What’s Being Chinese – After Beijing’s September 3 Military Parade?

The hugely anticipated parade is finally over. I glued my eyes to the live telecast. I must confess I was a little disappointed, for I thought it would be grander. I suppose I was expecting too much.

Yes, the presentation appeared a little conventional to me – the uniformed services’ columns were as neat and tight as before, but the closeness of the weaponry did not exude the level of awe I had anticipated. The flow looked a little casual to me, never mind the more prominent and frightful ones from the US perspective – like the awesome DF61, DF-5C, and DF-31BJ ICBMs, the DF-21D “Carrier Killers”, the DF-26 “Guam Killers”, and the D-10 Cruise Missiles.

I do not propose to enumerate the 70-plus pieces of cutting-edge weaponry China displayed in the parade; readers have certainly been spoiled for choice from the podcasts streaming out these few days! But there is something that many might have missed – the introduction of three newly established formations: the Information Support Force, the Military Aerospace Force, and the Cyberspace Force, accompanied by their latest equipment. The debut signals Beijing’s drive to reshape its combat doctrine by integrating advanced technologies into cross-force joint operations.

Another weapon worth highlighting is its LY-1 laser system, which can intercept drones, cruise missiles, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft. It offers precise, yet low-cost-per-shot elimination of threats without physical destruction.

Noticeably absent was the display of China’s naval power and its 6^th generation stealth fighters and bombers and formidable wholesome warfare and defence systems. Some visual effects should have been designed to project that during the parade, not to mention many of the weapons that are currently being developed with some of the “dark” technology the country already possesses.

Nonetheless, its intended message to the US and Japan was loud and clear: Don’t mess with us. We are more than ready and capable of defeating you if you try to be funny!

Strange, though: why am I talking about the US’s fears when the parade was a celebration to mark the 80th anniversary of the defeat of Japan and fascism?

The US was China’s strongest ally in World War II, and their common enemy in the Asia-Pacific theatre was Japan. (Strictly speaking, Taiwan was also a part of Japan then; many of the soldiers ravaging Southeast Asia were Taiwanese!)

Let’s be honest: Despite its efforts and sacrifices, China by itself did not defeat Japan.

This might be the reason Japan has never formally apologized. They have always thought Han Chinese were inferior beings – to them China has been ruled or ravaged by non-Hans several times over the last two millennia! And I suppose Japanese will always harbour this: Why can’t we ascend to be one too?

Even before the US formally entered the conflict, General Claire Chennault’s “Flying Tigers” played a dramatic and crucial role in helping China during the war. The Flying Tigers were composed of about 100 US volunteer pilots and around 200 ground crew. They were recruited by the Chinese Nationalist government to protect China’s vital supply routes, especially the Burma Road, defend Chinese cities from Japanese bombing raids, and provide direct combat support to Chinese ground forces. In just about seven months (Dec 1941 to July 1942), they achieved an extraordinary kill ratio. They intercepted Japanese bombers attacking Kunming, Rangoon, and other key cities, saving countless civilian lives. At a time when China was struggling and US fortunes were low after Pearl Harbor, the Flying Tigers gave a badly needed morale boost.

(In July 1942, this volunteer group disbanded and was absorbed into the US Army Air Force under Chennault’s continued leadership. He then commanded the 14th Air Force in China, extending American air support throughout the war.)

The Flying Tigers became a symbol of US-China wartime cooperation, remembered in both countries as a heroic example of solidarity against Japanese aggression.

Contrary to Trump’s criticism that Xi did not acknowledge US help during the war[i], their descendants had in fact been invited to attend the September 3 parade. (I thought Xi would mention the vital role of the US and the UK in fighting World War II and fascism, which was core object of the celebration; unfortunately, he did not. The magnanimity would certainly have neutralised the ill feelings of the leaders of these two countries who, in the first place, had opted to stay away from the celebration.)

Chennault’s daughter Cynthia and his granddaughter Nell Calloway were among those honoured. In addition, Elyn MacInnis, whose father-in-law was among the Flying Tigers, was also invited to witness the parade. Beyond the parade, the Flying Tigers' legacy continues to be actively commemorated:

• Exhibitions honouring their wartime service have recently opened in Chongqing, Liuzhou, and Fujian—some timed with the 80th anniversary of WWII’s end. Descendants were invited to contribute materials and visit.
• Delegations of veterans and family descendants have travelled to China repeatedly – laying wreaths, attending exhibitions, and strengthening the long-standing memory of cooperative wartime resistance.

And what a twist of events after the war – Japan became the darling of the US, and China, the bad guy!

Reaction in Taiwan

ChatGPT estimated that only about one million people in the island watched the Sept 3 parade live on news channels. However, I read somewhere that another five million Taiwanese watched it online via other media – YouTube, news sites, social media livestreams. The parade has certainly put paid to the DPP government’s propaganda that China is only a paper tiger. Recent feedback gives the impression that people in Taiwan are more receptive to the idea of becoming part of a unified China.

The Renaming of the Pentagon to the Department of War

Two days after the parade, Trump signed an executive order that officially rebrands the US Department of Defense as the Department of War, and the Secretary of Defense as the Secretary of War. Is this a coincidence? I say it is not. And I am afraid this vindictive man is going to come up with new ways to try to break China.

Let’s hear some of the other reactions:
Most western leaders are still in the state of denial or outright being hypocritical, even though they are still being bullied left, right and centre by Trump and his Sycophants.

• EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, could only express concern over the growing alignment among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, characterising it as a potential threat to the rules-based international order. She is still sleeping! Her home country Estonia may become another Ukraine, if it continues to marginalise the ethnic Russians in the country.

• Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico – one of the few Western leaders to attend – encouraged the West to take the event seriously. He noted that Xi’s message emphasised a choice between peace and war, and he criticised the absence of EU leaders, suggesting they miscalculated by opting out.

• The Financial Times (via Western analyst commentary) warned that Xi and Kim Jong Un’s meeting amid the parade signals the emergence of an “autocratic alliance,” which has raised alarm across Europe. Another broken record?

• South Korea, Japan, and the US promptly announced renewed “Freedom Edge” defence drills, signalling pushback and alliance-strengthening in Asia. Let’s see how long they can talk tough, given the fact that US is losing steam on QUAD, etc.

• Former Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews’s attendance – especially alongside Putin and Kim – drew some silly domestic backlash, but in reality, he is one of the few Australian politicians who understands realpolitik. This is indeed a chance to engage with real regional leaders.

The official line from Japan

Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi said, “We will continue to gather and analyse information (on cooperation among Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang) with serious interest to assess its impact on regional security.” He further claimed that China’s increased assertiveness in the East and South China Seas raises concern, asserting that any unilateral change to the status quo by force is absolutely unacceptable. But at the same time, he expressed Japan’s desire to advance a strategic, mutually beneficial relationship with China—one that fosters stability through constructive dialogue.

Stop your rhetoric, Hayashi-san, the writing is on the wall. China today is no longer the China of mid-1800s. Unfortunately, Militarist Japan only understands if the sword is on the back of their necks.

(Readers might want to know that a former prime minister of Japan actually attended the parade: Yukio Hatoyama[ii]. He said, “I, as a Japanese, attended the commemoration with a sense of reflection and remorse. I am grateful to have been invited to take part in the ceremony; it was highly meaningful.” He further remarked that he was deeply struck by the conviction that Japan must learn from history in order to face the future.)

And from the Philippines

Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. described the event as an act of intimidation to smaller nations like theirs. He went on to criticise China’s attempt to “reshape” World War II history, warning that such revisionism could erase the atrocities committed under regimes like Mao’s in China and Stalin’s in Russia. Obviously, he has not read history.

He obviously does not know what the Japanese had done to the Filipinos during World War II. Also, does China need to use any of these new gears to fight the Philippines?

Be that as it may…

The message is clear:

        One: Militarily, China is already stronger than any country in the world.

The US has more nuclear warheads than China (so does Russia), but unless it is prepared to see the whole world destroyed, this numerical superiority, together with all its nuclear submarines, which are still believed to be technologically more advanced than China’s, is irrelevant. So are its mighty aircraft carrier strike groups; they are largely lame ducks now in the wake of China’s DF-21Ds now.

 

(A very common self-consoling, ostrich-like conclusion from many western armchair military analysts is that China’s military has not battle-tested. Long live their complacency!)

 

        Two: The Global South has accepted China as their champion.

With Trump shooting everyone and also himself in the foot, who can count on the US today? NATO is irrelevant to the Global South, so is much of EU, which is now totally pre-occupied with trying to prop up Ukraine in the name of defending Europe.

 

The only country that can help the Global South fight and uphold fairness in the world is China.

 

What’s meant to be Chinese today?
Much of what is going to be said below is my personal take and advocacy. Certainly, much of it will also not go down well with many readers. Do feel free to disagree!

First of all, is there a common definition of “Chinese”?

I think this is still a question that cannot be easily answered today.

Naturally, those who live in China are Chinese. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) officially recognises 56 ethnic groups (民族 mín-zú) as Chinese, and they are treated equally. Historically, after the 1911 Revolution, Sun Yat-sen and the early Republic of China (ROC) promoted the idea of a “Republic of Five Nationalities” (五族共和 Wǔ-zú Gòng-hé) – Han (汉), Manchu (满), Mongol (蒙), Hui (回, Chinese Muslims), and Tibetan (藏). There were, of course, many others such as Zhuang, Uyghur, Miao, and so on. The republic’s flag (1912–1928) carried five stripes, each representing one of these nationalities.

Today Han Chinese account for about 91–92% of the population. I believe the majority of the minorities in China today are happy to identify themselves as Chinese. (I visited Xinjiang just a couple of months ago, and judging from what I saw, there is really no reason for me to believe otherwise.) Nonetheless, history, religion, culture, and mutual prejudices will always be exploited by the West to try to divide and weaken China. Therefore, the PRC government must always maintain the highest level of vigilance, hence the West’s persistent demonisation of China.

Outside mainland China, the definition becomes a little tricky.

Many non-mainland people of Chinese ancestry are still struggling with their identity. The question “Am I Chinese?” has often troubled them, especially to the descendants of early immigrants to the US, Canada, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as the younger generations in Southeast Asia and even in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Many in Hong Kong are still reluctant to identify themselves as Chinese, even though the former British colony has been returned to China in 1997, albeit under a one-country-two-systems manner; they rather call themselves Hong Kongers instead. About 30% of Taiwanese, though still practising Chinese culture, actually look up to Japan as their “fatherland”. To call them Chinese is a “please don’t insult me” no-no, for to them the name connotes backwardness and crudeness. CPC (the Communist Party of China)[iii] is an archaic ideology and represents everything they have been brought up to hate: Totalitarianism, autocracy, and what-have-you.

Distinguished historian and sinologist Wang Gungwu (王赓武, b. 1930) has spent decades trying to define what it means to be Chinese. He has just released a new book titled Roads to Chinese Modernity: Civilisation and National Culture, which is basically a compilation of many of his speeches before. In this book he writes how China has struggled to earn its place in the world today – from a dying dynasty to an infant republic, to the chaos of the warlord years, to the atrocities committed by the Japanese, to Mao’s victory in 1949, to the madness of the Cultural Revolution, to Deng Xiaoping’s reawakening of China, and to what is China today under Xi Jinping. He argues objectively and quite persuasively how the CPC government has been trying to find modernity during all these years. To him international laws were new to the PRC, and the country might not have acted in a manner that was deemed “correct” to the international, meaning, western-centric, community. Corruption has been a key problem in China and Xi is now going all out to get rid of this cancer. To Wang, China needs a strong hand, and the CPC is China’s emperor today. Period.

Wang is genuine to this day; unfortunately, his views on China, I heard, have not always been well regarded by Chinese leaders. (Even to many alumni of the former Nanyang University, Wang is still being blamed for eroding the university’s Chinese identity.)

Wang was born in Surabaya (then Dutch East Indies) to Chinese scholar parents from Jiangsu. As a child, he moved with his family to Ipoh in the then British Malaya, where he spent most of his formative years. His parents instilled in him a strong grounding in both Chinese classics and English education.

In the aftermath of World War II, Wang was sent to study at the National Central University in Nanjing. However, he had to abort his studies there due to the escalating civil war. He returned to Malaya and enrolled at the University of Malaya in Singapore, graduating with first-class honours in History in 1953. He later earned his PhD in Chinese history from the University of London in 1957.

Wang began his academic career at the University of Malaya, later becoming Professor of Far Eastern History at the Australian National University (ANU). He also served as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Hong Kong (1986–1995). After that, he moved to Singapore, where he became Director (1996–2006) and later Chairman of the Board (2007–2019) of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He is now University Professor at NUS, though he has retained his Australian citizenship.

He is therefore most eminently qualified to speak about China, define “Chinese”, and talk about Chineseness, both the good and ugly sides of it.

“China” itself is a foreign term; nobody really knows for certain how it came about. Yet most of us have resigned ourselves to using “Chinese” to describe ourselves. We can also call ourselves Zhōngguó-rén (中國人), but technically, Zhōngguó-rén refers specifically to people of China.

We can also refer to ourselves as Huá-rén (华人), a term that emphasises cultural or ethnic identity over national citizenship.

Wang draws a key distinction between Huá-yì (华裔), meaning ethnic Chinese – someone of Chinese ancestry living outside China and who is a citizen of another country – and Huá-qiáo (华侨), which refers more accurately to overseas Chinese who retain their Chinese citizenship or nationality, which not too many Huá-rén do now.

Regardless of whether we consider ourselves Huá-yì, or Australian, or American, as long as we are ethnically Chinese, we should take pride in being Chinese, for our shared heritage and ancestry, regardless of our citizenship.

Conclusion

But will this September 3 watershed event change our concept of ourselves?

The parade has shown that the Chinese are a hugely patriotic, determined and disciplined people. They are tireless innovators, not the copycats that Western critics love to brand them. And do believe this: China does not seek to replace the US or exploit other countries; its leadership simply wants the Chinese people to live a better tomorrow. Take a deep look at Xi, and you will see how different he is from Trump and all the pseudo-leaders of the Western world.

Even though we may not share CPC’s ideology or concept of governance, we have to admit that it has done much for China and for “Chinese” all over the world. Minimally, you are no longer being seen or treated as a second-class being in any part of the world. You should stand tall as Hua-ren and use our DNA traits to help the world.

And let’s not forget; there are many aspects of Chineseness that are still deemed ugly even by our own kind. Let’s help to eliminate them.

 

End

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[i] Trump described the spectacle as a “beautiful ceremony” and “very, very impressive.” He added, “But I understood the reason they were doing it … they were hoping I was watching—and I was watching.” However, he twitted this: “Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against The United States of America.” He also noted that China’s official ceremony omitted mention of the U.S.’s significant contributions to the Allied victory in WWII, stating that the U.S. “helped China very, very much.”

So, to sum it up: Trump’s off-the-cuff reaction was a mix of grudging admiration for the showmanship, a self-aware nod to its symbolic intent, and pointed criticism framed as historical grievance toward Xi’s narrative.

[ii] Hatoyama often frames his political outlook within a family tradition of advocating friendship with China:

• Great-grandfather (Kazuo Hatoyama, 1856–1911)
  A prominent politician in the late Meiji era, he served as Speaker of the House of Representatives. Historical accounts note that he, unlike many contemporaries, believed in cultivating good relations with China rather than pursuing purely expansionist policies.
• Grandfather (Ichirō Hatoyama, 1883–1959)
  Prime Minister of Japan (1954–1956) and founder of the Liberal Democratic Party. He worked toward postwar normalization of Japan’s diplomacy and emphasized reconciliation in Asia. Although normalization with China came later (1972), Ichirō’s foreign policy line leaned toward independence from U.S. dominance and greater engagement with Asian neighbour’s, including China and the Soviet Union.
• Father (Iichirō Hatoyama, 1918–1993)
  Foreign Minister under Prime Minister Takeo Miki in the mid-1970s. He was instrumental in promoting Japan–China normalization after 1972 and actively pushed for economic and cultural exchanges with Beijing.
• Yukio Hatoyama (b. 1947)
  As Prime Minister (2009–2010) and later as a private citizen, he continued this lineage, calling for an East Asian Community and repeatedly apologizing for Japan’s wartime aggression in China. His appearance at the 2025 parade was widely portrayed in Chinese media - as the type of remorse Japan should show to China. 

Across three generations (grandfather, father, and himself, plus even earlier family roots) the Hatoyamas have been associated with a relatively China-friendly orientation in Japanese politics.

 [iii] The correct acronym for the ruling party in China is “CPC”, which stands for the Communist Party of China. This is the official translation used by the party itself and by the Chinese government in English-language communications.

Why the confusion between “CPC” and “CCP”?

• “CPC” is the party’s own preferred and official translation, used in all state publications, press briefings, and diplomatic communications.
• “CCP” (Chinese Communist Party) is more commonly used in Western media, academia, and public discourse, especially in the U.S., but it’s technically not the official name.
• The use of “CCP” is sometimes deliberate in political contexts — to emphasize “Chinese” over “Communist” or vice versa, depending on intent — and in some cases can carry ideological undertones or be perceived as pejorative by Beijing.

Scholarly Discussion

• Scholars such as Kerry Brown, Timothy Cheek, and David Shambaugh have pointed out that using “CPC” shows precision and neutrality, especially in formal or diplomatic contexts.
• Meanwhile, others argue that “CCP” reflects long-standing English usage and is not inherently biased unless used in specific rhetorical frames.