I took the threat by Donald Trump to
wipe out Persian civilization in one night seriously. After endless taunts, I
thought he would finally go all out to silence his critics. Surprise, surprise –
he chickened out again, barely two hours before the deadline.
I was wrong. I had overestimated TACO.
By now, the pattern is unmistakable: escalate to the brink; if the gamble fails, retreat – yet loudly declare victory. And now, Iran is given “another two weeks.”
From a humanitarian standpoint, the ceasefire is welcome. A regional war teetering on the edge of escalation could easily have spiralled into something far worse.
The mediation, reportedly driven by Pakistan with support from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt, has produced a 10-point framework. Trump says they can “talk.” Let us examine what that really means:
- Sanctions
relief – Washington’s primary lever against Iran, now to be eased or
lifted. Who, exactly, is conceding?
- Recognition
of uranium enrichment – A decades-old US red line. Is this now abandoned?
- US
military drawdown – A reduced American footprint in the Gulf. Once
unthinkable.
- Security
guarantees – A US pledge of non-aggression, with China potentially as
guarantor. A remarkable reversal.
- Strait
of Hormuz arrangements – From ultimatum to negotiation—possibly even
allowing Iran to monetize passage.
- Release
of frozen assets – Billions returned to Tehran.
- Recognition
of Iran’s regional role – Implicit acceptance of its influence across
Iraq, Lebanon, and beyond; from “pariah” to stakeholder.
(The remaining points—prisoner exchanges, normalization, phased implementation—are secondary.)
And yet, despite the obvious tilt, Trump claims victory.
One cannot help but think of Ah Q—forever triumphing in his own imagination.
Still, caution is warranted.
This “10-point plan” is not an
agreement; it is a moving target. Trump first called it “workable,” then
“fraudulent.” Accounts differ; details shift. At best, it is a bargaining
document – a convenient off-ramp dressed up as strategy.
Even before the ink dries, Benjamin Netanyahu resumes strikes in Lebanon, while Iran again flexes control over the Strait of Hormuz.
Why the Climbdown?
Rising petrol prices in the US are one pressure point. But the deeper issue is structural: economic strain, political fatigue, and a narrowing base of support. His much-vaunted legacy already shows cracks.
More revealing, perhaps, is the dubious “rescue mission” narrative.
The official story – of a downed F-15E Strike Eagle and a dramatic extraction – raises more questions than it answers. No images, no proof, no corroboration.
Alternative accounts suggest something far less heroic: a failed attempt to seize enriched uranium in Isfahan, ending in losses and hurried self-destruction of US assets. The F-15E incident may have been just one fragment of a larger debacle.
For a country that habitually showcases
its military successes, the silence is telling.
With Trump and his circle, truth is elastic; narrative often replaces reality.
While the world fixates on TACO’s theatrics, a quieter but potentially more consequential development unfolds in the East.
Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) visit to China, at the invitation of Xi Jinping, may prove significant.
Cheng is no lightweight. Trained in law
(National Taiwan University; Temple University) and international relations
(Cambridge), she moved from the DPP to the KMT, served multiple terms in the
Legislative Yuan, and assumed KMT leadership in 2025.
Her personal background is equally telling. Her father, from Yunnan, fought under Chiang Kai-shek, continued resistance after 1949, and eventually settled in Taiwan.
Her mother is Taiwanese. She calls herself a “daughter of Yunnan” – a symbolic bridge between histories.
Reactions in Taiwan remain divided. Yet the visit may plant seeds that only later bear fruit.
Cheng represents a strand of thinking that sees the mainland and Taiwan not as separate destinies, but as a temporarily divided continuum. History, in this view, is cyclical: 分久必合,合久必分.
Fragmentation is an aberration; reunification, a restoration.
Her message is framed in 情 (shared heritage) and 和 (harmony), invoking even the memory of Taiwanese denied the right to mourn Dr Sun Yat-sen under Japanese rule.
Yet realities intrude. China’s rise – and its willingness to use force if necessary – casts a long shadow. At the same time, more Taiwanese may begin to question their role in a broader geopolitical contest.
How long can one remain a pawn – and at what cost?
Why continue underwriting foreign arms industries when the strategic imbalance is so stark?
Cheng’s path is far from smooth.
Within the KMT, resistance persists. Figures like Chu Li-luan (朱立倫) continue to anchor Taiwan’s security in US protection. Others, such as Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), represent alternative currents but remain politically constrained.
Cheng seeks to revive the 1992 Consensus. It may no longer suffice.
Taiwan’s politics are fragmented, often driven by short-term interests. If there is to be a durable framework, it must go deeper – beyond slogans, beyond ambiguity.
A clearer anchoring principle may be required: that Taiwan’s future should not be defined as a pawn in the strategic games of external powers.
End.
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