’s military parade in Beijing – marking the 80th anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II – it is worth asking: why does this commemoration matter so deeply to Chinese people everywhere?

The official name of the event is long: “Conference to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.” The length is deliberate. It situates China’s wartime struggle not just as a regional tragedy, but as part of the global fight against fascism.

It is important to know who is coming and who is not, especially from countries which were directly affected by World War II.

I suppose most readers would have read who they are and it is therefore superfluous for me to name them here, save to mention the more remarkable ones – like Indonesia’s Probowo Subianto who has to cancel his trip due to protests and riots that are troubling his country now. Generally, the list includes those who have just attended the SCO Summit in Tianjin, except Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Türkiye. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim will also be attending.

Two from Europe are coming - Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić and Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico.

The US and all its NATO allies are not attending. Neither is Japan.

Another important mention is the absence of Singapore Prime Minister or President; the country is represented by Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong. (Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong was in Japan a couple of days ago (August 21 to 27) and during his visit, he received the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun, Japan’s highest honour, presented by Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru. It is interesting to note that Japan has been lobbying friends NOT to attend China’s September 3 military parade.) Another key absentee is the President of South Korea, Lee Jae-Myung; he will be represented by Woo Won-Shik, the Speaker of South Korea’s National Assembly. And in a subtle message to Lee, Beijing is placing North Korea's Kim Jong Un as the second most important guest in its protocol line-up. Too bad, Lee, since you are afraid of Trump!

The official name of the parade is actually: "Conference to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War."

What has World War II in China got to do with fascism?

This lengthy title reflects China's framing of the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II within the broader context of its anti-fascist contributions.

The link between fascism and the Japanese invasion of China is not as direct as with Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy, but China (and later the Allies) are framing it this way.

Japan’s wartime ideology shared traits with fascism

 

  • Militarism and ultranationalism: Japan in the 1930s–40s was dominated by its military, with emperor-centred nationalism, suppression of dissent, and glorification of war.
  • Authoritarian rule: Civilian politics collapsed after 1931 (Manchurian Incident). Japan became effectively a military dictatorship, much like fascist regimes in Europe.
  • Imperial expansion: Just as Mussolini sought a “New Roman Empire” and Hitler a “Third Reich,” Japan pursued a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” claiming liberation of Asia but practicing domination.
  • Rather than considering itself as a regional victim of Japan, China urged countries to remember Japan’s war atrocities as a part of the global fascist war against humanity – in the wake of what has started to emerge since Donald Trump first assumed presidency in the USA.

 

The PRC officially calls WWII the “World Anti-Fascist War” (世界反法西斯), which many would disagree. Yes, Japan wasn’t a textbook fascist state like Nazi Germany, but its militarist authoritarianism, expansionism, and war time alliance with Germany and Italy certainly justify China’s labelling – just as Mussolini sought a “New Roman Empire” and Hitler a “Third Reich,” Japan pursued a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” claiming liberation of Asia but practicing domination.

Top of Form

 

Bottom of Form

World War II didn’t just “begin” in Europe in 1939, but in East Asia years earlier, with China at the centre.

After the Meiji Restoration (1868), Japan rapidly industrialized, built a modern army/navy, and began seeking colonies (Taiwan in 1895, Korea in 1910). Qing was weakening. It suffered defeats – the First Sino-Japanese War 1894–95 and Boxer Protocol 1901) left China fragmented and semi-colonized, inviting further aggression.

The 1920s–30s saw rising militarist control in Tokyo. Many officers believed Japan needed “living space” (Hakkō ichiu – “all the world under one roof”) and access to raw materials, especially in China.

Japanese officers staged a railway sabotage near Mukden (Shenyang) on September 18, 1931 and used it as a pretext to invade Manchuria. It set up a puppet state Manchukuo under the last Qing emperor Puyi in 1932. Then came the Marco Polo Bridge incident (July 7, 1937). A skirmish outside Beijing escalated into a full-scale invasion. Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing were captured. In Nanjing, Japan committed one of the worst atrocities of the war – the Nanjing Massacre (Dec 1937-Jan 1938). By late 1937, the Sino-Japanese War had become a vast, brutal conflict – effectively the Asian front of WWII.

While Europe remained in uneasy peace until 1939 (when Germany invaded Poland), millions were already fighting and dying in China. By 1941, China had tied down over half of Japan’s army, preventing Tokyo from committing all its forces elsewhere. Western powers began to see the Sino-Japanese War as part of the wider anti-fascist struggle.

(In 1940: Japan joined Germany and Italy in the Tripartite Pact. It attacked Pearl Harbour in 1941. From the Chinese (and some historians’) perspective), WWII really began in 1937 (or even 1931), not 1939.)

The Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai Tōa Kyōeiken, 大東亜共栄圏) 

This is Japan’s official justification for its conquests in China and across Asia during the late 1930s-1940s – Asia for the Asians, liberation from western colonialism/imperialism and shared prosperity. Japanese presented it as a noble cause, even until today.

From the late 19th century, some Japanese thinkers promoted solidarity among Asian peoples against Western colonialism. Japan, being the first non-Western country to industrialize successfully, claimed it should lead Asia.

But in truth, Japan lacked raw materials (oil, rubber, iron ore, food). Leaders argued Japan needed to create a self-sufficient regional economic bloc, free from Western embargoes. Instead of mutual prosperity, resources and labor were extracted for Japan’s war machine. Japan created “independent” regimes (Manchukuo, Wang Jingwei’s Nanjing government, Burma under Ba Maw, the Philippines under José P. Laurel), but these were tightly controlled. Forced labor, comfort women, famines (e.g. in Vietnam 1944–45), and brutal suppression of dissent revealed the gap between rhetoric and reality.

(Many Asians did resent Western colonialism. Japan’s victories over European powers (e.g. fall of Singapore in 1942) shocked the world and inspired anti-colonial movements. Leaders like Subhas Chandra Bose (India) or Ba Maw (Burma) cooperated with Japan, believing it offered a chance to end European rule. However, once occupation realities set in, enthusiasm often turned to resistance.

Be that as it may, it did create some lasting consequences: by smashing Western colonial dominance in Asia, Japan inadvertently created space for postwar independence movements (Indonesia, Vietnam, Burma, India).

(Remember Radhabinod Pal, a judge from India who served at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)? He is indeed remembered in Japan with unusual respect because he was the only judge to deliver a full dissenting opinion acquitting all the accused Japanese leaders. Pal’s dissenting judgment ran over 1,200 pages. He argued that the trial was not impartial and saw Western colonialism in Asia as no less aggressive than Japan’s expansion. To him, Japan’s rhetoric of “Asia for the Asians” had a kernel of legitimacy: Japan challenged European empires that had long exploited Asia. Pal was outvoted 10–1; the other judges convicted and sentenced Japanese leaders (including executions of Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki and others). His dissent earned him lasting admiration. Today a monument to him stands at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. I leave this to readers to ponder! To me, this may partly explains Modi’s lack of interest in this parade.)

The US’s Love Affair with Japan after World War II

In the Cairo Conference (November 1943), attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, Japan was supposed to be stripped of all the territories it had taken “by violence and greed.” Notably, Taiwan and Manchuria were to be restored to China and Korea would “become free and independent in due course.” In the Yalta Conference (February 1945), attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, the Soviet Union agreed to enter the war against Japan in exchange for territorial concessions: Return of southern Sakhalin (lost in 1905), the Kuril Islands, the Influence over Port Arthur and Dalian. And in Potsdam Conference (July–August 1945), attended by Truman, Churchill/Attlee and Stalin, the declaration called on Japan to surrender unconditionally. It reaffirmed that Japan would be limited to its home islands (Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and smaller minor islands as determined). Although it did not specify every territory, the terms of the Cairo Declaration were supposed to be honoured.

There was also a postwar treaty – the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951, effective 1952) where Japan renounced claims to Korea, Taiwan, the Kurils, South Sakhalin, Pacific islands (Micronesia), etc. Unfortunately, it did not clearly state to whom some islands would go, leaving disputes unresolved – Taiwan, Kurils, Diaoyu (Senkaku to Japanese). The U.S. kept control of Okinawa until 1972 and Micronesia as Trust Territories.

The US strategy in Asia shifted after 1945. General Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), oversaw Japan’s occupation (1945–1952). While the Allies had promised sweeping restitution of territories, in reality the US went relatively easy on Japan. Here’s why:

By 1946–47, the U.S. no longer saw Japan only as the defeated enemy, but as a potential bulwark against communism. The Chinese Civil War was tilting toward the Communists (victory in 1949) and the Soviet Union was expanding influence in East Asia (North Korea, Sakhalin, Kurils). Washington began rebuilding Japan quickly, rather than crippling it.

The Japanese emperor, who was instrumental in the legitimization of the invasion, was not tried for war crimes and was instead retained. Much of its bureaucracy and many of its business elites, and even many wartime figures were quietly rehabilitated to keep society functional. This shifted from punishing Japan to making it a stable, loyal ally. Instead of dismantling Japan’s economy, the U.S. launched policies to rebuild industry (e.g., Dodge Plan, 1949), ensuring Japan could be a prosperous, capitalist partner.

Whereas in Europe, Germany was divided and demilitarized.

Notwithstanding, History Meant Nothing to Many

1.    Australia

Australian soldiers were sent into the Malayan-Singapore front before Japan launched its invasion in December 1941, as part of Britain’s preparations to defend Southeast Asia. In August 1940, the first elements of the 8th Division AIF (Australian Imperial Force) arrived in Malaya. By early 1941 – The division was split into the various key points in Malaya. Their role was to strengthen British garrisons alongside Indian, British, and local forces under the newly formed Malaya Command.

 

On 8 December 1941, the same day as the Pearl Harbor attack), Japan invaded northern Malaya, landing at Kota Bharu. While the British troops were retreating southwards, Australian forces fought some real battles with the Japanese in Gemas and Bakri (near Muar). Unfortunately, they had to retreat onto Singapore in late January 1942. Nonetheless, they fought the Japanese hard there between 7–15 February 1942, after which Singapore surrendered and around 15,000 Australians became prisoners of war.

 

Between February 1942 and November 1943, Japan launched more than 100 air raids on northern Australia. The first and biggest raid took place in Darwin (19 February 1942). The same day Japanese forces landed in Timor, 188 aircraft from carriers and bases in the Dutch East Indies attacked Darwin. About 240 were killed, including civilians and military personnel, 8 ships sunk, 2 airfields hit, town devastated.

 

Subsequent, Darwin was bombed about 64 times from Japanese fighters from Timor and the Banda Sea.

 

Japanese aircraft, operating from captured bases in the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia), also struck Broome, Wyndam, Derby, Port Hedland, Katherine, Townsville, and even Horn Island (Torres Strait) and Exmouth Gulf.

 

Japanese submarines also shelled Sydney Harbour attack (31 May-1 June 1942; three midget subs penetrated; one sank a depot ship, killing 21) and Newcastle. Merchant shipping along Australia’s coast was harassed by submarines.

 

Now Australia is happy to join with Japan in all the alliances that are meant to contain China!

 

What a twist of history!

2.    The UK

When Keir Starmer became UK’s prime minister in July 2024, I thought UK had finally got itself out of the shithole that was first dug by Boris Johnson and subsequently enlarged by Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak. He has turned out to be a big let-down. His domestic agenda has largely failed, and he is using his support for Ukraine to stay internationally “relevant”.

 

And recently he had the silly idea of asking the country’s half-baked aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales to visit Tokyo, making the first-ever port call by a foreign aircraft carrier to Tokyo.

 

Why?

 

He wants strengthening UK–Japan Defence Ties!

 

For what?

 

To contain China in Indo-Pacific, of course!

 

It would carry exercises that can integrate with U.S. and Japanese fleets. The UK is still being very delusional about its power. It thinks it is still a global maritime power that operate beyond Europe. For Japan, it showcases international support. For the US, it reinforces trilateral cooperation (U.S.–Japan–UK) as a counterweight to China’s growing naval power.

 

But Starmer has forgotten that the UK has been totally humiliated by Japan during the Pacific War!

Fall of Singapore (February 1942)

    • The surrender of Singapore was Britain’s largest military capitulation in history.
    • Around 80,000 troops (British, Indian, and Australian) became prisoners of war.
    • Winston Churchill called it the “worst disaster” and “largest capitulation” in British military history.

Sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse (December 1941)

    • Just days after Pearl Harbor, Japanese aircraft sank the two capital ships off Malaya.
    • This was the first time modern battleships had been sunk solely by aircraft while at sea, and it shocked the Royal Navy.
    • Symbolically devastating: Britain’s prestige as a great naval power was shattered in Asia overnight.

Loss of Colonies in Asia

    • Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma — all fell quickly.
    • Britain’s imperial naval presence in the Pacific was effectively extinguished.

 

Starmer consoles himself by saying that Japan is now a close partner of the UK, tied by common democratic values and security interests and both “face” challenges from China’s “assertiveness” and North Korea’s “unpredictability”.

 

3.    Others

The Philippines were also invaded by Japan during World War II and they also suffered terribly. Most notably was the Bataan Death March (April 1942). After the surrender, some 76,000 Filipino and American soldiers were forced to march about 100 km without food or water. Around 10,000 Filipinos and 650 Americans died. All in all, about one million Filipinos died during the war (combat, massacres, famine, disease). During the U.S. recapture of Manila (Feb–March 1945), it is said that Japanese forces massacred 100,000 civilians.

 

The Filipinos are certainly very forgiving.

 

I do not propose to name several other countries. It is their leaders or peoples’ sense of history!

CONCLUSION

For Chinese everywhere, the September 3 parade is not just a show of arms. It is a reminder that China bore the brunt of Asia’s anti-fascist war, long before the West woke up in 1939. It is also a message to the world that history matters – even if some nations have chosen to forget their own humiliations at the hands of militarist Japan. For the Global South, it signals that in a world of shifting power, China intends to stand not as a victim, but as a protector.

It is China’s way of telling its people and the world: we remember.

(To this day, few Japanese think Japan had lost the war to China. To them, it was the America’s two atom bombs that made them to surrender!)

While some nations turn allies into friends and enemies into partners, China insists that history still matters. For overseas Chinese, the message should resonate even more strongly: never again will China stand weak, fragmented, or voiceless. And they can stand tall wherever they are.

Most of the western world is still very much in denial. To those who have been following the real stuff, I am sure they know China’s military is already superior to the US’s. (Few things can function well in the wake of Trump’s reward for mediocrity, sycophancy and anti-China/Chinese policies.) I do not know what will be displayed during the parade. But I suspect it is going to be a shock-and-awe do, not so much to the guests, but to the US, Japan and the West. It should put to rest the delusions they have been holding all this while. With China around, the Global South will finally have a protector.

I am privileged to be able to count a few high-profile thinkers as acquaintances. In a recent chit-chat with one of them – a certain ex-lord mayor from one of the major cities in Germany – he has conceded that China will be the No 1 in the world economically, technologically and militarily in no time, thanks to Trump and a weak Europe; he nevertheless fears China’s rise, saying that it will be another hegemon once it has fully come of age. I I begged to disagree with him and was happy to extend a copy of my recent book and urged him to try to read it. I hope he does! (I could understand where he was coming from. Many Europeans - as well many in the other parts of the world - still think China is very much a Stalinist state like the former Soviet Union - thanks largely to the might of the western press and TV channels in distorting news and facts.) 

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Appendix

What's the "philosophy" behind fascism?

Unlike liberalism, socialism, or communism, fascism never had a single, coherent “textbook philosophy.” It’s more a set of ideas, instincts, and political practices that crystallized in Europe after World War I, especially in Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany. But scholars generally agree on a few core philosophical underpinnings:

1. Ultranationalism as the highest value

  • The individual exists only in service of the nation (the Volksgemeinschaft in Germany, the Stato in Italy).
  • The nation is often imagined in mythic, organic terms — a “living body” that must be purified and strengthened.
  • Loyalty to the state/nation outranks personal freedom or universal human rights.

2. The cult of strength, hierarchy, and struggle

  • Fascists rejected Enlightenment ideals of rational debate, equality, and progress.
  • They embraced violence and struggle as natural and necessary for human flourishing (“life as perpetual battle”).
  • War was seen as noble and rejuvenating — a way to purge weakness and unite the people.

3. Anti-liberalism and anti-communism

  • Fascism saw liberal democracy as weak, decadent, and too focused on individual rights.
  • It also fought communism/socialism, which emphasized class struggle and international solidarity rather than national unity.
  • Fascism positioned itself as a “third way” — neither liberal capitalism nor Marxist socialism, but an authoritarian nationalism.

4. The Leader principle (Führerprinzip / Duce concept)

  • Fascism glorifies charismatic leadership — the Leader embodies the will of the people and the destiny of the nation.
  • Obedience is not just political but almost spiritual, with Mussolini/Hitler presented as saviors.

5. Myth, culture, and destiny

  • Fascists often invoked a romanticized past (Rome for Mussolini, Aryan/Germanic myths for Hitler) to inspire a glorious future.
  • They rejected rationalism in favor of myth, symbols, ritual, and mass mobilization.
  • “Truth” was less important than what united and mobilized people emotionally.

6. Collectivism without equality

  • Unlike socialism, fascism was collectivist without class equality.
  • Workers and capitalists were forced into corporatist structures (state-controlled unions, business councils) to “cooperate” under state direction.
  • The state mediated conflicts but always favored national power over individual or class interests.

In short: Fascism is a philosophy of militant nationalism, authoritarian leadership, glorification of struggle, and rejection of liberal/egalitarian ideals. It thrives on myth, hierarchy, and the belief that violence and obedience forge national greatness.

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End