During our journey along the Karakoram Highway, we came across evidence of China's extensive involvement in Pakistan's infrastructure development.
China is participating in three major projects along the highway, two involving enormous hydroelectric dams and the third involving the reconstruction and realignment of the highway itself.
The first is the Diamer-Bhasha Dam, a huge 4,500 MW hydroelectric and water-storage project near Chilas.
Unlike a conventional hydroelectric installation, Diamer-Bhasha is also intended to regulate the flow of the Indus River, support irrigation and reduce the amount of sediment entering downstream reservoirs.
The second is the Dasu Hydropower Project, another gigantic dam being constructed downstream on the Indus River. Its ultimate planned generating capacity is 4,320 MW.
Unlike Diamer-Bhasha, Dasu is substantially financed by the World Bank, although its principal construction contractor is Chinese.
The third project involves the reconstruction and realignment of approximately 62 kilometres of the Karakoram Highway, including tunnels, bridges and new sections of road.
This is closely connected to the dam projects.
When the Dasu reservoir is filled, a substantial section of the existing Karakoram Highway will disappear beneath the water. Pakistan therefore has to construct a replacement highway along the mountainsides at higher elevations. Plans for the alternative route include 15 tunnels and nine arch bridges.
The Karakoram Highway is not simply a road serving Pakistan's northern communities. It is the principal established overland highway connection between Pakistan and China's Xinjiang region, crossing the border at Khunjerab Pass.
It is consequently an important component of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
China is also helping to develop Gwadar Port, a deep-water port on Pakistan's Arabian Sea coast. The port is intended to connect through Pakistan's road network to the Karakoram Highway, which leads all the way to the Chinese border at Khunjerab Pass.
This is a central part of the
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC, 中巴经济走廊), a flagship project of China's Belt
and Road Initiative.
How the Route Connects
From there, the road continues to Kashgar in China's Xinjiang region.
The corridor has several alternative
alignments rather than one continuous, newly constructed expressway. Some
sections have been completed, others are being upgraded, and Gwadar has yet to
realise its intended commercial capacity.
The corridor offers western China an alternative trade route to the Arabian Sea, reducing its dependence on shipping routes through the Strait of Malacca. Gwadar is also close to the Strait of Hormuz, through which substantial Gulf oil shipments pass.
However, moving large quantities of
cargo across the Karakoram mountains presents major logistical and economic
challenges, notwithstanding the strategic attraction of the corridor.
China already has a substantial road network connecting Khunjerab Pass to Kashgar (喀什) in Xinjiang, and from Kashgar onwards to Urumqi and the rest of China. The route from Khunjerab to Kashgar is a well-paved mountain highway, although not yet a continuous four-lane expressway. Beyond Kashgar, China's modern expressway network takes over.
Kashgar is also connected by railway to Xinjiang's main rail network, allowing freight to transfer from road to rail.
The road connection from Pakistan to China is therefore not merely theoretical. It is already carrying commercial traffic.
However, the capacity and economics required to turn Gwadar–Khunjerab–Kashgar into a major international freight artery remain a concern.
For goods destined for western China, especially Xinjiang, the corridor could have considerable value. For goods headed to China's eastern industrial centres, its advantages over established sea routes are much less clear.
Better roads and more reliable electricity could also encourage tourism, regional trade and industrial development.
There is also a geopolitical dimension. India claims Gilgit-Baltistan as part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and objects to Chinese-supported infrastructure development in the territory. China and Pakistan reject India's objections to their cooperation.
Security is another challenge. Chinese engineers and Pakistani workers have faced militant attacks, particularly in connection with the Dasu project.
Nevertheless, these developments illustrate the depth of China's long-term economic and strategic engagement with Pakistan.
But Pakistan was not always so closely associated with China.
For several decades, it was one of America's closest strategic partners in Asia.
The US and Pakistan: From Close Allies to Deep Mutual Distrust
For decades, Pakistan was among America's closest strategic partners in Asia. Yet, in May 2011, American special forces secretly entered Pakistan, killed Osama bin Laden in a residential compound near a major Pakistani military academy, and departed without informing the Pakistani government beforehand.
How did two supposed allies end up in such an extraordinary situation?
The answer lies in the nature of their relationship.
The US–Pakistan partnership was built less on shared values than on strategic necessity. Each needed the other at different times, frequently for very different reasons.
Pakistan Was America's Cold War Ally
Under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India pursued a policy of non-alignment, refusing to formally join either the American or Soviet bloc.
Pakistan made a different calculation.
Its leadership believed an alliance with the United States would provide military assistance, financial support and diplomatic leverage against India.
Washington, meanwhile, wanted countries along the Soviet Union's southern periphery to help contain communism.
The arrangement suited both sides.
In 1954, Pakistan signed a mutual defence assistance agreement with the US. It subsequently joined two Western-backed security organisations:
- SEATO
(1954) — the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, intended to contain
communist expansion in Asia.
- The Baghdad Pact (1955) — subsequently renamed CENTO, intended to contain Soviet influence in the Middle East and surrounding regions.
Pakistan received substantial American
military equipment, training and economic assistance.
However, the fundamental contradiction was apparent from the beginning.
America viewed Pakistan primarily as an
ally against Soviet communism. Pakistan viewed America primarily as a source of
support against India.
When Pakistan fought India in 1965, Washington suspended military assistance to both countries.
Pakistan felt betrayed because it depended far more heavily on American weapons than India did.
This difference in expectations would repeatedly undermine their relationship.
There is an interesting episode in which Pakistan played a vital role in international diplomacy.
In the late 1960s, President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger wanted to establish relations with the People's Republic of China.
At that time, Washington and Beijing had no formal diplomatic relations. Pakistan, however, enjoyed friendly relations with both countries.
In July 1971, Kissinger secretly travelled from Pakistan to Beijing, using an official visit to Islamabad and a purported period of illness as cover.
The mission helped prepare the way for Nixon's historic visit to China in February 1972.
Pakistan had thus become an important intermediary in one of the twentieth century's most consequential diplomatic breakthroughs.
Yet this did not eliminate the contradictions in its relationship with Washington.
During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, which led to the independence of Bangladesh, Nixon favoured Pakistan's military government for geopolitical reasons, despite mounting evidence of atrocities in East Pakistan.
America's relationship with Pakistan was clearly driven more by strategic calculations than by consistent political or humanitarian principles.
Pakistan Becomes Indispensable to America's War Against the Soviet Union
In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
For Washington, the invasion presented an opportunity to weaken its principal Cold War adversary.
Pakistan, led by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, became the principal staging ground for the covert American effort to support the Afghan resistance.
The CIA coordinated much of the American programme, while Saudi Arabia also provided substantial financial support.
Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) became the principal intermediary between foreign sponsors and Afghan mujahideen groups.
This arrangement gave Pakistan considerable influence over which Afghan resistance groups received assistance.
The United States also supplied Pakistan with advanced F-16 fighter aircraft and substantial financial assistance.
The Unintended Consequences
From Washington's perspective, a major Cold War objective had been achieved. But the regional consequences were far more complicated.
The war had strengthened armed Islamist networks, entrenched Pakistan's intelligence involvement in Afghanistan and facilitated the development of militant organisations that would later threaten regional and international security.
Then there was Osama bin Laden.
He was a Saudi who developed his own networks supporting Arab volunteers in Afghanistan.
Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, there is no convincing documentary evidence that the CIA directly recruited or trained bin Laden. Its principal assistance programme operated through Pakistan's ISI and predominantly supported Afghan resistance groups.
Nevertheless, the anti-Soviet war created an environment in which bin Laden and other transnational militants could develop their organisations.
Al-Qaeda emerged in 1988, during the final stages of the Afghan war.
After the Soviet withdrawal, America's interest in Pakistan declined.
In 1990, Washington suspended substantial military assistance because of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme.
Pakistan once again felt that America had used it and then abandoned it.
September 11: Pakistan Becomes America's Ally Again
At the time, Afghanistan was governed by the Taliban, whose regime had close historical connections with Pakistan's security establishment.
The US demanded that Pakistan cooperate in its campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
President Pervez Musharraf, who had seized power in a military coup in 1999, agreed.
Pakistan offered intelligence cooperation, logistical support, access to airspace and assistance with American military operations in Afghanistan.
The US, in return, lifted important sanctions and resumed extensive military and economic assistance.
But there was a serious problem.
Washington wanted Pakistan to destroy militant organisations operating from its territory.
Pakistan's security establishment, however, distinguished between militants threatening Pakistan itself and Afghan groups it considered potentially useful for maintaining influence in Afghanistan.
Consequently, while Pakistan assisted the US in capturing numerous al-Qaeda operatives, elements of the Afghan Taliban and allied militant networks continued to find refuge on Pakistani soil.
This became the central source of American suspicion.
Pakistan was effectively cooperating with Washington against some militants while maintaining relationships with other groups Washington was fighting.
It was a contradiction that could not be sustained indefinitely.
This was one of the most extraordinary covert military operations in modern history.
For nearly ten years after the September
11 attacks, Osama bin Laden had evaded American intelligence agencies.
The prevailing assumption was that he was hiding somewhere in the remote mountainous borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Instead, he was living in Abbottabad, a garrison town north of Islamabad, not far from the prestigious Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul.
This was precisely what made his discovery so shocking.
The CIA had spent years tracing the movements of one of bin Laden's trusted couriers.
By 2010, American intelligence had identified a suspicious residential compound in Abbottabad. The success of the subsequent assault in May 2011 is now history.
Bin Laden's body was later buried at sea from the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson.
The extraordinary fact was that the
Americans had deliberately not informed Pakistan beforehand.
Washington feared that advance warning might compromise the operation and allow bin Laden to escape.
This was a remarkable reflection of how little trust remained between the two supposed allies.
It also raised an uncomfortable question: How could Pakistan's powerful ISI have been completely unaware of bin Laden's presence in a town so closely associated with the military establishment?
Was it an extraordinary intelligence failure, or had some individuals knowingly protected him?
Pakistan subsequently established the Abbottabad Commission to investigate the affair. Its findings exposed serious institutional failures but did not conclusively establish whether bin Laden had received official protection.
The question remains troubling.
Relations deteriorated further in
November 2011 when a NATO airstrike near the Afghan border killed 24 Pakistani
soldiers. Pakistan responded by closing NATO supply routes through its
territory.
By then, the relationship had become deeply strained.
China and Pakistan had already developed strong relations since the 1960s, largely because of their respective strategic concerns involving India.
Over time, China became an important supplier of military equipment and technology to Pakistan.
Chinese assistance also contributed to Pakistan's defence-industrial capabilities, including the jointly developed JF-17 fighter aircraft.
The relationship expanded substantially with the announcement of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor in 2015.
Projects included power stations, highways, port infrastructure and industrial initiatives.
China offered Pakistan something the US had often been reluctant to provide: sustained involvement in major infrastructure development, alongside an extensive defence relationship.
The gigantic dam and highway projects we encountered during our journey are examples of this continuing partnership.
A Pakistan Astronaut in China’s Tiangong Space Station
Muhammad Zeeshan Ali and Khurram Daud have been undergoing training in Beijing. One will be selected for the mission. However, the successful candidate will spend approximately one week aboard Tiangong, rather than the usual six-month rotation of Chinese astronauts. The Pakistani astronaut will serve as a payload specialist, conducting scientific experiments involving biotechnology, materials and other research.
He would become the first Pakistani in space and the first foreign astronaut aboard China's Tiangong station.
There is another interesting
development: Pakistan is also preparing a domestically built robotic rover to
participate in China's Chang'e-8 lunar mission, currently planned for around
2028.
These demonstrate that China–Pakistan cooperation has expanded beyond roads, dams, ports and military equipment into advanced scientific and space technology.
However, Pakistan did not simply abandon Washington.
It continued to maintain relationships with both powers, attempting to benefit from its strategic importance to each.
India decided to strike targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir on 7 May 2025, following a terrorist attack on tourists in Indian-administered Kashmir two weeks earlier.
Twenty-six civilians were killed, including 25 Indians and one Nepali national. Most of the victims were Hindu men.
India accused Pakistan-based militants associated with a UN-designated terrorist organisation of carrying out the attack. Pakistan denied involvement and called for an independent investigation.
Regardless, India struck.
Sindoor is the red vermilion powder traditionally worn by many married Hindu women, particularly along the parting of their hair, to signify their married status.
India chose the name as a symbolic
reference to the women whose husbands were murdered in the Pahalgam attack.
It was therefore both a military operation and a highly emotional political message to the Indian public.
In its response, Pakistan inflicted losses on India's attacking aircraft, including the formidable French-made Rafale fighter jets.
Pakistan's success in shooting down Indian aircraft received considerable international attention. Yet, even after India's military leadership acknowledged aircraft losses, some AI platforms continued to be reluctant to acknowledge the significance of the episode, citing insufficient evidence concerning the precise number and types of aircraft lost. (I wrote about this in my blog in May 2025.)
The ceasefire stopped the immediate fighting. Nonetheless, India celebrated its supposed "victory" regardless.
The confrontation also woke up many armchair military analysts to the capabilities of Chinese military aircraft.
The Chinese-made J-10C, in its export J-10CE version, had demonstrated what it could potentially achieve in modern aerial combat. And that was only the J-10CE. What about China's newer generations of fighter aircraft?
Interestingly, relations between Washington and Islamabad have improved since 2025, following years of friction.
In September 2025, President Donald Trump hosted Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir at the White House.
Pakistan subsequently increased its diplomatic engagement with Washington, particularly concerning regional security, trade and mediation involving Iran.
China remains Pakistan's principal long-term infrastructure and defence partner, while the US continues to be an important market and a significant financial and diplomatic interlocutor.
Pakistan therefore finds itself balancing relations with two major powers whose own strategic rivalry has been intensifying.
The history of US–Pakistan relations illustrates a recurring pattern.
During the Cold War, Washington needed Pakistan to help contain the Soviet Union.
In the early 1970s, Pakistan helped
Washington establish contact with China.
In the 1980s, Pakistan became indispensable to America's covert war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.
After September 11, it was once again needed for America's war against terrorism.
Yet whenever American strategic
priorities changed, Pakistan frequently found itself sidelined or subjected to
pressure.
The fundamental problem was that Washington and Islamabad rarely shared the same long-term objectives.
America saw Pakistan through the lens of its global priorities. Pakistan's overriding concerns were its security against India, its influence in Afghanistan and its ability to obtain external economic and military support.
The Abbottabad episode was perhaps the clearest illustration of the contradictions in their relationship.
After decades of military cooperation and billions of dollars in assistance, the Americans did not trust Pakistan sufficiently to inform it before entering its territory to eliminate Osama bin Laden.
And Pakistan, despite being America's ally in the war against terrorism, had allowed militant networks hostile to American interests to operate from its territory.
Now China has emerged as Pakistan's most dependable long-term strategic partner, particularly in defence and infrastructure development.
Yet Islamabad continues to cultivate Washington.
Pakistan has learnt to make use of its strategic geography. Situated between China, India, Afghanistan and Iran, it has repeatedly found ways to remain relevant to competing powers.
Whether it can continue balancing China and the US as their rivalry intensifies is another question altogether.
End
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