The
hugely anticipated parade is finally over. I glued my eyes to the live
telecast. I must confess I was a little disappointed, for I thought it would be
grander. I suppose I was expecting too much.
Yes, the
presentation appeared a little conventional to me – the uniformed services’
columns were as neat and tight as before, but the closeness of the weaponry did
not exude the level of awe I had anticipated. The flow looked a little casual
to me, never mind the more prominent and frightful ones from the US perspective
– like the awesome DF61, DF-5C, and DF-31BJ ICBMs, the DF-21D “Carrier Killers”,
the DF-26 “Guam Killers”, and the D-10 Cruise Missiles.
I do not
propose to enumerate the 70-plus pieces of cutting-edge weaponry China displayed
in the parade; readers have certainly been spoiled for choice from the podcasts
streaming out these few days! But there is something that many might have
missed – the introduction of three newly established formations: the
Information Support Force, the Military Aerospace Force, and the Cyberspace
Force, accompanied by their latest equipment. The debut signals Beijing’s drive
to reshape its combat doctrine by integrating advanced technologies into
cross-force joint operations.
Another
weapon worth highlighting is its LY-1 laser system, which can intercept drones,
cruise missiles, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft. It offers precise, yet
low-cost-per-shot elimination of threats without physical destruction.
Noticeably
absent was the display of China’s naval power and its 6th generation
stealth fighters and bombers and formidable wholesome warfare and defence
systems. Some visual effects should have been designed to project that during
the parade, not to mention many of the weapons that are currently being
developed with some of the “dark” technology the country already possesses.
Nonetheless,
its intended message to the US and Japan was loud and clear: Don’t mess with
us. We are more than ready and capable of defeating you if you try to be funny!
Strange,
though: why am I talking about the US’s fears when the parade was a celebration
to mark the 80th anniversary of the defeat of Japan and fascism?
The US
was China’s strongest ally in World War II, and their common enemy in the
Asia-Pacific theatre was Japan. (Strictly speaking, Taiwan was also a part of
Japan then; many of the soldiers ravaging Southeast Asia were Taiwanese!)
Let’s be honest:
Despite its efforts and sacrifices, China by itself did not defeat Japan.
This
might be the reason Japan has never formally apologized. They have always
thought Han Chinese were inferior beings – to them China has been ruled or
ravaged by non-Hans several times over the last two millennia! And I suppose
Japanese will always harbour this: Why can’t we ascend to be one too?
Even
before the US formally entered the conflict, General Claire Chennault’s “Flying
Tigers” played a dramatic and crucial role in helping China during the war. The
Flying Tigers were composed of about 100 US volunteer pilots and around 200
ground crew. They were recruited by the Chinese Nationalist government to
protect China’s vital supply routes, especially the Burma Road, defend Chinese
cities from Japanese bombing raids, and provide direct combat support to
Chinese ground forces. In just about seven months (Dec 1941 to July 1942), they
achieved an extraordinary kill ratio. They intercepted Japanese bombers
attacking Kunming, Rangoon, and other key cities, saving countless civilian
lives. At a time when China was struggling and US fortunes were low after
Pearl Harbor, the Flying Tigers gave a badly needed morale boost.
(In July
1942, this volunteer group disbanded and was absorbed into the US Army Air
Force under Chennault’s continued leadership. He then commanded the 14th Air
Force in China, extending American air support throughout the war.)
The
Flying Tigers became a symbol of US-China wartime cooperation, remembered in
both countries as a heroic example of solidarity against Japanese aggression.
Contrary
to Trump’s criticism that Xi did not acknowledge US help during the war[i],
their descendants had in fact been invited to attend the September 3 parade. (I
thought Xi would mention the vital role of the US and the UK in fighting World
War II and fascism, which was core object of the celebration; unfortunately, he
did not. The magnanimity would certainly have neutralised the ill feelings of
the leaders of these two countries who, in the first place, had opted to stay away
from the celebration.)
Chennault’s
daughter Cynthia and his granddaughter Nell Calloway were among those honoured.
In addition, Elyn MacInnis, whose father-in-law was among the Flying Tigers,
was also invited to witness the parade. Beyond the parade, the Flying Tigers'
legacy continues to be actively commemorated:
- Exhibitions honouring their wartime service
have recently opened in Chongqing, Liuzhou, and Fujian—some timed with the
80th anniversary of WWII’s end. Descendants were invited to contribute
materials and visit.
- Delegations of veterans and family descendants
have travelled to China repeatedly – laying wreaths, attending
exhibitions, and strengthening the long-standing memory of cooperative
wartime resistance.
And what
a twist of events after the war – Japan became the darling of the US, and
China, the bad guy!
Reaction
in Taiwan
ChatGPT estimated that only about one million people in the island watched the
Sept 3 parade live on news channels. However, I read somewhere that another
five million Taiwanese watched it online via other media – YouTube, news sites,
social media livestreams. The parade has certainly put paid to the DPP
government’s propaganda that China is only a paper tiger. Recent feedback gives
the impression that people in Taiwan are more receptive to the idea of becoming
part of a unified China.
The
Renaming of the Pentagon to the Department of War
Two days
after the parade, Trump signed an executive order that officially rebrands the US
Department of Defense as the Department of War, and the Secretary of Defense as
the Secretary of War. Is this a coincidence? I say it is not. And I am afraid this vindictive man is going to come up with new ways to try to break China.
Let’s
hear some of the other reactions:
Most
western leaders are still in the state of denial or outright being hypocritical,
even though they are still being bullied left, right and centre by Trump and
his Sycophants.
• EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, could only express concern over the
growing alignment among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, characterising it
as a potential threat to the rules-based international order. She is still
sleeping! Her home country Estonia may become another Ukraine, if it continues
to marginalise the ethnic Russians in the country.
• Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico – one of the few Western leaders to
attend – encouraged the West to take the event seriously. He noted that Xi’s
message emphasised a choice between peace and war, and he criticised the
absence of EU leaders, suggesting they miscalculated by opting out.
• The Financial Times (via Western analyst commentary) warned that Xi and Kim
Jong Un’s meeting amid the parade signals the emergence of an “autocratic
alliance,” which has raised alarm across Europe. Another broken record?
• South Korea, Japan, and the US promptly announced renewed “Freedom Edge”
defence drills, signalling pushback and alliance-strengthening in Asia. Let’s
see how long they can talk tough, given the fact that US is losing steam on
QUAD, etc.
• Former Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews’s attendance – especially alongside
Putin and Kim – drew some silly domestic backlash, but in reality, he is one of
the few Australian politicians who understands realpolitik. This is indeed a
chance to engage with real regional leaders.
The
official line from Japan
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi said, “We will continue to gather and
analyse information (on cooperation among Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang) with
serious interest to assess its impact on regional security.” He further claimed
that China’s increased assertiveness in the East and South China Seas raises
concern, asserting that any unilateral change to the status quo by force is
absolutely unacceptable. But at the same time, he expressed Japan’s desire to
advance a strategic, mutually beneficial relationship with China—one that
fosters stability through constructive dialogue.
Stop your
rhetoric, Hayashi-san, the writing is on the wall. China today is no
longer the China of mid-1800s. Unfortunately, Militarist Japan only understands
if the sword is on the back of their necks.
(Readers
might want to know that a former prime minister of Japan actually attended the
parade: Yukio Hatoyama[ii].
He said, “I, as a Japanese, attended the commemoration with a sense of
reflection and remorse. I am grateful to have been invited to take part in the
ceremony; it was highly meaningful.” He further remarked that he was deeply
struck by the conviction that Japan must learn from history in order to face
the future.)
And from
the Philippines
Defense
Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. described the event as an act of intimidation to
smaller nations like theirs. He went on to criticise China’s attempt to “reshape”
World War II history, warning that such revisionism could erase the atrocities
committed under regimes like Mao’s in China and Stalin’s in Russia. Obviously,
he has not read history.
He
obviously does not know what the Japanese had done to the Filipinos during
World War II. Also, does China need to use any of these new gears to fight the
Philippines?
Be that
as it may…
The message is clear:
One: Militarily, China is already stronger than any
country in the world.
The US has more nuclear warheads than China (so
does Russia), but unless it is prepared to see the whole world destroyed, this numerical
superiority, together with all its nuclear submarines, which are still believed
to be technologically more advanced than China’s, is irrelevant. So are its
mighty aircraft carrier strike groups; they are largely lame ducks now in the
wake of China’s DF-21Ds now.
(A very common self-consoling, ostrich-like conclusion
from many western armchair military analysts is that China’s military has not
battle-tested. Long live their complacency!)
Two: The Global South has accepted China as their
champion.
With Trump shooting everyone and also himself in
the foot, who can count on the US today? NATO is irrelevant to the Global South,
so is much of EU, which is now totally pre-occupied with trying to prop up Ukraine
in the name of defending Europe.
The only country that can help the Global South
fight and uphold fairness in the world is China.
What’s
meant to be Chinese today?
Much of
what is going to be said below is my personal take and advocacy. Certainly,
much of it will also not go down well with many readers. Do feel free to
disagree!
First of
all, is there a common definition of “Chinese”?
I think
this is still a question that cannot be easily answered today.
Naturally,
those who live in China are Chinese. The People’s Republic of China (PRC)
officially recognises 56 ethnic groups (民族 mín-zú) as Chinese, and they are treated equally. Historically,
after the 1911 Revolution, Sun Yat-sen and the early Republic of China (ROC) promoted
the idea of a “Republic of Five Nationalities” (五族共和 Wǔ-zú Gòng-hé) – Han (汉), Manchu
(满), Mongol (蒙), Hui (回, Chinese
Muslims), and Tibetan (藏). There
were, of course, many others such as Zhuang, Uyghur, Miao, and so on. The republic’s
flag (1912–1928) carried five stripes, each representing one of these
nationalities.
Today Han
Chinese account for about 91–92% of the population. I believe the majority of the
minorities in China today are happy to identify themselves as Chinese. (I
visited Xinjiang just a couple of months ago, and judging from what I saw,
there is really no reason for me to believe otherwise.) Nonetheless, history,
religion, culture, and mutual prejudices will always be exploited by the West
to try to divide and weaken China. Therefore, the PRC government must always
maintain the highest level of vigilance, hence the West’s persistent
demonisation of China.
Outside
mainland China, the definition becomes a little tricky.
Many
non-mainland people of Chinese ancestry are still struggling with their
identity. The question “Am I Chinese?”
has often troubled them, especially to the descendants of early immigrants to
the US, Canada, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as the younger
generations in Southeast Asia and even in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Many in Hong
Kong are still reluctant to identify themselves as Chinese, even though the
former British colony has been returned to China in 1997, albeit under a
one-country-two-systems manner; they rather call themselves Hong Kongers
instead. About 30% of Taiwanese, though still practising Chinese culture, actually
look up to Japan as their “fatherland”. To call them Chinese is a “please don’t
insult me” no-no, for to them the name connotes backwardness and crudeness. CPC
(the Communist Party of China)[iii]
is an archaic ideology and represents everything they have been brought up to hate:
Totalitarianism, autocracy, and what-have-you.
Distinguished
historian and sinologist Wang Gungwu (王赓武, b. 1930) has spent decades trying to define what
it means to be Chinese. He has just released a new book titled Roads to
Chinese Modernity: Civilisation and National Culture, which is basically a
compilation of many of his speeches before. In this book he writes how China
has struggled to earn its place in the world today – from a dying dynasty to an
infant republic, to the chaos of the warlord years, to the atrocities committed
by the Japanese, to Mao’s victory in 1949, to the madness of the Cultural Revolution,
to Deng Xiaoping’s reawakening of China, and to what is China today under Xi
Jinping. He argues objectively and quite persuasively how the CPC government has
been trying to find modernity during all these years. To him international laws
were new to the PRC, and the country might not have acted in a manner that was
deemed “correct” to the international, meaning, western-centric, community. Corruption
has been a key problem in China and Xi is now going all out to get rid of this
cancer. To Wang, China needs a strong hand, and the CPC is China’s
emperor today. Period.
Wang is
genuine to this day; unfortunately, his views on China, I heard, have not
always been well regarded by Chinese leaders. (Even to many alumni of the
former Nanyang University, Wang is still being blamed for eroding the
university’s Chinese identity.)
Wang was
born in Surabaya (then Dutch East Indies) to Chinese scholar parents from
Jiangsu. As a child, he moved with his family to Ipoh in the then British
Malaya, where he spent most of his formative years. His parents instilled in
him a strong grounding in both Chinese classics and English education.
In the
aftermath of World War II, Wang was sent to study at the National Central
University in Nanjing. However, he had to abort his studies there due to the
escalating civil war. He returned to Malaya and enrolled at the University of
Malaya in Singapore, graduating with first-class honours in History in 1953. He
later earned his PhD in Chinese history from the University of London in 1957.
Wang
began his academic career at the University of Malaya, later becoming Professor
of Far Eastern History at the Australian National University (ANU). He also
served as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Hong Kong (1986–1995). After
that, he moved to Singapore, where he became Director (1996–2006) and later
Chairman of the Board (2007–2019) of the East Asian Institute at the National
University of Singapore (NUS). He is now University Professor at NUS, though he
has retained his Australian citizenship.
He is
therefore most eminently qualified to speak about China, define “Chinese”, and talk
about Chineseness, both the good and ugly sides of it.
“China”
itself is a foreign term; nobody really knows for certain how it came about.
Yet most of us have resigned ourselves to using “Chinese” to describe
ourselves. We can also call ourselves Zhōngguó-rén (中國人), but technically, Zhōngguó-rén refers specifically to people of
China.
We can
also refer to ourselves as Huá-rén (华人), a term that emphasises cultural or ethnic identity over national
citizenship.
Wang
draws a key distinction between Huá-yì (华裔), meaning ethnic Chinese – someone of Chinese ancestry living outside
China and who is a citizen of another country – and Huá-qiáo (华侨), which refers more accurately to overseas Chinese
who retain their Chinese citizenship or nationality, which not too many Huá-rén
do now.
Regardless
of whether we consider ourselves Huá-yì, or Australian, or American, as
long as we are ethnically Chinese, we should take pride in being Chinese, for
our shared heritage and ancestry, regardless of our citizenship.
Conclusion
But will
this September 3 watershed event change our concept of ourselves?
The
parade has shown that the Chinese are a hugely patriotic, determined and
disciplined people. They are tireless innovators, not the copycats that Western
critics love to brand them. And do believe this: China does not seek to replace
the US or exploit other countries; its leadership simply wants the Chinese
people to live a better tomorrow. Take a deep look at Xi, and you will see how
different he is from Trump and all the pseudo-leaders of the Western world.
Even
though we may not share CPC’s ideology or concept of governance, we have to
admit that it has done much for China and for “Chinese” all over the world. Minimally,
you are no longer being seen or treated as a second-class being in any part of
the world. You should stand tall as Hua-ren and use our DNA traits to
help the world.
And let’s
not forget; there are many aspects of Chineseness that are still deemed ugly even by our own kind. Let’s help to eliminate
them.
End
[i] Trump described the spectacle as a
“beautiful ceremony” and “very, very impressive.” He added, “But I understood
the reason they were doing it … they were hoping I was watching—and I was
watching.” However, he twitted this: “Please give my warmest regards to
Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against The United States of
America.” He also noted that China’s official ceremony omitted mention of the
U.S.’s significant contributions to the Allied victory in WWII, stating that
the U.S. “helped China very, very much.”
So, to
sum it up: Trump’s off-the-cuff reaction was a mix of grudging admiration for
the showmanship, a self-aware nod to its symbolic intent, and pointed criticism
framed as historical grievance toward Xi’s narrative.
[ii]
Hatoyama
often frames his political outlook within a family tradition of advocating
friendship with China:
- Great-grandfather (Kazuo Hatoyama,
1856–1911)
A prominent politician in the late Meiji era, he served as Speaker of the
House of Representatives. Historical accounts note that he, unlike many
contemporaries, believed in cultivating good relations with China rather
than pursuing purely expansionist policies.
- Grandfather (Ichirō Hatoyama, 1883–1959)
Prime Minister of Japan (1954–1956) and founder of the Liberal Democratic
Party. He worked toward postwar normalization of Japan’s diplomacy and
emphasized reconciliation in Asia. Although normalization with China came
later (1972), Ichirō’s foreign policy line leaned toward independence from
U.S. dominance and greater engagement with Asian neighbour’s, including
China and the Soviet Union.
- Father (Iichirō Hatoyama, 1918–1993)
Foreign Minister under Prime Minister Takeo Miki in the mid-1970s. He was
instrumental in promoting Japan–China normalization after 1972 and
actively pushed for economic and cultural exchanges with Beijing.
- Yukio Hatoyama (b. 1947)
As Prime Minister (2009–2010) and later as a private citizen, he continued
this lineage, calling for an East Asian Community and repeatedly
apologizing for Japan’s wartime aggression in China. His appearance at the
2025 parade was widely portrayed in Chinese media - as the type of remorse Japan should show to China.
Across
three generations (grandfather, father, and himself, plus even earlier family
roots) the Hatoyamas have been associated with a relatively China-friendly
orientation in Japanese politics.
[iii] The
correct acronym for the ruling party in China is “CPC”, which stands for the
Communist Party of China. This is the official translation used by the party
itself and by the Chinese government in English-language communications.
Why the confusion between “CPC” and “CCP”?
- “CPC” is the party’s own preferred and
official translation, used in all state publications, press briefings, and
diplomatic communications.
- “CCP” (Chinese Communist Party) is more
commonly used in Western media, academia, and public discourse, especially
in the U.S., but it’s technically not the official name.
- The use of “CCP” is sometimes deliberate
in political contexts — to emphasize “Chinese” over “Communist” or vice
versa, depending on intent — and in some cases can carry ideological
undertones or be perceived as pejorative by Beijing.
Scholarly Discussion
- Scholars such as Kerry Brown, Timothy
Cheek, and David Shambaugh have pointed out that using “CPC” shows
precision and neutrality, especially in formal or diplomatic contexts.
- Meanwhile, others argue that “CCP”
reflects long-standing English usage and is not inherently biased unless
used in specific rhetorical frames.
