During our journey along the Karakoram
Highway, we came across evidence of China's extensive involvement in Pakistan's
infrastructure development.
China is participating in three major
projects along the highway, two involving enormous hydroelectric dams and the
third involving the reconstruction and realignment of the highway itself.
The Diamer-Bhasha Dam
The first is the Diamer-Bhasha Dam, a
huge 4,500 MW hydroelectric and water-storage project near Chilas.
Unlike a conventional hydroelectric
installation, Diamer-Bhasha is also intended to regulate the flow of the Indus
River, support irrigation and reduce the amount of sediment entering downstream
reservoirs.
The Dasu Hydropower Project
The second is the Dasu Hydropower
Project, another gigantic dam being constructed downstream on the Indus River.
Its ultimate planned generating capacity is 4,320 MW.
Unlike Diamer-Bhasha, Dasu is
substantially financed by the World Bank, although its principal construction
contractor is Chinese.
The Karakoram Highway
The third project involves the
reconstruction and realignment of approximately 62 kilometres of the Karakoram
Highway, including tunnels, bridges and new sections of road.
This is closely connected to the dam
projects.
When the Dasu reservoir is filled, a
substantial section of the existing Karakoram Highway will disappear beneath
the water. Pakistan therefore has to construct a replacement highway along the
mountainsides at higher elevations. Plans for the alternative route include 15
tunnels and nine arch bridges.
The Karakoram Highway is not simply a
road serving Pakistan's northern communities. It is the principal established
overland highway connection between Pakistan and China's Xinjiang region,
crossing the border at Khunjerab Pass.
It is consequently an important
component of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
China is also helping to develop Gwadar
Port, a deep-water port on Pakistan's Arabian Sea coast. The port is intended
to connect through Pakistan's road network to the Karakoram Highway, which
leads all the way to the Chinese border at Khunjerab Pass.
This is a central part of the
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC, 中巴经济走廊), a flagship project of China's Belt
and Road Initiative.
How the Route Connects
The approximately 2,700-km corridor is
designed to run from Gwadar Port through Pakistan's road network to the
Karakoram Highway, and onwards to Khunjerab Pass at the Pakistan–China border.
From there, the road continues to
Kashgar in China's Xinjiang region.
The corridor has several alternative
alignments rather than one continuous, newly constructed expressway. Some
sections have been completed, others are being upgraded, and Gwadar has yet to
realise its intended commercial capacity.
The corridor offers western China an
alternative trade route to the Arabian Sea, reducing its dependence on shipping
routes through the Strait of Malacca. Gwadar is also close to the Strait of
Hormuz, through which substantial Gulf oil shipments pass.
However, moving large quantities of
cargo across the Karakoram mountains presents major logistical and economic
challenges, notwithstanding the strategic attraction of the corridor.
China already has a substantial road
network connecting Khunjerab Pass to Kashgar (喀什) in Xinjiang, and from Kashgar onwards
to Urumqi and the rest of China. The route from Khunjerab to Kashgar is a
well-paved mountain highway, although not yet a continuous four-lane
expressway. Beyond Kashgar, China's modern expressway network takes over.
Kashgar is also connected by railway to
Xinjiang's main rail network, allowing freight to transfer from road to rail.
The road connection from Pakistan to
China is therefore not merely theoretical. It is already carrying commercial
traffic.
However, the capacity and economics
required to turn Gwadar–Khunjerab–Kashgar into a major international freight
artery remain a concern.
For goods destined for western China,
especially Xinjiang, the corridor could have considerable value. For goods
headed to China's eastern industrial centres, its advantages over established
sea routes are much less clear.
Better roads and more reliable
electricity could also encourage tourism, regional trade and industrial
development.
There is also a geopolitical dimension.
India claims Gilgit-Baltistan as part of the former princely state of Jammu and
Kashmir and objects to Chinese-supported infrastructure development in the
territory. China and Pakistan reject India's objections to their cooperation.
Security is another challenge. Chinese
engineers and Pakistani workers have faced militant attacks, particularly in
connection with the Dasu project.
Nevertheless, these developments
illustrate the depth of China's long-term economic and strategic engagement
with Pakistan.
But Pakistan was not always so closely
associated with China.
For several decades, it was one of
America's closest strategic partners in Asia.
The US and Pakistan: From Close Allies
to Deep Mutual Distrust
The US–Pakistan relationship is one of
the more intriguing stories in modern geopolitics.
For decades, Pakistan was among
America's closest strategic partners in Asia. Yet, in May 2011, American
special forces secretly entered Pakistan, killed Osama bin Laden in a
residential compound near a major Pakistani military academy, and departed without
informing the Pakistani government beforehand.
How did two supposed allies end up in
such an extraordinary situation?
The answer lies in the nature of their
relationship.
The US–Pakistan partnership was built
less on shared values than on strategic necessity. Each needed the other at
different times, frequently for very different reasons.
Pakistan Was America's Cold War Ally
Following the partition of British India
in 1947, Pakistan found itself confronting a much larger and militarily
stronger neighbour, India.
Under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru,
India pursued a policy of non-alignment, refusing to formally join either the
American or Soviet bloc.
Pakistan made a different calculation.
Its leadership believed an alliance with
the United States would provide military assistance, financial support and
diplomatic leverage against India.
Washington, meanwhile, wanted countries
along the Soviet Union's southern periphery to help contain communism.
The arrangement suited both sides.
In 1954, Pakistan signed a mutual
defence assistance agreement with the US. It subsequently joined two
Western-backed security organisations:
- SEATO
(1954) — the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, intended to contain
communist expansion in Asia.
- The
Baghdad Pact (1955) — subsequently renamed CENTO, intended to contain
Soviet influence in the Middle East and surrounding regions.
Pakistan received substantial American
military equipment, training and economic assistance.
However, the fundamental contradiction
was apparent from the beginning.
America viewed Pakistan primarily as an
ally against Soviet communism. Pakistan viewed America primarily as a source of
support against India.
When Pakistan fought India in 1965,
Washington suspended military assistance to both countries.
Pakistan felt betrayed because it
depended far more heavily on American weapons than India did.
This difference in expectations would
repeatedly undermine their relationship.
Pakistan Helps America Open the Door to
China
There is an interesting episode in which
Pakistan played a vital role in international diplomacy.
In the late 1960s, President Richard
Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger wanted to establish
relations with the People's Republic of China.
At that time, Washington and Beijing had
no formal diplomatic relations. Pakistan, however, enjoyed friendly relations
with both countries.
In July 1971, Kissinger secretly
travelled from Pakistan to Beijing, using an official visit to Islamabad and a
purported period of illness as cover.
The mission helped prepare the way for
Nixon's historic visit to China in February 1972.
Pakistan had thus become an important
intermediary in one of the twentieth century's most consequential diplomatic
breakthroughs.
Yet this did not eliminate the
contradictions in its relationship with Washington.
During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War,
which led to the independence of Bangladesh, Nixon favoured Pakistan's military
government for geopolitical reasons, despite mounting evidence of atrocities in
East Pakistan.
America's relationship with Pakistan was
clearly driven more by strategic calculations than by consistent political or
humanitarian principles.
Pakistan Becomes Indispensable to
America's War Against the Soviet Union
This was perhaps the high point of
US–Pakistan strategic cooperation.
In December 1979, the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan.
For Washington, the invasion presented
an opportunity to weaken its principal Cold War adversary.
Pakistan, led by General Muhammad
Zia-ul-Haq, became the principal staging ground for the covert American effort
to support the Afghan resistance.
The CIA coordinated much of the American
programme, while Saudi Arabia also provided substantial financial support.
Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services
Intelligence agency (ISI) became the principal intermediary between foreign
sponsors and Afghan mujahideen groups.
This arrangement gave Pakistan
considerable influence over which Afghan resistance groups received assistance.
The United States also supplied Pakistan
with advanced F-16 fighter aircraft and substantial financial assistance.
The Unintended Consequences
The Soviet Union withdrew from
Afghanistan in February 1989.
From Washington's perspective, a major
Cold War objective had been achieved. But the regional consequences were far
more complicated.
The war had strengthened armed Islamist
networks, entrenched Pakistan's intelligence involvement in Afghanistan and
facilitated the development of militant organisations that would later threaten
regional and international security.
Then there was Osama bin Laden.
He was a Saudi who developed his own
networks supporting Arab volunteers in Afghanistan.
Contrary to what is sometimes claimed,
there is no convincing documentary evidence that the CIA directly recruited or
trained bin Laden. Its principal assistance programme operated through
Pakistan's ISI and predominantly supported Afghan resistance groups.
Nevertheless, the anti-Soviet war
created an environment in which bin Laden and other transnational militants
could develop their organisations.
Al-Qaeda emerged in 1988, during the
final stages of the Afghan war.
After the Soviet withdrawal, America's
interest in Pakistan declined.
In 1990, Washington suspended
substantial military assistance because of Pakistan's nuclear weapons
programme.
Pakistan once again felt that America
had used it and then abandoned it.
September 11: Pakistan Becomes America's
Ally Again
On 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda attacked
the United States, killing nearly 3,000 people.
At the time, Afghanistan was governed by
the Taliban, whose regime had close historical connections with Pakistan's
security establishment.
The US demanded that Pakistan cooperate
in its campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
President Pervez Musharraf, who had
seized power in a military coup in 1999, agreed.
Pakistan offered intelligence
cooperation, logistical support, access to airspace and assistance with
American military operations in Afghanistan.
The US, in return, lifted important
sanctions and resumed extensive military and economic assistance.
But there was a serious problem.
Washington wanted Pakistan to destroy
militant organisations operating from its territory.
Pakistan's security establishment,
however, distinguished between militants threatening Pakistan itself and Afghan
groups it considered potentially useful for maintaining influence in
Afghanistan.
Consequently, while Pakistan assisted
the US in capturing numerous al-Qaeda operatives, elements of the Afghan
Taliban and allied militant networks continued to find refuge on Pakistani
soil.
This became the central source of
American suspicion.
Pakistan was effectively cooperating
with Washington against some militants while maintaining relationships with
other groups Washington was fighting.
It was a contradiction that could not be
sustained indefinitely.
The Abbottabad Raid: 2 May 2011
This was one of the most extraordinary
covert military operations in modern history.
For nearly ten years after the September
11 attacks, Osama bin Laden had evaded American intelligence agencies.
The prevailing assumption was that he
was hiding somewhere in the remote mountainous borderlands between Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
Instead, he was living in Abbottabad, a
garrison town north of Islamabad, not far from the prestigious Pakistan
Military Academy at Kakul.
This was precisely what made his
discovery so shocking.
The CIA had spent years tracing the
movements of one of bin Laden's trusted couriers.
By 2010, American intelligence had
identified a suspicious residential compound in Abbottabad. The success of the
subsequent assault in May 2011 is now history.
Bin Laden's body was later buried at sea
from the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson.
The extraordinary fact was that the
Americans had deliberately not informed Pakistan beforehand.
Washington feared that advance warning
might compromise the operation and allow bin Laden to escape.
This was a remarkable reflection of how
little trust remained between the two supposed allies.
It also raised an uncomfortable
question: How could Pakistan's powerful ISI have
been completely unaware of bin Laden's presence in a town so closely associated
with the military establishment?
Was it an extraordinary intelligence
failure, or had some individuals knowingly protected him?
Pakistan subsequently established the
Abbottabad Commission to investigate the affair. Its findings exposed serious
institutional failures but did not conclusively establish whether bin Laden had
received official protection.
The question remains troubling.
Relations deteriorated further in
November 2011 when a NATO airstrike near the Afghan border killed 24 Pakistani
soldiers. Pakistan responded by closing NATO supply routes through its
territory.
By then, the relationship had become
deeply strained.
Pakistan's Gradual Movement Towards
China
China and Pakistan had already developed
strong relations since the 1960s, largely because of their respective strategic
concerns involving India.
Over time, China became an important
supplier of military equipment and technology to Pakistan.
Chinese assistance also contributed to
Pakistan's defence-industrial capabilities, including the jointly developed
JF-17 fighter aircraft.
The relationship expanded substantially
with the announcement of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor in 2015.
Projects included power stations,
highways, port infrastructure and industrial initiatives.
China offered Pakistan something the US
had often been reluctant to provide: sustained involvement in major
infrastructure development, alongside an extensive defence relationship.
The gigantic dam and highway projects we
encountered during our journey are examples of this continuing partnership.
A Pakistan Astronaut in China’s Tiangong
Space Station
It will happen during the next crew
rotation, reportedly aboard Shenzhou-24 (神舟二十四号). The launch date is scheduled for November
2026.
Muhammad Zeeshan Ali and Khurram Daud
have been undergoing training in Beijing. One will be selected for the mission.
However, the successful candidate will spend approximately one week aboard
Tiangong, rather than the usual six-month rotation of Chinese astronauts. The
Pakistani astronaut will serve as a payload specialist, conducting scientific
experiments involving biotechnology, materials and other research.
He would become the first Pakistani in
space and the first foreign astronaut aboard China's Tiangong station.
There is another interesting
development: Pakistan is also preparing a domestically built robotic rover to
participate in China's Chang'e-8 lunar mission, currently planned for around
2028.
These demonstrate that China–Pakistan
cooperation has expanded beyond roads, dams, ports and military equipment into
advanced scientific and space technology.
Top of Form
Bottom of Form
However, Pakistan did not simply abandon
Washington.
It continued to maintain relationships
with both powers, attempting to benefit from its strategic importance to each.
Remember Operation Sindoor?
India decided to strike targets in
Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir on 7 May 2025, following a terrorist
attack on tourists in Indian-administered Kashmir two weeks earlier.
Twenty-six civilians were killed,
including 25 Indians and one Nepali national. Most of the victims were Hindu
men.
India accused Pakistan-based militants
associated with a UN-designated terrorist organisation of carrying out the
attack. Pakistan denied involvement and called for an independent
investigation.
Regardless, India struck.
Sindoor is the red vermilion powder
traditionally worn by many married Hindu women, particularly along the parting
of their hair, to signify their married status.
India chose the name as a symbolic
reference to the women whose husbands were murdered in the Pahalgam attack.
It was therefore both a military
operation and a highly emotional political message to the Indian public.
In its response, Pakistan inflicted
losses on India's attacking aircraft, including the formidable French-made
Rafale fighter jets.
Pakistan's success in shooting down
Indian aircraft received considerable international attention. Yet, even after
India's military leadership acknowledged aircraft losses, some AI platforms
continued to be reluctant to acknowledge the significance of the episode,
citing insufficient evidence concerning the precise number and types of
aircraft lost. (I wrote about this in my blog in May 2025.)
The ceasefire stopped the immediate
fighting. Nonetheless, India celebrated its supposed "victory"
regardless.
The confrontation also woke up many
armchair military analysts to the capabilities of Chinese military aircraft.
The Chinese-made J-10C, in its export
J-10CE version, had demonstrated what it could potentially achieve in modern
aerial combat. And that was only the J-10CE. What about China's newer
generations of fighter aircraft?
Where Do US–Pakistan Relations Stand
Today?
Interestingly, relations between
Washington and Islamabad have improved since 2025, following years of friction.
In September 2025, President Donald
Trump hosted Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Field
Marshal Asim Munir at the White House.
Pakistan subsequently increased its
diplomatic engagement with Washington, particularly concerning regional
security, trade and mediation involving Iran.
China remains Pakistan's principal
long-term infrastructure and defence partner, while the US continues to be an
important market and a significant financial and diplomatic interlocutor.
Pakistan therefore finds itself
balancing relations with two major powers whose own strategic rivalry has been
intensifying.
Conclusion
The history of US–Pakistan relations
illustrates a recurring pattern.
During the Cold War, Washington needed
Pakistan to help contain the Soviet Union.
In the early 1970s, Pakistan helped
Washington establish contact with China.
In the 1980s, Pakistan became
indispensable to America's covert war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.
After September 11, it was once again
needed for America's war against terrorism.
Yet whenever American strategic
priorities changed, Pakistan frequently found itself sidelined or subjected to
pressure.
The fundamental problem was that
Washington and Islamabad rarely shared the same long-term objectives.
America saw Pakistan through the lens of
its global priorities. Pakistan's overriding concerns were its security against
India, its influence in Afghanistan and its ability to obtain external economic
and military support.
The Abbottabad episode was perhaps the
clearest illustration of the contradictions in their relationship.
After decades of military cooperation
and billions of dollars in assistance, the Americans did not trust Pakistan
sufficiently to inform it before entering its territory to eliminate Osama bin
Laden.
And Pakistan, despite being America's
ally in the war against terrorism, had allowed militant networks hostile to
American interests to operate from its territory.
Now China has emerged as Pakistan's most
dependable long-term strategic partner, particularly in defence and
infrastructure development.
Yet Islamabad continues to cultivate
Washington.
Pakistan has learnt to make use of its
strategic geography. Situated between China, India, Afghanistan and Iran, it
has repeatedly found ways to remain relevant to competing powers.
Whether it can continue balancing China
and the US as their rivalry intensifies is another question altogether.
End
