Xi’s “Purge” of China’s Military - Zeekr and Zika

China's Zeekr

The removal of Zhang Youxia (张又侠), Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Liu Zhenli (刘振立), also a CMC member and Chief of Staff, a few days ago has sent shockwaves around the world. They have been placed under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law,” a euphemism for corruption or political disloyalty.

Is this a deep leadership restructuring taking place in China, or something else?

Since Xi became CMC Chairman in 2012, he has pushed a major anti-corruption drive into the military, restructuring its leadership to ensure loyalty and strengthen centralised control. In recent years, particularly from 2023 to the present, the pace and prominence of removals have accelerated, including the unprecedented fall of sitting CMC vice chairmen and other top commanders.

A couple of months ago — in October last year — He Weidong (何卫东) became the first sitting CMC Vice Chairman to be removed since the Cultural Revolution era. Removed together with him was Miao Hua (苗华), Director of the CMC Political Work Department, who was widely regarded as a Xi loyalist. Also removed at the same time were seven other full generals:

1. He Hongjun (何宏军), Executive Deputy Director, CMC Political Work Department
2. Wang Xiubin (王秀斌), Executive Deputy Director, CMC Joint Operations Command Center
3. Lin Xiangyang (林向阳), Commander, Eastern Theater Command
4. Qin Shutong (秦树桐), Political Commissar (Army)
5. Yuan Huazhi (袁华智), Political Commissar (Navy)
6. Wang Houbin (王厚斌), Commander, Rocket Force
7. Wang Chunning (王春宁), Commander, People’s Armed Police

Defence Minister and former Rocket Force commander Wei Fenghe (魏凤和) was removed in 2024, while in 2023 Li Shangfu (李尚福), Minister of National Defense, was purged.

Earlier casualties included Liu Zheng (刘铮), former Deputy Director of the PLA General Logistics Department; Li Zuocheng (李作成), the retired Chief of the CMC Joint Staff Department; and Li Yuchao (李玉超), former Commander of the Rocket Force.

All were three-star full generals.

Before Xi, the PLA had largely been a law unto itself, especially from the 1990s to the early 2010s. Although the PLA formally answered to the Party, in practice senior generals ran powerful fiefdoms. Civilian leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao often lacked either the authority or the will to discipline top officers. Promotions were heavily influenced by patronage networks rather than professional merit. This gave rise to what many Chinese insiders later described as “军中山头林立” — mountains within the military, each with its own lord.

Corruption was systemic. “Buying ranks” was an open secret. Under generals Xu Caihou (徐才厚) and Guo Boxiong (郭伯雄) — both CMC vice chairmen — promotions to major general, lieutenant general, and full general were widely believed to be for sale. Key posts in logistics, armaments, and personnel became cash cows. Officers paid bribes to secure promotions, avoid audits, or obtain lucrative postings. Xu and Guo were the gatekeepers, and both fell between 2014 and 2015.

Xi later lamented that corruption had reached a level that “threatened the survival of the Party and the army.”

The PLA also ran businesses. Until the late 1990s and early 2000s, PLA units owned hotels, real estate, and trading companies. Officers blurred the lines between national defence and personal enrichment. Although Jiang formally ordered the PLA out of business in 1998, the networks and habits remained.

Xi did three things his predecessors did not dare to do fully:

    (a) Took down CMC vice chairmen

• Xu Caihou
• Guo Boxiong
• He Weidong, Zhang Youxia

    This shattered the belief that “CMC vice chairmen are untouchable.”

    (b) Broke service-based power blocs

• Rocket Force
• Equipment Development Department
• Political Work Department

     The recent purges show that Xi is still dismantling entrenched networks, even among his own appointees. 

    (c) Centralised loyalty to one authority

• Loyalty is no longer to “the Party” in an abstract sense
• It is explicitly to Xi as CMC Chairman

Outcome...
The system is certainly cleaner than before. However, corruption may simply have shifted from the open buying of ranks to more subtle forms. In the interim, fear has replaced impunity. Professionalisation has improved, but initially at the cost of initiative, candour, and internal trust.

Xi genuinely believes that corruption threatens China’s war-fighting ability. If he is true to his mission, these temporary hiccups will disappear in due course.

Poor Messaging…

Unfortunately, Beijing has been poor at explaining Xi’s transformation effort to the outside world.

          1. Silence looks like instability

China’s instinct is secrecy, but externally this backfires. Senior generals disappear, defence  ministers vanish without explanation, and CMC vice chairmen fall with boilerplate language.

 

To outsiders, this does not look like reform — it looks like elite chaos or factional warfare.

 

Western analysts fill the vacuum with the most damaging interpretations:

·         “The PLA is hollowed out”

·         “Xi doesn’t trust his own generals”

·         “China’s military is unready for war”

 

Beijing’s refusal to engage allows these narratives to harden.

2. Anti-corruption without benchmarks sounds arbitrary
“Serious violations of discipline and law” tells the world nothing. Without clear standards or named offences, it appears to be selective punishment rather than systemic clean-up. Internally, cadres may understand the signals; externally, it feels opaque and personalistic.

            3. The PLA is still treated as a sacred black box

           The CPC continues to communicate as if:

·         Military affairs are nobody else’s business

·         Foreign perceptions do not matter

That mindset worked when China was inward-looking. It does not work when China is a near-peer military power, operating globally and under constant strategic scrutiny.

What Could Have Been Done?
The framing should have shifted from PURGE to PROFESSIONALISATION.

Standards, operational competence, and key command rotations to prevent fiefdoms should have been emphasised. “We are building a modern, rules-based military, not a loyalty club” is the kind of language people understand. Due process must be observed, and outcomes should not be conveyed through leaks, rumours, or silence.

At present, every purge reinforces the idea that if Xi goes, the system collapses. Reforms should be institutionalised — promotion criteria codified, command regulations published, and collective CMC decision-making, even if symbolic, emphasised.

The irony is this: Xi may be carrying out the most radical PLA transformation since Mao, yet because of how it is communicated, the world interprets it as paranoia, instability, and personal insecurity.

However, I believe Xi is now confident enough to transform the PLA without the baggage of the old guards. Modern warfare requires quality young bloods, which China has plenty. 

Regardless, I have great faith in Xi. Let us help him explain his good intentions to the world.

End

 

Postscript…
Friends may be wondering why I have chosen a picture of Zeekr – a Chinese car – to introduce this article. Zeekr 极氪 (pronounced Jí kè), which means “Extreme Krypton,” is a premium electric vehicle brand owned by Geely Automobile Holdings, and it is known for its high performance. Yet the name Zeekr is faintly unsettling. Doesn’t it sound rather like Zika, the mosquito-borne virus infamous for causing severe birth defects when expectant mothers are infected?

A month or so ago, while I was in Shanghai, I visited a Pien Tze Huang (片仔癀) franchise outlet to buy a facial lotion that I thought would be suitable for my wife. When I returned, she unpacked the box and tried to make sense of the instructions. She asked whether I trusted it. I could hardly blame her. The English translation was so Mickey-mousy that few people – especially those who are unfamiliar with the depth and sophistication of traditional Chinese medical formulations – would dare to use the product. And yet Pien Tze Huang has a pedigree spanning nearly 500 years, dating back to the Ming Dynasty, and occupies a venerable place in traditional Chinese medicine.

Fortunately, Chinese companies now appear to be paying closer attention to global sensibilities in branding. Names like BYD, rendered in Chinese as 比亚迪 (pronounced Bǐyàdí), travel far more easily across languages and cultures. Is this, perhaps, a quiet form of reverse engineering in product naming?

In much the same way, Xi would do well to be more conscious of how China is viewed by the outside world.