From Fascination to Contempt to Fear: The Evolution of the West’s Attitude Toward China

 

The shifting posture of the West toward China – from distant wonder to dismissive disdain, and finally to anxious apprehension – traces a centuries-long arc shaped by exploration, colonial rivalry, civilizational clash, geopolitical competition, and power transition. What began as a romanticized vision of a wealthy, sophisticated empire has evolved, through conflict, stereotyping, and modern great-power rivalry, into a complex mix of unease and fear. This essay unpacks that transformation, from the age of discovery to the present day.

I. The Age of Fascination: China as Europe’s Mythic, Wealthy Horizon

In the centuries before direct contact, China was not a rival to the West but a mythic, coveted destination – a land of unimaginable riches and advanced civilization that fired Europe’s most ambitious explorers.

The core drive for navigators like Vasco da Gama and Christopher Columbus was simple: to reach the fabled wealth of Asia, and above all China, via a direct sea route. For medieval and early modern Europe, China (known as “Cathay”) was synonymous with luxury: silk, porcelain and tea, and goods so rare they defined elite status. For generations, European trade with Asia relied on the overland Silk Road or Middle Eastern intermediaries, who inflated costs and controlled access.

By the 15th century, this fragile system collapsed. The fall of Constantinople handed the Ottoman Empire control of key land routes, making trade exorbitantly expensive and politically fraught. European powers hungered for direct access – to cut out middlemen, seize commercial profits, and bypass Islamic dominance.

Portugal’s Vasco da Gama led the way, sailing around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope to reach India in 1498, opening a permanent maritime path to Asian trade. Spain’s Christopher Columbus, seeking a shorter westward route to “Cathay,” stumbled upon the Americas in 1492, mistakenly believing he had reached Asia (a miscalculation born from underestimating the Earth’s size).

For both, China was the ultimate prize: India and Southeast Asia were waystations, but China was the apex of prestige and wealth.

This fascination was fuelled by two forces: Renaissance curiosity and utopian mythmaking. The Renaissance’s spirit of intellectual wonder drove European exploration, while accounts like Marco Polo’s Travels painted China as a civilization beyond European imagining: vast, orderly cities, a powerful centralized state, and revolutionary technologies – paper money, grand canals, efficient postal systems – that left Europeans awestruck. (Skepticism lingers over whether Polo personally visited China, but his tales shaped Western perception for centuries.)

To European readers, Cathay was a near-utopia: sophisticated, prosperous, and culturally advanced. It was not merely admired – it was economically tantalizing. The unspoken European fantasy was clear: If we can trade with China directly, we will grow unimaginably rich.

Religious myth amplified this allure. The legend of Prester John, a mythic Christian ruler of a wealthy, wondrous eastern kingdom, drifted across European imagination – first placed in Central Asia or India, then China, then Ethiopia. Its shifting location exposed Europe’s profound ignorance: Europeans filled gaps in knowledge with fantasy. The quest for Prester John became another quiet driver of exploration, tying spiritual longing to commercial ambition.

Yet when Europeans finally reached East Asia, they encountered a reality that defied their greedy dreams: China was sophisticated, but not easily exploitable.

The Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) controlled trade tightly, viewing Europeans as unruly barbarians, not equals. The dream of effortless wealth from China collided with imperial self-confidence.

A Critical Turning Point: Zheng He’s Voyages and Ming Isolationism

The West’s fascination collided with a pivotal choice in Chinese history: the Ming court’s decision to turn inward after Zheng He’s grand maritime expeditions (1405–1433). These voyages were not European-style “exploration” for profit or conquest, but imperial prestige projects – projecting Ming power across the Indian Ocean, from Southeast Asia to East Africa, and expanding the tributary system that framed China as the world’s cultural and political centre.

Within decades, however, the Ming abandoned naval ambition. Northern steppe invasions demanded urgent land defence (including costly Great Wall upgrades); scholar-officials dismissed maritime trade as wasteful, morally suspect, and tied to low-status merchants (Confucian hierarchy prioritized agrarian stability over commerce); Zheng He’s fleets were financially unsustainable, with no clear returns to justify their cost; and coastal piracy linked to unregulated trade fuelled calls for restriction.

The Ming did not fully “close China off” – but they imposed strict haijin (sea ban) policies: private overseas trade was banned, foreign contact limited to official tribute missions, and foreigners confined to supervised ports.

When Portuguese traders arrived in the 16th century, they were seen as unruly outsiders; violent clashes near Guangzhou preceded limited tolerance. The Ming granted Portugal Macau in 1557 (under Chinese sovereignty) only because European trade supplied silver, the lifeblood of China’s economy.

Crucially, the Ming held fast to a civilizational superiority mindset: Europeans, like all foreigners, were expected to bow to China’s centrality in the tributary order. Unlike Europe’s outward imperial surge, the Ming saw no need for overseas expansion – setting a civilizational divide that would shape East-West relations for centuries.

II. The Age of Contempt: Humiliation, Stereotyping, and Western Superiority

By the 19th century, fascination curdled into contempt. The once-mythic Cathay fell to military defeat, colonial encroachment, and Western caricature, as Europe’s industrial and military power overwhelmed a declining Qing Dynasty. This era of “contempt” was rooted in China’s “Century of Humiliation” (c.1839–1949)—a cascade of defeats that shattered Western respect and birthed dehumanizing stereotypes.

1. Western and Japanese Humiliation: The Collapse of Imperial China

The Century of Humiliation began with the Opium Wars. Britain defeated China in the First Opium War (1839–1842), forcing the Qing to open treaty ports, cede Hong Kong, and pay crippling indemnities. The Second Opium War (1856–1860) delivered an even deeper wound: Anglo-French troops looted and burned the Old Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan), destroying irreplaceable cultural treasures – a deliberate act of civilizational humiliation, not just military victory.

Western powers imposed unequal treaties that stripped China of sovereignty: foreigners enjoyed extraterritoriality (immune from Chinese law), controlled tariffs and infrastructure, and carved out semi-colonial enclaves like Shanghai. Britain, France, Germany, and Russia seized concessions and leased territories; China was never fully colonized like India, but it was economically partitioned. The 1900 Boxer Rebellion, a popular uprising against foreign domination, was crushed by an eight-nation alliance, leading to more indemnities and foreign troops stationed in Beijing.

Worse still, China was humiliated by a former tributary: Japan. The First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) saw a modernizing Japan decisively defeat the Qing, stripping China of Korea, seizing Taiwan, and imposing heavy reparations. After the 1912 Qing collapse, warlordism left China fragmented – inviting further Japanese aggression: the 1931 seizure of Manchuria (and the puppet state Manchukuo), the 1937 full-scale invasion, and unspeakable atrocities including the Nanjing Massacre and biological/chemical warfare via Unit 731. For the West, these defeats confirmed a narrative of Chinese “weakness” and “backwardness.”

2. The Birth of Racist Stereotyping: Fu Manchu and the “Yellow Peril”

Contempt hardened into racist stereotyping in Western popular culture and policy. Sax Rohmer’s early 20th-century villain Fu Manchu became the face of the “Yellow Peril” – a sinister, cunning, hyper-intelligent “alien” figure, marked by a Qing queue (pigtail), thin mustache, and exotic robes. Fu Manchu was not just a character; he codified a dehumanizing myth: Chinese people as untrustworthy, dangerous, and fundamentally incompatible with Western civilization.

This stereotype had real-world roots: 19th-century Chinese labour migration to the U.S., Australia, and Canada sparked economic anxiety and racial panic; colonial hierarchies ranked civilizations, framing non-Western peoples as “inferior”; and anti-Chinese policies like the U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) and Australia’s White Australia Policy enshrined discrimination in law. Fu Manchu amplified these prejudices, searing them into mainstream consciousness through novels, films, and comics.

The queue – imposed on Han Chinese by the Qing – was weaponized to signal “backwardness,” turning a historical detail into a visual marker of Western contempt. Even as China modernized, these stereotypes persisted, frozen in the Western imagination.

3. Modern Reinforcers of Contempt: Ideology and Cultural Clash
Mid-20th-century events deepened Western disdain. The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) broadcast images of chaos, ideological extremism, and cultural destruction to the West, framing China as unstable, radical, and hostile to “universal” Western values. Later, the surge of Chinese mass tourism brought frequent complaints about etiquette - loudness, poor queuing – to reinforce stereotypes of Chinese “uncouthness.” These issues were typical of first-generation global tourism, and China has long run “civilized tourism” campaigns to address them – but Western media (even overseas Chinese like me) often ignored context, using anecdotes to justify contempt.

By the late 20th century, contempt was rooted in three pillars: colonial-era racial hierarchy, ideological hostility to communism, and cultural condescension toward a civilization once admired but now deemed “inferior.”

III. The Age of Fear: Geopolitical Rivalry and the Rise of a New Great Power

Today, contempt has faded – replaced by fear. The West no longer sees China as a weak, backward nation, but as a peer competitor: a technological, economic, and geopolitical giant challenging Western dominance. This fear is not irrational prejudice, but a product of real power transition, ideological divergence, and systemic competition.

Geopolitics and the Illusion of “Friendship”

Geopolitics is driven by national interest, not sentiment – a reality that defines China’s global relations and fuels Western anxiety. As a realist perspective holds, the anarchic international system prioritizes survival, security, and prosperity; “friendship” is a byproduct of aligned interests, not moral affinity.

The U.S.-Soviet WWII alliance turned to Cold War enmity; U.S.-China rapprochement in the 1970s was a marriage of convenience against the USSR, not shared values.

China’s 14 neighbouring states illustrate this: no border nation is a “brotherly” ally. Russia’s “personal friendship” with China is transactional, not eternal; Vietnam, Mongolia, and Central Asian states balance ties with China and the West; Japan, India, and the Philippines are explicit rivals. In Europe, only Serbia and Hungary lean pro-China; most retain a colonial-era superiority complex. Sino-African relations are rooted in infrastructure-for-minerals trade, not emotional bond; Brazil’s warmth toward China depends on its current government.

China has few formal allies – but this is not weakness. Its strength lies in non-aggression and sovereignty: unlike Western powers, it does not impose political conditions on aid or trade. This resonates deeply with the Global South, which remembers colonial exploitation and Western moralizing. For the West, however, China’s lack of allies is irrelevant: its sheer power is the threat.

Trump: The “Heaven-Sent” Catalyst for Western Fear

U.S. foreign policy under Donald Trump accelerated the West’s shift to fear – by undermining the Western-led rules-based order and elevating China as a credible alternative. Trump’s actions shattered Global South trust in the U.S.: his threats to abandon NATO, support for Israel’s Gaza campaign, plot to kidnap Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, and brinkmanship with Iran normalized violations of national sovereignty, pre-emptive force, and disregard for civilian life. These acts revived memories of 19th-century gunboat diplomacy, convincing much of the world that the U.S. is an unreliable, lawless hegemon.

Trump’s chaotic, personality-driven governance - pathological narcissism, impulsivity, contempt for institutions – stood in stark contrast to China’s leadership. For the Global South, this contrast made China a beacon of stability.

Xi Jinping: The Anti-Trump and the Face of a New Superpower

If Trump embodied Western decline, Xi Jinping became the symbol of Chinese strength and predictability – a leader admired across the Global South for pragmatism, strategic consistency, and respect for sovereignty.

Unlike Western leaders who impose governance or human rights conditions on aid, Xi’s China promotes non-interference and development without strings – via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which delivers infrastructure, trade, and technology to poorer nations.

Scholars like Jeffrey Sachs frame Xi not as an “authoritarian model,” but a delivery-oriented leader: a figure offering an alternative path to modernization, free from colonial baggage and Western moralizing. The Global South does not seek to copy China’s system – but it respects China’s refusal to impose its values on others. For the West, this is the core fear: Xi’s China is not just a rival power, but a legitimate alternative to Western hegemony – one that commands growing global respect.

Conclusion: From Awe to Anxiety—The West’s Unsettled Reckoning

The West’s journey from fascination to contempt to fear is a story of power and perception. For centuries, China was a distant, admired dream; then a defeated, stereotyped victim; now a formidable challenger. Fascination stemmed from ignorance and envy; contempt from colonial superiority and military dominance; fear from the end of Western unipolarity.

China’s rise under Xi Jinping – accelerated by Western missteps like Trump’s chaos – has repositioned it as a global power par excellence. The West’s fear is not of Chinese aggression, but of displacement: of losing its centuries-old grip on global economic, political, and cultural leadership.

In the end, the West’s attitude toward China is a mirror: it reflects not just China’s evolution, but the West’s own insecurities, fading dominance, and struggle to adapt to a multipolar world. What began as wonder at a distant empire has ended with anxiety about a peer competitor – and that fear defines the 21st century’s greatest geopolitical story.

End

Country vs. Nation: When Power and Meaning Diverge

 

Just some outlandish thoughts...

I always contend that there is a difference between “country” and “nation.” Many countries are not nations per se, and nations are not countries or states. This is a conceptual mismatch at the heart of how we commonly understand political identity today. 

By definition, a country (or state) is a political and legal entity. It is sovereign, with defined borders, a government, and recognition under international law. A nation is a large group of who share a common culture, language, history, ethnicity, or even a shared narrative about themselves, inhabiting a specific territory.

By the above definitions, some countries contain multiple nations. The United Kingdom, for example, includes the English in England, the Scottish in Scotland, the Welsh in Wales, and the Irish in Northern Ireland. In Canada, indigenous people there identify themselves as First Nations. This narrow definition means that the Kurdish people, who live across Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria can also say that they are a nation. And historically, it is also said that the Jewish identity existed as a nation long before the modern state of Israel. 

Some would also define China this way, but I do not believe the Chinese government tolerates this line of thinking, which I agree. I will return to this later.

When a country and a nation roughly coincide, the most appropriate term to apply, in my opinion, is "nation-state". Japan is considered close to this model, as its population is almost homogeneous.

In essence, a country is something you can map; a nation is something people feel. And a nation-state encompasses both.

That is why nationalism can be so powerful. It is not just about borders or governments, but about identity, belonging, and sometimes grievance. This distinction lies behind many major global tensions:

• Independence movements (when a nation wants its own country)
• Disputes over minorities
• Competing national narratives within the same state

China: Civilisation-State vs. Modern Country
China officially presents itself as a unified nation-state, but in reality, it is closer to what some scholars call a civilisation-state.

• The state (country) is the People's Republic of China.
• The “nation” is framed as Zhonghua minzu (the Chinese nation) – a constructed, broad civilisational identity.

Internally, there are 56 distinct ethnic groups (e.g., Han, Tibetan, Uyghur), which complicates the idea of a single nation. The Chinese government tries to align nation with country - to make cultural identity and political loyalty converge - engineering a nation to match its country. Despite scepticism, it is nearly succeeding. The dilution of ethnic patriotism and the promotion of a common identity - Zhōng-Huá Rén-mín [中华人民]. 

The US: White Supremacy from the Very Beginning

The United States is almost the reverse case. The country was founded primarily on a written constitution and political principles, rather than on a pre-existing ethnic or cultural nation. Nationhood came later, built around ideals rather than ethnicity.

American “national” identity is premised on civic ideals – liberty, democracy, the “American Dream” – not on a single ethnicity or ancient culture. But in reality, this identity has long been hijacked. White people dominated from the outset; slavery was introduced; Indigenous peoples were excluded; citizenship was effectively limited to white men. From the beginning, there was a gap between ideals and practice.

White supremacy played a major role in shaping American identity – through laws like segregation, immigration restrictions favouring Europeans, and cultural narratives of a “White” America.

Structurally, the US is constitutionally secular, but Christianity has largely shaped American identity. Public life has long been influenced by Christianity (e.g., political rhetoric, social norms). There is also a strong historical presence of Judaism, particularly in intellectual, legal, and cultural spheres.

Although these civic ideals were later used to challenge white supremacy, non-Whites have never felt they are equal. The American nation is built on universal ideals, but those ideals have been selectively interpreted, restricted, and fought over – particularly by forces like racial hierarchy and religious influence. Donald Trump champions this today. The US now looks more like a broken country, let alone a nation.

The Case of Australia

Australia is especially interesting. It has three overlapping “nations”:

1. Indigenous nations – Hundreds of distinct Aboriginal nations existed long before the modern state.
2. British-derived national identity – The original political and cultural foundation of the country.
3. Modern multicultural nation – Built through immigration, especially post-WWII and recent Asian migration.

The “country” exists clearly (borders, institutions), but the nation is still a work in progress, especially regarding what “Australian values” really mean. Fortunately, Australia remains a stable country.

As for Israel

The Jewish “nation” existed for millennia without a state. Modern Israel was created to realise that nation, but the country was originally Palestine’s. Thus, two nations compete within the same territory. In essence, the country of Israel is still contested.

What about India?

Using the earlier dictionary distinction of country/state equals political entity, and nation is shaped by shared identity, a description of India as a “multinational state” does hold water. India contains dozens of major linguistic-cultural blocs: Tamil, Bengali, Punjabi, Marathi, Gujarati, etc., many with long historical identities. Some of these have had strong regional nationalisms (e.g., Tamil nationalism in the south, Sikh nationalism in Punjab, Kashmiri identity in the north). The federal structure—states largely organized along linguistic lines—implicitly acknowledges these distinctions.

However, since independence in 1947, India has also cultivated a pan-Indian civic identity: constitution, democracy, shared institutions, national symbols. Unlike places that fractured (e.g., Yugoslavia), India has largely held together despite diversity. Therefore, civically, India itself functions as a single nation with internal diversity.

Bottom of Form

And the “tribal” states?
In parts of Africa and the Gulf, pre-modern social organization (tribes, clans, lineages) still shapes politics in visible ways. Colonial borders in much of Africa (formalized after the Berlin Conference) grouped together very different communities into single states.

In countries like Nigeria or Kenya, electoral politics often align with ethnic or regional blocs. And in fragile states such as Somalia or Libya, clan or tribal affiliations can outweigh central authority.

And in the Gulf, states like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates have ruling families whose legitimacy is historically rooted in tribal alliances. Social networks, patronage, and even aspects of governance can still reflect tribal lineage structures.

“Tribe” was heavily used in colonial anthropology to imply “pre-modern” or “less developed” societies. Even “modern” states have similar dynamics. Voting blocs based on ethnicity, religion, or region exist in places like the US, India, or Europe too—just described in different language.

But calling them “tribal states” risks being seen as condescending. Many are modern states. They are all internationally recognized sovereign entities, members of the United Nations. They have bureaucracies, constitutions (formal or informal), and national institutions.

Then, is the United Nations a misnomer?

The name United Nations reflects the 1945 worldview, not a precise theoretical definition. It was coined during World War II by Franklin D. Roosevelt to refer to the Allied “nations” fighting the Axis. Membership is made up of sovereign states, not nations in the cultural sense. Strictly speaking, it’s closer to a “United States (of the world)” than a union of nations. But ironically, it is hardly “united” in any meaningful way.

In my opinion, it should be named “World Order Organisation” – if it is what the fair world wants it to function.  

Three Paradoxes

1. Taiwan

Taiwan is part of China; the majority of its population is Han Chinese. But separatists there see Taiwan as a separate country; some even see themselves as a distinct nation – a Taiwanese identity rather than a Chinese one.

2. Ukraine
Ukraine versus Russia is another clear example. Russians and Ukrainians are “one people.” Yet Ukraine asserts a distinct national identity - language, history, political orientation. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the issue was politically and geographically settled. Unfortunately, with NATO’s instigation, Ukraine chose to abandon neutrality and pursue NATO membership – hence the war.

3. Palestine
The conflict involving Israel and the Palestinian territories is perhaps the most emotionally and historically layered. Jews have realised their nation-statehood but deny Palestinians the right to seek their own. Essentially, two nations claim the same territory as their country. This conflict is intractable. It is not just a border dispute but a collision of national narratives, histories, and identities.

Conclusion
A country is a structure of power; a nation is a structure of meaning. When both align, the result is stability. When they diverge, tensions arise and conflicts prevail. Unfortunately, the US is always undermining things! 

End

Trump’s April 6 Deadline

 

On February 28, Donald Trump, conned by Benjamin Netanyahu, started a war against Iran. The world knows that he has dug himself into a quagmire from which he is finding it difficult to exit. (He could, if he were a statesman, but he is too narcissistic to do so.)

The deadline by which he wants Iran to completely surrender – after two earlier extensions – is April 6.

Two days ago, Trump addressed a high-level White House gathering focused on the Iran situation. Essentially, he said that if the Iranians do not come to the table, the U.S. “would hit them very hard over the next two to three weeks,” threatening to destroy Iran’s critical infrastructure, including energy and oil facilities. He even used the phrase about sending Iran “back to the Stone Age.” In the same meeting, he also gave the impression that he was prepared to leave the Strait of Hormuz blockade to the importers of oil to solve. The latter did offer some hope that he was easing up on Iran.

The most tangible and market-visible prize that Iran has scored over the U.S. is that it has effectively restricted shipping. The U.S. does not seem able to do anything unless its troops go in to “liberate” the Strait – which, if undertaken, would mean a large number of body bags returning to the U.S.

We know Trump needs a trophy to extricate himself, even if only a symbolic one.

He has already claimed he has effected a “regime change” in Iran, and that Iran’s navy, air force, and missile programs are crippled. He repeatedly boasts that Iran is begging for a deal.

But the truth is, Iran is still raining deadly missiles on Israel and U.S. bases in the Gulf states. These cannot be excuses again; he needs a new one.

A new trophy is psychologically important for Trump’s style. The optics of Iran yielding—not just negotiating—are key.

Domestic political stabilization

This is a must-achieve “trophy.” His approval rating has dropped and economic concerns are rising. In reality, this may be the primary driver behind the timing of this mad pursuit of his.

Nonetheless, he still can claim many superficial “deliveries” – for example, a unilateral declaration that Iran has agreed to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and that talks are underway – but I suspect most Americans no longer believe them.

I am more inclined to think that he will launch a last-minute strike targeting Iran’s missile facilities, possibly a symbolic infrastructure installation, in addition to the remaining military bases. He will then declare objectives achieved and announce a willingness to negotiate. This potential trophy is visual – something he can point to and say: “We finished the job.”

Another possible trophy could come through the mediation efforts of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Türkiye. He could claim that Iran has agreed to a framework agreement – even if thin – on nuclear limits and vague commitments on shipping or inspections. We know Trump can frame even a weak deal as historic. His rhetoric that “We’re giving diplomacy a chance” would continue.

External audiences

Below is a chart tracking China and the U.S.’s “favourability” in a survey of 42 countries. Suffice it to say, nothing Trump does will change the opinion the world at large holds of him.

But will Iran come to the table?

My guess is that Iran will not.

It has just been reported that Kamal Kharrazi, Iran's former foreign minister and a senior foreign policy adviser, was severely wounded, and his wife killed, in an Israeli airstrike on their home in Tehran. Kharrazi was recently involved in backchannel diplomatic efforts, engaging with Pakistani officials to help arrange a potential meeting between senior Iranian officials and U.S. Vice President JD Vance aimed at ending the conflict. This has led to speculation that the strike was intended to derail those peace talks.

And the U.S. has just bombed the B1 bridge linking Tehran and Karaj, a major satellite city. The bridge is a key piece of infrastructure. Some reports say it was hit twice. It causes disruption but will not paralyze the country.

These actions signal escalation and will toughen Iran’s resolve to fight on. Zeal and hatred will override any economic or rational thinking.

This time Iran is not unprepared…

Internally, the U.S. was shocked to learn that Iranian missiles can now penetrate its defences and hit targets with great precision. After suffering severe damage to its nuclear sites during the U.S.’s “Operation Midnight Hammer” in June 2025, Iran has wised up and decided to fully adopt China’s BeiDou-3 satellite navigation system, the more advanced version of which can provide centimetre-level kinematic accuracy. It is believed that Iran has also acquired 500 ballistic missiles from North Korea.

And in the U.S., the house is on fire…
Yes, some 5,000 boots are ready to land on Iranian soil. They will certainly be able to inflict severe damage on Iran’s oil and gas infrastructure if they do attack.

But at the same time, Pete Hegseth has just sacked Randy George, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. Earlier, he removed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Charles Q. Brown Jr. and the head of the Navy, Lisa Franchetti. Others include David Hodne (senior Army commander), William Green Jr. (head of chaplains), and several more. They were either appointed under Joe Biden and linked to earlier leadership like Mark Milley, or because they are Black or female. The U.S. system is supposed to rely on a politically neutral professional military, but what is happening is the blatant politicisation of the armed forces and the suppression of internal dissent.

This is lethal to command stability during a conflict.

(Trump has also sacked Attorney General Pam Bondi, and Kash Patel, the FBI director, is likely to go soon.)

Conclusion

I wish TACO failure, but perversely, I also wish him success in controlling the Oval Office – for this is truly a heaven-sent situation for China to continue scaling new heights in the “favourability” chart shown above.

Unfortunately, a prolonged war will not serve any country any good in the long run, China included.

End

 

 

In Relationship Management, Never Assume things…

 

I remember reading a book by the late Dato’ Tan Chin Nam – a name many Australians also know, thanks to his four-time wins of the Melbourne Cup – in which he advised one never to assume things. "Assume," he said, "makes an ass out of you and me!" It’s a simple, even crude, mnemonic, but its truth has been unfolding for me in unexpected ways as I grow older.

I seem to have contracted a form of Obsessive Disorder syndrome. I am always reaching for my laptop to write and post articles on my blog; the urge is spontaneous. I must have inundated my friends and readers with too many postings! A friend, finding my habit intolerable, finally wrote something to this effect: I don’t care about all the things you have been writing; I just want to take care of my own health. I fully empathized with his sentiment and lost no time in offering my apology, informing him that I would henceforth exclude him from my broadcast list. I had assumed he enjoyed the constant stream of my thoughts. I was wrong.

So, friends and readers, do let me know if you do not want me to include you in my broadcast list.

This experience opened my eyes to my own behavior in other areas. I am a member of several WhatsApp chat groups – my junior high school mates, my senior high school mates, my university mates, my Muarian group, my condo group, and several others. Because of the intensity of traffic, I have put some on “locked chats”, only checking them when I have little to do. For those I allow to come through, I usually do quick scrolls and read only things I find useful. Even then, I dread seeing a junior high school mate’s constant posting of his morning taiji exercises, his cross-country runs, and even the food he eats. I couldn’t help but rub it in, asking if some of the pictures were recycled. He didn’t seem to take the hint.

Several others would, without fail – almost daily – post “Happy Monday," "Good morning, Happy Tuesday," and so on. And yet there are some who forward everything they receive, much of which is fake news. I would "curse" each time I saw such messages upon being alerted to their arrival. I therefore understood my friend’s outburst completely.

Why had I been so blind? I had assumed my own digital habits were the norm.

When KC asked if I would like to meet up with an old university mate Keong who was on a cruise ship which would be making a port call in Melbourne, I gladly offered to join him to play host. We picked him up at the pier and played tourists on the City Circle Tram. We broke our journey at the Parliament House station and had a good lunch at Sharks Fin Inn nearby. Upon our return, as the rain began to fall, we waited for quite a while for the tram. It had little standing room when we boarded, but the next two stops were horrendous. Chinese tourists forced their way into the tram even though it was already packed like sardines. The tram doors were unable to close because they were blocked by these tourists, who were clearly scared of being left behind by their tour group. They simply refused to disembark. I felt a wave of embarrassment – another moment that reinforces Western prejudice against the Chinese. But later, I wondered: was I guilty of an assumption here too, assuming their behaviour was a simple lack of manners rather than a reflection of panic and group pressure?

We later adjourned to KC’s home for tea, talking nostalgically about our university days. On our way back to his ship, my wife served a simple meal for him at our place. There, Keong shared something very candid. A top student in our Mechanical Engineering class at the University of Malaya (UM), he said that after working for a couple of years, he decided he wanted to be a millionaire. He saw an MBA as his route. He went to the US, did very well, and was offered a PhD program, which consumed all his savings. He joined the university and later became a professor until he retired two years ago. Did he become a millionaire? No lah, he said, laughing.

I pulled his leg: if he had failed his MBA, he might have become one! I remembered a saying from my graduate school days – a Distinction pass paves the way to becoming a professor, an Ordinary pass makes you a decent manager, and a Fail destines you for great success in business. How apt.

It reminded me of another friend who spent six years getting his degree with us at UM. He is one of the few who was made a Dato by one of the royal houses. He used to joke: four years, honours degree; five years, general degree; and six years, datoship!

We also talked about relationships. One of my brothers-in-law was also our classmate. (KC, Keong and he graduated with first-class honours.) And like Keong, he went to the US for his MBA. In university, he was a dasher – good-looking and a highflyer. But now he shuns classmates. He cannot get along with his daughter’s Caucasian husband and, for years, has not been on speaking terms with his brother-in-law – who is my wife’s brother – who also lives in Melbourne. At first glance, it’s puzzling. But having worked for many difficult bosses, I have learned to read body language. And as I grow older, I have become increasingly mellow, even if I still "fight" with strangers over matters of principle. This mellowness has helped me get along with him, and with many others who have their own idiosyncrasies.

Even though I am opinionated, I no longer try to persuade or influence my two middle-aged children and their children. I don’t believe they even read the books I have published or the blog I keep. I am conscious that a grandson often says I am a little "disoriented" when I speak with him. Instead of correcting him, I let it be. After all, at my age, I know I am slow in connecting things and young people tend to be impatient.

This, I now see, is the true lesson from Dato’ Tan’s advice. I assumed my friend wanted my articles. I assumed my WhatsApp group members were thoughtless. I assumed the tourists were simply rude. I assume my grandson sees my slowness as a flaw. But letting go of these assumptions – releasing the need to be understood, to correct, to impose my own narrative – has brought a peace I didn’t expect.

With this attitude, I am happy to maintain a harmonious relationship with all my loved ones and a courteous relationship with friends and acquaintances. I no longer want to make an ass out of you and me. I just want to let things be.

End

 

Brinkmanship in the Gulf: Why TACO’s Iran Deadline Keeps Sliding

 

Donald Trump’s five-day deadline threat against Iran’s energy infrastructure lapsed yesterday. Instead of striking, he postponed it by ten days—to April 6. He claims he was happy to give Iran another extension because talks were ongoing and productive. Do you believe him? Iran denies any such talks took place.

What is credible is this: Pakistan and possibly Egypt are now acting as intermediaries, conveying demands between the two sides. We must take all claims with a grain of salt.

The Real Pressures Behind the Pause
Trump realizes – though refuses to admit – that the war he has started with Benjamin Netanyahu has been a disaster, especially given the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Domestically, he faces strong economic and political pressure to end the conflict. Internationally, oil prices are spiking, allies are crying out for fuel, and the economies of Gulf states are coming to a standstill.

Nonetheless, strikes and military activities continue. Netanyahu is extending the war into Lebanon.

The “Boots” Are Still on the High Seas
The postponement is likely tactical and temporary. Two amphibious assault ships - Tripoli* and Bataan – have yet to arrive. *Tripoli* is Japan-based; *Bataan* is Atlantic-based. Both are being redirected toward the Gulf. The former is expected in early April, the latter slightly later. Each carries F-35B short-takeoff stealth fighters, attack and transport helicopters, and – more lethally – between 1,500 and 2,200 Marines, along with amphibious assault vehicles, light armored vehicles, artillery, and landing craft. They are capable of launching beach landings, raids, and ground troop deployments.

Except for Poland (if I am not mistaken), none of its allies have responded to the call to send ships to help open the Strait of Hormuz.

A Vulnerable Strategy
Amphibious ships are extremely vulnerable in the Gulf, especially in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran specializes in asymmetric coastal warfare. The northern side of the strait – Iran’s coastline – is one of the most dangerous environments in the world for large naval vessels.

The Strait is only about 33 km wide at its narrowest, with shipping lanes even narrower and highly predictable. Iran controls the entire northern coastline and key islands such as Qeshm and Abu Musa. Any ship entering the strait is already inside Iran’s weapons envelope. Iran has designed a system specifically for this scenario: naval mines, coastal and ballistic anti-ship missiles, drones, fast attack boats, and mini-submarines – all intended to overwhelm, confuse, and exhaust U.S. defences.

Amphibious ships like Tripoli and Bataan are especially vulnerable: large, slow, packed with troops, aircraft, and fuel. A successful strike would inflict massive casualties and cause a significant political shock.

The 82nd Airborne Division – widely described as the U.S. military’s rapid-response unit – has troops reportedly aboard Tripoli. While highly capable, the division is not designed to fight a full-scale war alone. It specializes in parachute assault and rapid seizure of key targets. Only about 2,200 troops of its total 15,000–20,000 are believed to be en route. The unit has limited armour and relies on speed, surprise, and air support – capabilities Iran already understands well. The U.S. would likely keep these ships outside the strait and move them in only after suppressing Iranian defences.

Thus, the Trump paradox: the ships are deployed to signal strength, yet using them aggressively inside Hormuz is extraordinarily risky.

A Pattern of Posturing
This pause is Trump’s own cocktail: a tactical pause, political calculation, and limited diplomacy. His behaviour is becoming a pattern – escalating rhetorically with ultimatums, moving forces into position, and then delaying at the last moment. This fits a broader style often associated with him: creating a crisis, personalizing the conflict, employing brinkmanship, and then stepping back to claim a deal.

It is unlikely that Iran, under its current leadership, will concede under pressure. Unlike Venezuela, its clerical leadership is driven by religious mission. The pause will only strengthen its position.

Trump’s Shameless Legacy Building
Trump’s shamelessness knows no bounds. His preoccupation with legacy has produced a series of episodes that range from the absurd to the self-aggrandizing:

1. A Statue in Venezuela

At a recent White House cabinet meeting, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum reportedly floated the idea that Venezuela might build a statue of Trump following U.S. actions there. Trump enthusiastically engaged with the notion, comparing himself to historical liberators.

2. Mount Rushmore Monument Addition

Trump has also asked about being added to Mount Rushmore. During a 2020 visit, South Dakota Governor Kristi Noem presented him with a model showing his face alongside Washington, Jefferson, Roosevelt, and Lincoln. The monument sits on land sacred to Native Americans, and engineers warn that further carving could damage it. (Unfortunately, you don’t have someone like the late Tan Sri Lim Goh Tong of the Genting fame in the US. The late Lim could easily create a fake addition to Mount Rushmore to accommodate Trump’s fantasy.)

3. Trump’s Signature on U.S. Paper Currency 

I hardly read mainstream Western papers now. But my wife just showed me another ridiculous act of sycophancy. Apparently, the US Treasury has approved putting Trump’s signature on new paper currency—a break from a 165-year tradition in which notes carried only the signatures of the Treasury Secretary and the Treasurer. Treasurer Brandon Beach called the move “appropriate” and “well deserved,” and has also floated the idea of putting Trump’s image on coins, though placing a living person on circulating U.S. coinage would require congressional action.

Zhèng Qì [正气] versus Xié Qì [邪气]
In my last article, I wrote about zhèng qì – righteousness and moral courage – and xié qì – deviant or corrupting energy. I chose not to broadcast that piece because it used my cultural background to contrast Chinese and U.S. leadership in ways many might not appreciate.

Rather than saying Trump embodies xié qì, I would now put it this way: what we are witnessing is not the presence of zhèng qì restraining conflict, but it is the manifestation of xié qì in Trump - where threats, self-centredness, and brinkmanship replace moral clarity and strategic consistency. 

Conclusion
With Trump, you can never tell what rabbit he will produce next. One thing is certain: he will not be kindly remembered by most future historians.

 

End

正气 (zhèng qì)

The term 正气 (zhèng qì) is deeply rooted in Chinese philosophy and carries a richness that goes far beyond simple translations such as “righteousness” or “moral courage.”

At its core, 正气 refers to a morally upright, life-sustaining force that resists corruption and disorder.

It combines 正 (zhèng) — upright, correct, just — with 气 (qì) — vital energy or life force. It is therefore not merely an ethical concept, but a form of moral energy embodied within a person.

Philosophical Roots

正气 is most strongly associated with Mencius (孟子) of the Confucian tradition. He believed that human beings possess an innate moral sense, and that 正气 is cultivated through righteousness (义), integrity, and the courage to do what is right.

A person endowed with 正气 does not bend to power, but acts rightly even under pressure.

There is also a Daoist dimension. In Daoist thought, 气 is the fundamental energy of the universe. 正气 represents its harmonious and balanced form, in contrast to 邪气 (xié qì) — deviant or corrupting energy.

During the Song dynasty, Wen Tianxiang (文天祥, 1236–1283) gave one of the most powerful expressions of this idea in his Song of Righteousness (正气歌), written while imprisoned before his execution. In it, 正气 is described as a cosmic moral force that fills heaven and earth and resides in those who remain loyal and upright — a symbol of moral courage in the face of death and an unyielding refusal to betray one’s principles.

The Nature of 正气

In essence, 正气 is about being the kind of person whose very presence embodies what is right.

It is reflected in those who:

• Refuse to lie even under threat
• Do not exploit others even when they have the power to do so
• Remain calm, firm, and principled amid chaos

Yet 正气 is not simply about being right. It is about embodying righteousness as an inner force that cannot be shaken.

(I understand that there is also a Western equivalent called Stoicism which emphasises moral firmness, self-discipline, and the refusal to be swayed by external circumstances.)

Social and Political Dimensions

正气 is not only a personal virtue; it is also deeply tied to social responsibility, loyalty, and historical duty.

Xi Jinping and Wang Yi, in my opinion, exemplify 正气 in their governance and diplomacy, amongst them:

• Upholding fairness in international relations
• Resisting hegemony and coercion
• Acting in accordance with justice (正义)

Their responses to global crises embody these principles on the international stage.

Wang Yi and the Language of 正气
Wang Yi frequently draws on classical Chinese expressions that reflect the spirit of 正气. These are not mere rhetorical flourishes, but serve as philosophical grounding for his positions.

For example, he has cited:

• 仁义不施而攻守之势异也
  (“When benevolence and justice are not practiced, the balance of power shifts.”)
• 兵者，凶器也，不可不审用
  (“Weapons are instruments of ill omen and must be used with utmost caution.”)

Such statements emphasise restraint, moral responsibility, and the primacy of justice over force.

A recurring theme in his diplomacy is the rejection of the idea that power determines truth, captured in the phrase:

• 拳头硬不等于道理硬
  (“A strong fist does not mean a strong argument.”)

He has also described China as a “ballast stone for international morality” (国际道义的压舱石), positioning it as a stabilising and principled force in global affairs. This framing is reflected in policy positions such as:

• Respect for national sovereignty
• Opposition to the abuse of force
• Non-interference in internal affairs
• Support for multilateralism and the role of the United Nations
• Resistance to coercion and hegemonic pressure 

Such diplomatic language reflects a broader Confucian influence on China’s foreign policy discourse.

Xi Jinping and Governance

Xi Jinping embodies 正气 through his domestic and international policies, amongst many others, such as:

• Large-scale poverty alleviation efforts
• Anti-corruption campaigns
• Emphasis on technological and economic development
• Engagement with grassroots communities

In foreign policy, he is advocating sovereignty, particularly for smaller states, and opposing what is perceived as Western dominance.

邪气 (xié qì): The Counterpoint

In contrast, 邪气 refers to forces or tendencies that are deviant, excessive, destabilising, or harmful to harmony — whether in the body, society, governance, or conflicts/wars against other countries.

In contemporary political commentary, Donald Trump, Pete Hegseth, Stephen Miller, and Lindsey Graham fit the traits associated with these evil and perverse human beings.

Regardless, concepts like 正气 and 邪气 are deeply philosophical and culturally embedded, and their application to contemporary political figures is inherently subjective. Many may arrive at different conclusions. However, I always hold strong opinions; feel free to disagree!

End