How China Manages Nature — The Spirit of 愚公移山

I tend to reflect a great deal after seeing something remarkable. I consider myself a reasonably well-travelled person, and Pakistan has been just one of my many destinations. Yet it has continued to linger in my mind — its awesome landscape, the innocence and good looks of its children, the warmth of its people, their remarkable observance of hygiene despite difficult living conditions, their food, and the apparent honesty of their merchants.

But there is something I thought was missing among its people — the spirit of Yú Gōng (愚公).

Why do I say this?

It is in their rural roads!

I like to think of myself as a voluntary champion of Chinese thought. Perhaps I can help many in the West understand something of what drives the Chinese mind.

Let me begin with an idiom: 愚公移山 (Yú Gōng Yí Shān) — literally, "The Foolish Old Man Who Moves the Mountains."

The story comes from the ancient Chinese text Liezi (列子), traditionally associated with the philosopher Lie Yukou (列御寇).

An old man known as Yugong (愚公) lived facing two great mountains, Taihang (太行) and Wangwu (王屋), which obstructed his family's passage. Instead of resigning himself to going around them forever, he decided that he and his descendants would remove the mountains, basket by basket.

A supposedly clever old man, Zhisou (智叟), mocked him. How could an ageing man possibly move two mountains?

Yugong replied that although he would die, his sons would continue, then his grandsons, and generation after generation. The mountains, meanwhile, would not grow any larger. Eventually, therefore, they could be removed.

That is the wisdom of the story. It is not about brute strength, but determination, continuity across generations, and refusing to be intimidated by the scale of a task.

Mao Zedong made the expression especially famous in modern China. In 1945, he used it metaphorically to describe the two great "mountains" weighing upon China — imperialism and feudalism.

The Indus Civilisation, of which present-day Pakistan was a part, is older than China's civilisation in some respects. The ancient Silk Road also passed through the region. Yet much remains to be done to improve its infrastructure.

We Chinese have a saying: 要想富，先修路 — "If you want to become rich, build the roads first."

I do not mean to glorify the Chinese, but the following achievements certainly speak volumes about the spirit of 愚公移山. They represent undertakings too large for one generation, but achievable when successive generations continue the work.

A Less Yellow Yellow River
The Yellow River (黄河) is literally becoming less yellow.

Historically, it acquired its colour from the enormous quantities of fine loess soil washed down from the Loess Plateau, particularly in Shaanxi, Shanxi, Gansu and Inner Mongolia.

At its extreme, the river carried more than two billion tonnes of sediment annually. Recent studies suggest that sediment transport has fallen dramatically, by roughly 90% since the 1980s.

China attacked the problem at its source rather than merely dredging the river.

It undertook extensive revegetation of the Loess Plateau, converting steep agricultural land into grassland and forest through the Grain for Green programme (退耕还林还草). Hillsides were terraced to slow runoff, while tens of thousands of small check dams (淤地坝) were constructed across gullies to trap eroded soil before it could enter the river.

By 2019, some 58,800 check dams had been constructed.

Interestingly, when these dams fill with sediment, they often create flat, fertile land suitable for cultivation. Thus, the programme simultaneously reduces erosion, protects the Yellow River and creates farmland.

Large reservoirs such as Xiaolangdi also help regulate water and sediment flows.

What impresses me is the philosophy behind the undertaking. China recognised that the fundamental problem was not the river itself, but the landscape feeding sediment into it.

Instead of fighting the consequences endlessly, it sought to eliminate the causes.

There are still environmental challenges, and recent studies suggest that the decline in sediment has begun to level off in some stretches. Nevertheless, the transformation of the Loess Plateau remains one of China's remarkable environmental achievements.

It demonstrates what sustained intervention over several decades can accomplish.

The Three Gorges Dam
The Yangtze River was another source of recurring calamities for China.

Historically, devastating floods regularly struck the middle Yangtze, particularly around Jingjiang and Wuhan. The great floods of 1931, 1935 and 1954 caused enormous loss of life and destruction.

Even as recently as 1998, while the Three Gorges Dam was still under construction, catastrophic flooding claimed thousands of lives and caused economic losses estimated at RMB166 billion.

The Three Gorges project fundamentally changed China's ability to manage such floods.

Its reservoir has approximately 22.1 billion cubic metres of dedicated flood-control storage, allowing floodwaters to be held back and released gradually, greatly reducing the danger to downstream cities and farmland.

But flood control is only one of its contributions.

With an installed generating capacity of 22.5 gigawatts, Three Gorges produces roughly 90–100 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually.

It has also transformed navigation along the Yangtze. Before the project, shipping between the eastern seaboard and Chongqing was severely constrained by difficult river conditions. Today, enormous quantities of cargo move through the Three Gorges navigation complex, connecting inland western China to Shanghai and the sea.

The reservoir also releases water during dry periods to support agriculture, industry, drinking-water supplies and navigation.

There is no simple way to calculate its total economic contribution. Electricity revenues alone are substantial, but the value of preventing even one catastrophic flood could exceed many years of electricity earnings.

To me, its greatest achievement is the combination: a river that periodically threatened to devastate central China has become an infrastructure asset providing flood protection, electricity, inland navigation and strategic water storage.

Three Gorges represents the philosophy of managing an entire river basin rather than treating the river as an isolated engineering problem.

Dujiangyan (都江堰) — Ancient Chinese Wisdom

If Three Gorges represents the enormous scale of modern Chinese engineering, Dujiangyan represents something perhaps even more remarkable — the wisdom of ancient Chinese hydraulic engineers.

Built around 256 BC under the Qin official Li Bing (李冰) and his son, Dujiangyan is a 2,280-year-old river-control and irrigation system that continues to function today.

It was designed to tame the Min River (岷江), which rushes down from the mountains into the relatively flat Chengdu Plain, frequently causing floods while other areas suffered from inadequate irrigation.

Li Bing's solution consisted of three ingenious components:

• Yuzui (鱼嘴), or Fish Mouth, which divides the river into two channels, directing water towards irrigation systems while allowing excess flows to continue downstream.
• Feishayan (飞沙堰), or Flying Sand Weir, which releases excess water and sediment back into the main river.
• Baopingkou (宝瓶口), or Bottle-Neck Channel, which regulates the quantity of water entering the Chengdu Plain.

The genius of Dujiangyan lies in its use of natural topography, river velocity and hydrology rather than simply overpowering the river with a massive barrier.

The system transformed the Chengdu Plain into one of China's most productive agricultural regions, earning Sichuan the name 天府之国 — "Land of Abundance."

The agricultural surplus also strengthened the Qin state, helping it eventually unify China in 221 BC.

What is extraordinary is that Dujiangyan never became merely an archaeological monument. More than two thousand years later, it continues to irrigate vast areas of farmland.

There is a wonderful ancient maxim associated with its maintenance:

深淘滩，低作堰 — "Dredge the riverbed deeply; keep the weir low."

In other words, do not simply keep raising barriers. Maintain the channels properly and allow nature to do much of the work.

That is more than two thousand years of systems engineering wisdom.

Three Gorges demonstrates how an enormous structure can control a river. Dujiangyan demonstrates how understanding a river allows us to work with nature rather than against it.

To me, that distinction is profound.

The Great Green Wall
Another remarkable undertaking is China's Three-North Shelterbelt Programme (三北防护林工程), popularly known as the Great Green Wall.

Started in 1978 and scheduled to continue until 2050, it stretches across northern China, covering a planned programme area exceeding four million square kilometres.

Its objective is to combat desertification, protect agricultural land and settlements, and reduce the devastating sandstorms that periodically affect northern China.

The programme is often described as planting trees across deserts. But that oversimplifies the undertaking.

China discovered through experience that planting trees indiscriminately in arid regions could be counterproductive. Unsuitable species often died, while others consumed scarce groundwater.

The strategy consequently evolved into something much more sophisticated:

Where rainfall permits, plant trees. Where it does not, use shrubs and grasses. Where even those cannot survive, stabilise the sand mechanically and preserve the existing desert ecosystem.

The programme combines vegetation restoration, grazing restrictions, agricultural shelterbelts and mechanical sand barriers.

One particularly impressive achievement came in November 2024, when China announced the completion of a continuous 3,046-kilometre sand-blocking belt around the Taklamakan Desert in Xinjiang.

The objective is not to turn the desert into a forest. It is to stabilise its margins, protect the surrounding oases and prevent shifting dunes from swallowing roads, railways, farmland and settlements.

China's statistics indicate substantial improvements in vegetation cover and reductions in desertified land, although drought, climate variability and ecological constraints remain serious challenges.

The Yellow River rehabilitation and the Great Green Wall are, in fact, complementary undertakings.

One prevents soil from being carried away by water; the other prevents it from being carried away by wind.

Both illustrate a common philosophy: rather than endlessly fighting nature's consequences, understand its processes and intervene at their sources.

Conclusion

The Three Gorges project was one of the most criticised undertakings in modern China, particularly by foreign observers, although there were also strong objections domestically.

The criticisms were not without substance.

More than a million people had to be resettled. Towns, villages, farmland and historical sites disappeared beneath the reservoir. Environmentalists expressed concerns about sedimentation, landslides, water pollution, fisheries and ecological disruption.

Engineers questioned the risks associated with a structure of unprecedented scale, while economists debated whether smaller dams might deliver similar benefits with fewer social and environmental consequences.

These were serious issues, and the costs should not be dismissed.

Yet the project has unquestionably delivered the principal benefits its advocates promised: enormous quantities of electricity, dramatically improved Yangtze navigation and, most importantly, substantially strengthened flood protection for the middle Yangtze.

China knew the social and environmental costs, but it also recognised the enormous strategic benefits the project could bring.

And isn't the bottom line obvious for all to see?

Looking across these undertakings, I see something distinctive in the Chinese philosophical mindset: the willingness to conceive and pursue projects not merely for a five-year political cycle, but across several generations.

The story of 愚公移山 is therefore not merely an ancient fable. It is a living philosophy.

It teaches that seemingly impossible tasks become possible through persistence, patience, accumulated knowledge and the willingness of successive generations to carry on what their predecessors began.

The Yellow River, Three Gorges, Dujiangyan and the Great Green Wall are examples of that philosophy in practice.

And why am I not particularly worried about ASML and the likes that seem to be holding back China to some extent today?

Because I know China will overcome!

End 

The Good Work of the Aga Khan Family

Aga Khan IV

From time to time, I saw and heard the name Aga Khan during our journey through northern Pakistan. I first came across the name when a dear friend of mine, Ir. Ong Guan Teck, received an Aga Khan Award for Architecture in the 1980s. When our local tour manager told me that the Serena Hotel we stayed in, as well as another where we had lunch, belonged to the Aga Khan's network, I thought I should find out more about the family and share its story with my readers.

Apparently, the Aga Khan family has made extraordinary contributions to Pakistan, particularly in healthcare, education, rural development, cultural preservation and tourism.

What is particularly interesting is that the Aga Khan's activities combine philanthropy with commercial investment. Rather than relying entirely on charitable donations, the organisation establishes businesses intended to be commercially viable while contributing to economic and social development.

The Aga Khan I had heard about was, in fact, Prince Karim Aga Khan IV (1936–2025), the 49th hereditary Imam, or spiritual leader, of the Nizari Ismaili Muslims, a branch of Shia Islam. He assumed the position in 1957, when he was just 20 years old, and led the community for nearly 68 years. He died in Lisbon on 4 February 2025, aged 88.

His son, Prince Rahim Aga Khan V, succeeded him as the 50th Imam and now heads the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN).

The Aga Khan Foundation began operating in Pakistan in 1969. It reported reaching approximately 1.5 million people in Pakistan through its programmes in 2025.

One of its best-known institutions is Aga Khan University, established in Karachi in 1983. Its teaching hospital is a major private healthcare institution, providing specialist medical care, medical education and clinical research.

The network has also developed healthcare facilities serving remote and underserved communities, including those in the mountainous north of Pakistan.

Its educational investments extend beyond university education to schools, teacher training and early childhood development. What distinguishes the network is its emphasis on building permanent institutions and professional capacity rather than simply distributing charitable assistance.

The Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP), established in 1982, has played an important role in the development of Gilgit-Baltistan and Chitral. Its activities include improving agricultural productivity, constructing irrigation systems, developing micro-hydroelectric generation, supporting rural enterprises and expanding opportunities for women.

More than 180 small hydroelectric installations have reportedly been built to supply electricity to remote communities in Chitral. The programme emphasises community ownership and management rather than permanent dependence on external assistance.

There is also a substantial cultural conservation programme. Among its projects are the restoration of Baltit Fort and Altit Fort in Hunza, as well as the conservation of historic settlements along the old Silk Road, which we visited during our journey along the Karakoram Highway. Several of these projects have received UNESCO Asia-Pacific heritage conservation awards.

The Historical Origins of the Aga Khan Family
The Aga Khan family's history is equally fascinating. Like the Parsis of India, the family traces its origins to Persia, although their religious backgrounds and histories are quite different. Its subsequent relationship with British India and its influence in Pakistan, despite not being a Pakistani royal family, are equally interesting.

That story goes back to the nineteenth century, involves the British Empire and the princely courts of India, and helps explain the family's extraordinary international position today.

A landmark development was the Aga Khan Case of 1866, in which the Bombay High Court ruled substantially in favour of Aga Khan I. The judgment strengthened his legal authority over the Khoja Ismaili community and its religious institutions and communal property.

This is a significant historical point. The family's economic strength cannot be explained simply by inherited Persian wealth. Its authority over an established and commercially active religious community, reinforced by colonial legal institutions, was also important.

A distinguished forebear was Sir Sultan Muhammad Shah, Aga Khan III (1877–1957), who grew up within the British Indian political and social environment. He became a prominent Muslim leader, educational reformer and international diplomat.

In 1906, Aga Khan III led a delegation of prominent Indian Muslims to meet the British Viceroy, Lord Minto, at Simla. The delegation argued that Muslims should be recognised as a distinct political community and receive appropriate representation in the institutions of British India.

This contributed to the introduction of separate Muslim electorates under the Indian Councils Act of 1909.

The All-India Muslim League was established in December 1906, following the Simla delegation, and Aga Khan III subsequently became one of its early presidents.

This is historically significant because it was the same Muslim League that, decades later, under Muhammad Ali Jinnah, led the political movement for the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

Aga Khan III himself advocated Hindu-Muslim cooperation at different stages of his career. His political thinking should therefore not be equated simply with the later demand for partition.

Internationally, he achieved remarkable recognition. In 1937, he became president of the Assembly of the League of Nations, the predecessor of the United Nations.

Instead of passing the religious leadership to his son, he designated his 20-year-old grandson, Prince Karim Aga Khan IV, as his successor in 1957. The young Karim was then studying at Harvard University.

Over the following nearly 68 years, Aga Khan IV transformed the family's existing philanthropic, religious and economic institutions into a far more extensive international development network.

Importantly, these activities were not confined to Ismaili Muslims. The network deliberately served wider populations, regardless of their faith, ethnicity or background.

Where Did the Aga Khan Family's Enormous Wealth Originate?
The family's wealth and institutional resources developed from several sources over generations.

First, the early Aga Khans possessed property, social standing and influential connections in Persia.

Second, there were religious contributions. Ismaili followers traditionally made financial contributions to support the Imam and community institutions. These became an important foundation of the Imamat's resources.

Third, there were commercial investments. The family and its institutions developed substantial interests in financial services, industry, tourism and other enterprises.

Fourth, there was international development funding. The Aga Khan Development Network receives financial support from donors, institutional partners and governments for various programmes. Such funding supports development activities and should not be confused with the family's personal wealth.

There is one aspect of this history that deserves particular reflection.

The first Aga Khan benefited from a political alliance with British imperial power. His grandson, Aga Khan III, participated in the constitutional politics of British India, helping establish a political organisation that eventually became central to the movement for an independent Pakistan.

Yet the following generation, under Aga Khan IV, moved substantially away from conventional political activism towards institution-building, economic development and humanitarian work.

No one can say with certainty how much personal wealth the Aga Khan family possesses. Some estimates have placed it as high as US$13 billion, although these figures are difficult to substantiate, not least because of the distinction between personal wealth, religious institutional assets and the holdings of development enterprises.

What is more significant is that the Aga Khan family established an institutional structure capable of deploying more than a billion US dollars annually in non-profit development activities, alongside a substantial network of commercially operated enterprises.

Conclusion
I find the Aga Khan family's story remarkable, not so much because of its wealth or royal status, but because of what successive generations have managed to build.

The family has evolved from a position of religious authority, supported in part by its historical relationship with British imperial power, into the leadership of an extensive international network devoted to education, healthcare, economic development and the preservation of cultural heritage.

What particularly impresses me is its approach to philanthropy. Instead of merely giving money away, it has built institutions, developed enterprises and helped communities acquire the capacity to improve their own lives. In this respect, its philosophy goes well beyond conventional charity.

Of course, the Aga Khan family is not alone in using private wealth for public good. There are many wealthy individuals and foundations around the world doing admirable work. But few have combined religious leadership, commercial enterprise and long-term social development on such an extensive international scale.

During our journey through northern Pakistan, we saw some of the physical evidence of this work, particularly in the restoration of historic monuments and the development of tourism infrastructure.

I began this journey knowing little more about the Aga Khan than the name of an architectural award. I returned with a much greater appreciation of a family whose influence extends far beyond its own religious community.

To me, the most enduring legacy of the Aga Khan family will not be the size of its fortune, but the institutions it leaves behind and the lives they continue to improve.

End

 

The Precariousness of Pakistan's Present Leadership

There is substantial evidence that Pakistan's present civilian leadership suffers from low public approval, while the imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan remains one of the country's most popular political figures.

Khan has been imprisoned since August 2023, yet his political party continues to command significant support, while the governing coalition faces persistent questions about its electoral legitimacy.

But there is another important dimension to Pakistan's political situation: the military establishment remains a powerful force in the country's politics.

Its relationship with Khan is crucial to understanding the present crisis.

How Unpopular Is the Present Government?
Pakistan's current Prime Minister is Shehbaz Sharif, whose government is supported by a coalition led by the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP).

Sharif has been Prime Minister since March 2024, having previously served from April 2022 to August 2023.

His government's legitimacy has been contested by Imran Khan's party, particularly following the disputed February 2024 general election.

Discontent over economic conditions, inflation and the country's persistent political instability has added to the government's difficulties.

Imran Khan Remains a Formidable Political Figure
Khan is a former international cricket captain, founder of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), and Prime Minister from 2018 to 2022.

He has been imprisoned since August 2023 on charges arising from several cases, which he maintains are politically motivated.

Yet imprisonment has not extinguished his political influence.

Unpublished surveys continued to show PTI leading nationally and Khan remaining the country's most popular political leader. However, there is not without competition – from PML-N in Punjab and PPP in Sindh. This suggests that while Khan commands substantial popular support, his political dominance is not uniform across the country.

The 2024 Election Revealed the Strength of Khan's Support
The clearest electoral evidence came on 8 February 2024.

Despite Khan's imprisonment and restrictions imposed on his party, PTI-backed independent candidates won the largest number of directly elected seats in the National Assembly. However, PTI did not secure an outright parliamentary majority, and the PML-N and PPP were able to form a governing coalition.

The election was, however, controversial. International observers raised concerns about restrictions on PTI, interference in the electoral process and discrepancies in reported results.

Why Is Imran Khan So Popular?
Khan captained Pakistan to victory in the 1992 Cricket World Cup and became a national sporting hero long before entering politics.

He subsequently built his political career around an anti-corruption message, attacking the established political families, particularly the Sharifs and Bhutto-Zardaris, whom he accused of perpetuating corruption and patronage.

His message appealed particularly to younger voters and those disillusioned with Pakistan's traditional political establishment.

After his removal from office in 2022, Khan increasingly challenged Pakistan's military leadership.

This appears to have reinforced his appeal among voters who resent military interference in civilian politics.

However, Khan's own record is not without controversy.

His government struggled with economic difficulties, while opposition parties also faced corruption prosecutions and political pressure during his premiership. His popularity therefore should not be confused with a universally favourable assessment of his performance in office.

The Military: Pakistan's Most Powerful Political Institution?
To understand Pakistani politics, one must examine the role of its military establishment, presently headed by Field Marshal Asim Munir.

Pakistan's military has exercised considerable influence over civilian governments for decades, including through prolonged periods of direct military rule.

Khan's relationship with the military illustrates this recurring pattern rather well.

In 2018, his rise to power was widely regarded as having benefited from the support of the military establishment.

However, the relationship subsequently deteriorated, particularly over military appointments and questions of civilian authority.

By 2022, Khan had lost his parliamentary majority and was removed through a constitutional vote of no confidence.

He subsequently blamed powerful political and military interests for his downfall.

Ironically, the institution that was once seen as having helped his political ascent became the principal target of his political attacks.

And rather than destroying his popularity, the confrontation appears to have strengthened his standing among many Pakistanis who are tired of military involvement in politics.

Pakistan's Political Dilemma
The present situation reflects three competing centres of power.

The first is the civilian government, which holds office through a parliamentary coalition.

The second is Imran Khan and his PTI party, which retain substantial electoral and popular support.

The third is the military establishment, which possesses considerable institutional power and influence over national affairs.

Pakistan's political tensions are therefore not simply a contest between a popular opposition leader and an unpopular prime minister.

They also concern the relationship between civilian authority, electoral legitimacy, judicial independence and military power.

The country has experienced repeated military interventions since independence in 1947. Civilian governments have often struggled to complete their terms, while political leaders who once enjoyed military support have subsequently fallen out with the generals.

It is a recurring cycle that has done little to strengthen the country's democratic institutions.

Conclusion
There is a remarkable historical irony in Pakistan's politics. Its military establishment has repeatedly helped political leaders rise, only to confront them once they have become sufficiently independent or powerful.

Imran Khan's experience appears to be another chapter in this recurring pattern.

The question is not simply whether Khan is more popular than Shehbaz Sharif, or whether he should be released from prison. The more fundamental question is whether Pakistan can ever develop a political system in which elected civilian leaders are allowed to govern without being constantly overshadowed by the military establishment.

No country can expect sustained political stability if its elected leadership is repeatedly undermined by forces operating outside the normal democratic process.

Pakistan has enormous potential. It possesses a large population, substantial human resources, an important geographical location and valuable economic opportunities arising from its relationships with China, the US and the wider region.

Yet much of that potential continues to be frustrated by political instability and institutional rivalries.

Until Pakistan resolves the imbalance between civilian political authority and military power, it may continue to change its governments without fundamentally changing the way it is governed.

End

Pakistan: Between China and the US

During our journey along the Karakoram Highway, we came across evidence of China's extensive involvement in Pakistan's infrastructure development.

China is participating in three major projects along the highway, two involving enormous hydroelectric dams and the third involving the reconstruction and realignment of the highway itself.

The Diamer-Bhasha Dam
The first is the Diamer-Bhasha Dam, a huge 4,500 MW hydroelectric and water-storage project near Chilas.

Unlike a conventional hydroelectric installation, Diamer-Bhasha is also intended to regulate the flow of the Indus River, support irrigation and reduce the amount of sediment entering downstream reservoirs.

The Dasu Hydropower Project
The second is the Dasu Hydropower Project, another gigantic dam being constructed downstream on the Indus River. Its ultimate planned generating capacity is 4,320 MW.

Unlike Diamer-Bhasha, Dasu is substantially financed by the World Bank, although its principal construction contractor is Chinese.

The Karakoram Highway
The third project involves the reconstruction and realignment of approximately 62 kilometres of the Karakoram Highway, including tunnels, bridges and new sections of road.

This is closely connected to the dam projects.

When the Dasu reservoir is filled, a substantial section of the existing Karakoram Highway will disappear beneath the water. Pakistan therefore has to construct a replacement highway along the mountainsides at higher elevations. Plans for the alternative route include 15 tunnels and nine arch bridges.

The Karakoram Highway is not simply a road serving Pakistan's northern communities. It is the principal established overland highway connection between Pakistan and China's Xinjiang region, crossing the border at Khunjerab Pass.

It is consequently an important component of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

China is also helping to develop Gwadar Port, a deep-water port on Pakistan's Arabian Sea coast. The port is intended to connect through Pakistan's road network to the Karakoram Highway, which leads all the way to the Chinese border at Khunjerab Pass.

This is a central part of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC, 中巴经济走廊), a flagship project of China's Belt and Road Initiative.

How the Route Connects

The approximately 2,700-km corridor is designed to run from Gwadar Port through Pakistan's road network to the Karakoram Highway, and onwards to Khunjerab Pass at the Pakistan–China border.

From there, the road continues to Kashgar in China's Xinjiang region.

The corridor has several alternative alignments rather than one continuous, newly constructed expressway. Some sections have been completed, others are being upgraded, and Gwadar has yet to realise its intended commercial capacity.

The corridor offers western China an alternative trade route to the Arabian Sea, reducing its dependence on shipping routes through the Strait of Malacca. Gwadar is also close to the Strait of Hormuz, through which substantial Gulf oil shipments pass.

However, moving large quantities of cargo across the Karakoram mountains presents major logistical and economic challenges, notwithstanding the strategic attraction of the corridor.

China already has a substantial road network connecting Khunjerab Pass to Kashgar (喀什) in Xinjiang, and from Kashgar onwards to Urumqi and the rest of China. The route from Khunjerab to Kashgar is a well-paved mountain highway, although not yet a continuous four-lane expressway. Beyond Kashgar, China's modern expressway network takes over.

Kashgar is also connected by railway to Xinjiang's main rail network, allowing freight to transfer from road to rail.

The road connection from Pakistan to China is therefore not merely theoretical. It is already carrying commercial traffic.

However, the capacity and economics required to turn Gwadar–Khunjerab–Kashgar into a major international freight artery remain a concern.

For goods destined for western China, especially Xinjiang, the corridor could have considerable value. For goods headed to China's eastern industrial centres, its advantages over established sea routes are much less clear.

Better roads and more reliable electricity could also encourage tourism, regional trade and industrial development.

There is also a geopolitical dimension. India claims Gilgit-Baltistan as part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and objects to Chinese-supported infrastructure development in the territory. China and Pakistan reject India's objections to their cooperation.

Security is another challenge. Chinese engineers and Pakistani workers have faced militant attacks, particularly in connection with the Dasu project.

Nevertheless, these developments illustrate the depth of China's long-term economic and strategic engagement with Pakistan.

But Pakistan was not always so closely associated with China.

For several decades, it was one of America's closest strategic partners in Asia.

The US and Pakistan: From Close Allies to Deep Mutual Distrust

The US–Pakistan relationship is one of the more intriguing stories in modern geopolitics.

For decades, Pakistan was among America's closest strategic partners in Asia. Yet, in May 2011, American special forces secretly entered Pakistan, killed Osama bin Laden in a residential compound near a major Pakistani military academy, and departed without informing the Pakistani government beforehand.

How did two supposed allies end up in such an extraordinary situation?

The answer lies in the nature of their relationship.

The US–Pakistan partnership was built less on shared values than on strategic necessity. Each needed the other at different times, frequently for very different reasons.

Pakistan Was America's Cold War Ally

Following the partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan found itself confronting a much larger and militarily stronger neighbour, India.

Under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India pursued a policy of non-alignment, refusing to formally join either the American or Soviet bloc.

Pakistan made a different calculation.

Its leadership believed an alliance with the United States would provide military assistance, financial support and diplomatic leverage against India.

Washington, meanwhile, wanted countries along the Soviet Union's southern periphery to help contain communism.

The arrangement suited both sides.

In 1954, Pakistan signed a mutual defence assistance agreement with the US. It subsequently joined two Western-backed security organisations:

• SEATO (1954) — the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, intended to contain communist expansion in Asia.
• The Baghdad Pact (1955) — subsequently renamed CENTO, intended to contain Soviet influence in the Middle East and surrounding regions. 

Pakistan received substantial American military equipment, training and economic assistance.

However, the fundamental contradiction was apparent from the beginning.

America viewed Pakistan primarily as an ally against Soviet communism. Pakistan viewed America primarily as a source of support against India.

When Pakistan fought India in 1965, Washington suspended military assistance to both countries.

Pakistan felt betrayed because it depended far more heavily on American weapons than India did.

This difference in expectations would repeatedly undermine their relationship.

Pakistan Helps America Open the Door to China
There is an interesting episode in which Pakistan played a vital role in international diplomacy.

In the late 1960s, President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger wanted to establish relations with the People's Republic of China.

At that time, Washington and Beijing had no formal diplomatic relations. Pakistan, however, enjoyed friendly relations with both countries.

In July 1971, Kissinger secretly travelled from Pakistan to Beijing, using an official visit to Islamabad and a purported period of illness as cover.

The mission helped prepare the way for Nixon's historic visit to China in February 1972.

Pakistan had thus become an important intermediary in one of the twentieth century's most consequential diplomatic breakthroughs.

Yet this did not eliminate the contradictions in its relationship with Washington.

During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, which led to the independence of Bangladesh, Nixon favoured Pakistan's military government for geopolitical reasons, despite mounting evidence of atrocities in East Pakistan.

America's relationship with Pakistan was clearly driven more by strategic calculations than by consistent political or humanitarian principles.

Pakistan Becomes Indispensable to America's War Against the Soviet Union

This was perhaps the high point of US–Pakistan strategic cooperation.

In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

For Washington, the invasion presented an opportunity to weaken its principal Cold War adversary.

Pakistan, led by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, became the principal staging ground for the covert American effort to support the Afghan resistance.

The CIA coordinated much of the American programme, while Saudi Arabia also provided substantial financial support.

Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) became the principal intermediary between foreign sponsors and Afghan mujahideen groups.

This arrangement gave Pakistan considerable influence over which Afghan resistance groups received assistance.

The United States also supplied Pakistan with advanced F-16 fighter aircraft and substantial financial assistance.

The Unintended Consequences

The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989.

From Washington's perspective, a major Cold War objective had been achieved. But the regional consequences were far more complicated.

The war had strengthened armed Islamist networks, entrenched Pakistan's intelligence involvement in Afghanistan and facilitated the development of militant organisations that would later threaten regional and international security.

Then there was Osama bin Laden.

He was a Saudi who developed his own networks supporting Arab volunteers in Afghanistan.

Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, there is no convincing documentary evidence that the CIA directly recruited or trained bin Laden. Its principal assistance programme operated through Pakistan's ISI and predominantly supported Afghan resistance groups.

Nevertheless, the anti-Soviet war created an environment in which bin Laden and other transnational militants could develop their organisations.

Al-Qaeda emerged in 1988, during the final stages of the Afghan war.

After the Soviet withdrawal, America's interest in Pakistan declined.

In 1990, Washington suspended substantial military assistance because of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme.

Pakistan once again felt that America had used it and then abandoned it.

September 11: Pakistan Becomes America's Ally Again

On 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda attacked the United States, killing nearly 3,000 people.

At the time, Afghanistan was governed by the Taliban, whose regime had close historical connections with Pakistan's security establishment.

The US demanded that Pakistan cooperate in its campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

President Pervez Musharraf, who had seized power in a military coup in 1999, agreed.

Pakistan offered intelligence cooperation, logistical support, access to airspace and assistance with American military operations in Afghanistan.

The US, in return, lifted important sanctions and resumed extensive military and economic assistance.

But there was a serious problem.

Washington wanted Pakistan to destroy militant organisations operating from its territory.

Pakistan's security establishment, however, distinguished between militants threatening Pakistan itself and Afghan groups it considered potentially useful for maintaining influence in Afghanistan.

Consequently, while Pakistan assisted the US in capturing numerous al-Qaeda operatives, elements of the Afghan Taliban and allied militant networks continued to find refuge on Pakistani soil.

This became the central source of American suspicion.

Pakistan was effectively cooperating with Washington against some militants while maintaining relationships with other groups Washington was fighting.

It was a contradiction that could not be sustained indefinitely.

The Abbottabad Raid: 2 May 2011
This was one of the most extraordinary covert military operations in modern history.

For nearly ten years after the September 11 attacks, Osama bin Laden had evaded American intelligence agencies.

The prevailing assumption was that he was hiding somewhere in the remote mountainous borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Instead, he was living in Abbottabad, a garrison town north of Islamabad, not far from the prestigious Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul.

This was precisely what made his discovery so shocking.

The CIA had spent years tracing the movements of one of bin Laden's trusted couriers.

By 2010, American intelligence had identified a suspicious residential compound in Abbottabad. The success of the subsequent assault in May 2011 is now history.

Bin Laden's body was later buried at sea from the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson.

The extraordinary fact was that the Americans had deliberately not informed Pakistan beforehand.

Washington feared that advance warning might compromise the operation and allow bin Laden to escape.

This was a remarkable reflection of how little trust remained between the two supposed allies.

It also raised an uncomfortable question: How could Pakistan's powerful ISI have been completely unaware of bin Laden's presence in a town so closely associated with the military establishment?

Was it an extraordinary intelligence failure, or had some individuals knowingly protected him?

Pakistan subsequently established the Abbottabad Commission to investigate the affair. Its findings exposed serious institutional failures but did not conclusively establish whether bin Laden had received official protection.

The question remains troubling.

Relations deteriorated further in November 2011 when a NATO airstrike near the Afghan border killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan responded by closing NATO supply routes through its territory.

By then, the relationship had become deeply strained.

Pakistan's Gradual Movement Towards China
China and Pakistan had already developed strong relations since the 1960s, largely because of their respective strategic concerns involving India.

Over time, China became an important supplier of military equipment and technology to Pakistan.

Chinese assistance also contributed to Pakistan's defence-industrial capabilities, including the jointly developed JF-17 fighter aircraft.

The relationship expanded substantially with the announcement of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor in 2015.

Projects included power stations, highways, port infrastructure and industrial initiatives.

China offered Pakistan something the US had often been reluctant to provide: sustained involvement in major infrastructure development, alongside an extensive defence relationship.

The gigantic dam and highway projects we encountered during our journey are examples of this continuing partnership.

A Pakistan Astronaut in China’s Tiangong Space Station

It will happen during the next crew rotation, reportedly aboard Shenzhou-24 (神舟二十四号). The launch date is scheduled for November 2026.

Muhammad Zeeshan Ali and Khurram Daud have been undergoing training in Beijing. One will be selected for the mission. However, the successful candidate will spend approximately one week aboard Tiangong, rather than the usual six-month rotation of Chinese astronauts. The Pakistani astronaut will serve as a payload specialist, conducting scientific experiments involving biotechnology, materials and other research.

He would become the first Pakistani in space and the first foreign astronaut aboard China's Tiangong station.

There is another interesting development: Pakistan is also preparing a domestically built robotic rover to participate in China's Chang'e-8 lunar mission, currently planned for around 2028.

These demonstrate that China–Pakistan cooperation has expanded beyond roads, dams, ports and military equipment into advanced scientific and space technology.

Top of Form

Bottom of Form

However, Pakistan did not simply abandon Washington.

It continued to maintain relationships with both powers, attempting to benefit from its strategic importance to each.

Remember Operation Sindoor?
India decided to strike targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir on 7 May 2025, following a terrorist attack on tourists in Indian-administered Kashmir two weeks earlier.

Twenty-six civilians were killed, including 25 Indians and one Nepali national. Most of the victims were Hindu men.

India accused Pakistan-based militants associated with a UN-designated terrorist organisation of carrying out the attack. Pakistan denied involvement and called for an independent investigation.

Regardless, India struck.

Sindoor is the red vermilion powder traditionally worn by many married Hindu women, particularly along the parting of their hair, to signify their married status.

India chose the name as a symbolic reference to the women whose husbands were murdered in the Pahalgam attack.

It was therefore both a military operation and a highly emotional political message to the Indian public.

In its response, Pakistan inflicted losses on India's attacking aircraft, including the formidable French-made Rafale fighter jets.

Pakistan's success in shooting down Indian aircraft received considerable international attention. Yet, even after India's military leadership acknowledged aircraft losses, some AI platforms continued to be reluctant to acknowledge the significance of the episode, citing insufficient evidence concerning the precise number and types of aircraft lost. (I wrote about this in my blog in May 2025.)

The ceasefire stopped the immediate fighting. Nonetheless, India celebrated its supposed "victory" regardless.

The confrontation also woke up many armchair military analysts to the capabilities of Chinese military aircraft.

The Chinese-made J-10C, in its export J-10CE version, had demonstrated what it could potentially achieve in modern aerial combat. And that was only the J-10CE. What about China's newer generations of fighter aircraft?

Where Do US–Pakistan Relations Stand Today?
Interestingly, relations between Washington and Islamabad have improved since 2025, following years of friction.

In September 2025, President Donald Trump hosted Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir at the White House.

Pakistan subsequently increased its diplomatic engagement with Washington, particularly concerning regional security, trade and mediation involving Iran.

China remains Pakistan's principal long-term infrastructure and defence partner, while the US continues to be an important market and a significant financial and diplomatic interlocutor.

Pakistan therefore finds itself balancing relations with two major powers whose own strategic rivalry has been intensifying.

Conclusion
The history of US–Pakistan relations illustrates a recurring pattern.

During the Cold War, Washington needed Pakistan to help contain the Soviet Union.

In the early 1970s, Pakistan helped Washington establish contact with China.

In the 1980s, Pakistan became indispensable to America's covert war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

After September 11, it was once again needed for America's war against terrorism.

Yet whenever American strategic priorities changed, Pakistan frequently found itself sidelined or subjected to pressure.

The fundamental problem was that Washington and Islamabad rarely shared the same long-term objectives.

America saw Pakistan through the lens of its global priorities. Pakistan's overriding concerns were its security against India, its influence in Afghanistan and its ability to obtain external economic and military support.

The Abbottabad episode was perhaps the clearest illustration of the contradictions in their relationship.

After decades of military cooperation and billions of dollars in assistance, the Americans did not trust Pakistan sufficiently to inform it before entering its territory to eliminate Osama bin Laden.

And Pakistan, despite being America's ally in the war against terrorism, had allowed militant networks hostile to American interests to operate from its territory.

Now China has emerged as Pakistan's most dependable long-term strategic partner, particularly in defence and infrastructure development.

Yet Islamabad continues to cultivate Washington.

Pakistan has learnt to make use of its strategic geography. Situated between China, India, Afghanistan and Iran, it has repeatedly found ways to remain relevant to competing powers.

Whether it can continue balancing China and the US as their rivalry intensifies is another question altogether.

End