Monday, November 2, 2026

Pakistan: Between China and the US

During our journey along the Karakoram Highway, we came across evidence of China's extensive involvement in Pakistan's infrastructure development.

China is participating in three major projects along the highway, two involving enormous hydroelectric dams and the third involving the reconstruction and realignment of the highway itself.


The Diamer-Bhasha Dam
The first is the Diamer-Bhasha Dam, a huge 4,500 MW hydroelectric and water-storage project near Chilas.

Unlike a conventional hydroelectric installation, Diamer-Bhasha is also intended to regulate the flow of the Indus River, support irrigation and reduce the amount of sediment entering downstream reservoirs.


The Dasu Hydropower Project
The second is the Dasu Hydropower Project, another gigantic dam being constructed downstream on the Indus River. Its ultimate planned generating capacity is 4,320 MW.

Unlike Diamer-Bhasha, Dasu is substantially financed by the World Bank, although its principal construction contractor is Chinese.


The Karakoram Highway
The third project involves the reconstruction and realignment of approximately 62 kilometres of the Karakoram Highway, including tunnels, bridges and new sections of road.

This is closely connected to the dam projects.

When the Dasu reservoir is filled, a substantial section of the existing Karakoram Highway will disappear beneath the water. Pakistan therefore has to construct a replacement highway along the mountainsides at higher elevations. Plans for the alternative route include 15 tunnels and nine arch bridges.

The Karakoram Highway is not simply a road serving Pakistan's northern communities. It is the principal established overland highway connection between Pakistan and China's Xinjiang region, crossing the border at Khunjerab Pass.

It is consequently an important component of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

China is also helping to develop Gwadar Port, a deep-water port on Pakistan's Arabian Sea coast. The port is intended to connect through Pakistan's road network to the Karakoram Highway, which leads all the way to the Chinese border at Khunjerab Pass.

This is a central part of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC, 中巴经济走廊), a flagship project of China's Belt and Road Initiative.

How the Route Connects

The approximately 2,700-km corridor is designed to run from Gwadar Port through Pakistan's road network to the Karakoram Highway, and onwards to Khunjerab Pass at the Pakistan–China border.

From there, the road continues to Kashgar in China's Xinjiang region.

The corridor has several alternative alignments rather than one continuous, newly constructed expressway. Some sections have been completed, others are being upgraded, and Gwadar has yet to realise its intended commercial capacity.

The corridor offers western China an alternative trade route to the Arabian Sea, reducing its dependence on shipping routes through the Strait of Malacca. Gwadar is also close to the Strait of Hormuz, through which substantial Gulf oil shipments pass.

However, moving large quantities of cargo across the Karakoram mountains presents major logistical and economic challenges, notwithstanding the strategic attraction of the corridor.

China already has a substantial road network connecting Khunjerab Pass to Kashgar (喀什) in Xinjiang, and from Kashgar onwards to Urumqi and the rest of China. The route from Khunjerab to Kashgar is a well-paved mountain highway, although not yet a continuous four-lane expressway. Beyond Kashgar, China's modern expressway network takes over.

Kashgar is also connected by railway to Xinjiang's main rail network, allowing freight to transfer from road to rail.

The road connection from Pakistan to China is therefore not merely theoretical. It is already carrying commercial traffic.

However, the capacity and economics required to turn Gwadar–Khunjerab–Kashgar into a major international freight artery remain a concern.

For goods destined for western China, especially Xinjiang, the corridor could have considerable value. For goods headed to China's eastern industrial centres, its advantages over established sea routes are much less clear.

Better roads and more reliable electricity could also encourage tourism, regional trade and industrial development.

There is also a geopolitical dimension. India claims Gilgit-Baltistan as part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and objects to Chinese-supported infrastructure development in the territory. China and Pakistan reject India's objections to their cooperation.

Security is another challenge. Chinese engineers and Pakistani workers have faced militant attacks, particularly in connection with the Dasu project.

Nevertheless, these developments illustrate the depth of China's long-term economic and strategic engagement with Pakistan.

But Pakistan was not always so closely associated with China.

For several decades, it was one of America's closest strategic partners in Asia.

The US and Pakistan: From Close Allies to Deep Mutual Distrust

The US–Pakistan relationship is one of the more intriguing stories in modern geopolitics.

For decades, Pakistan was among America's closest strategic partners in Asia. Yet, in May 2011, American special forces secretly entered Pakistan, killed Osama bin Laden in a residential compound near a major Pakistani military academy, and departed without informing the Pakistani government beforehand.

How did two supposed allies end up in such an extraordinary situation?

The answer lies in the nature of their relationship.

The US–Pakistan partnership was built less on shared values than on strategic necessity. Each needed the other at different times, frequently for very different reasons.

Pakistan Was America's Cold War Ally

Following the partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan found itself confronting a much larger and militarily stronger neighbour, India.

Under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India pursued a policy of non-alignment, refusing to formally join either the American or Soviet bloc.

Pakistan made a different calculation.

Its leadership believed an alliance with the United States would provide military assistance, financial support and diplomatic leverage against India.

Washington, meanwhile, wanted countries along the Soviet Union's southern periphery to help contain communism.

The arrangement suited both sides.

In 1954, Pakistan signed a mutual defence assistance agreement with the US. It subsequently joined two Western-backed security organisations:

  • SEATO (1954) — the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, intended to contain communist expansion in Asia.
  • The Baghdad Pact (1955) — subsequently renamed CENTO, intended to contain Soviet influence in the Middle East and surrounding regions. 

Pakistan received substantial American military equipment, training and economic assistance.

However, the fundamental contradiction was apparent from the beginning.

America viewed Pakistan primarily as an ally against Soviet communism. Pakistan viewed America primarily as a source of support against India.

When Pakistan fought India in 1965, Washington suspended military assistance to both countries.

Pakistan felt betrayed because it depended far more heavily on American weapons than India did.

This difference in expectations would repeatedly undermine their relationship.


Pakistan Helps America Open the Door to China
There is an interesting episode in which Pakistan played a vital role in international diplomacy.

In the late 1960s, President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger wanted to establish relations with the People's Republic of China.

At that time, Washington and Beijing had no formal diplomatic relations. Pakistan, however, enjoyed friendly relations with both countries.

In July 1971, Kissinger secretly travelled from Pakistan to Beijing, using an official visit to Islamabad and a purported period of illness as cover.

The mission helped prepare the way for Nixon's historic visit to China in February 1972.

Pakistan had thus become an important intermediary in one of the twentieth century's most consequential diplomatic breakthroughs.

Yet this did not eliminate the contradictions in its relationship with Washington.

During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, which led to the independence of Bangladesh, Nixon favoured Pakistan's military government for geopolitical reasons, despite mounting evidence of atrocities in East Pakistan.

America's relationship with Pakistan was clearly driven more by strategic calculations than by consistent political or humanitarian principles.

Pakistan Becomes Indispensable to America's War Against the Soviet Union

This was perhaps the high point of US–Pakistan strategic cooperation.

In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

For Washington, the invasion presented an opportunity to weaken its principal Cold War adversary.

Pakistan, led by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, became the principal staging ground for the covert American effort to support the Afghan resistance.

The CIA coordinated much of the American programme, while Saudi Arabia also provided substantial financial support.

Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) became the principal intermediary between foreign sponsors and Afghan mujahideen groups.

This arrangement gave Pakistan considerable influence over which Afghan resistance groups received assistance.

The United States also supplied Pakistan with advanced F-16 fighter aircraft and substantial financial assistance.

The Unintended Consequences

The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989.

From Washington's perspective, a major Cold War objective had been achieved. But the regional consequences were far more complicated.

The war had strengthened armed Islamist networks, entrenched Pakistan's intelligence involvement in Afghanistan and facilitated the development of militant organisations that would later threaten regional and international security.

Then there was Osama bin Laden.

He was a Saudi who developed his own networks supporting Arab volunteers in Afghanistan.

Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, there is no convincing documentary evidence that the CIA directly recruited or trained bin Laden. Its principal assistance programme operated through Pakistan's ISI and predominantly supported Afghan resistance groups.

Nevertheless, the anti-Soviet war created an environment in which bin Laden and other transnational militants could develop their organisations.

Al-Qaeda emerged in 1988, during the final stages of the Afghan war.

After the Soviet withdrawal, America's interest in Pakistan declined.

In 1990, Washington suspended substantial military assistance because of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme.

Pakistan once again felt that America had used it and then abandoned it.

September 11: Pakistan Becomes America's Ally Again

On 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda attacked the United States, killing nearly 3,000 people.

At the time, Afghanistan was governed by the Taliban, whose regime had close historical connections with Pakistan's security establishment.

The US demanded that Pakistan cooperate in its campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

President Pervez Musharraf, who had seized power in a military coup in 1999, agreed.

Pakistan offered intelligence cooperation, logistical support, access to airspace and assistance with American military operations in Afghanistan.

The US, in return, lifted important sanctions and resumed extensive military and economic assistance.

But there was a serious problem.

Washington wanted Pakistan to destroy militant organisations operating from its territory.

Pakistan's security establishment, however, distinguished between militants threatening Pakistan itself and Afghan groups it considered potentially useful for maintaining influence in Afghanistan.

Consequently, while Pakistan assisted the US in capturing numerous al-Qaeda operatives, elements of the Afghan Taliban and allied militant networks continued to find refuge on Pakistani soil.

This became the central source of American suspicion.

Pakistan was effectively cooperating with Washington against some militants while maintaining relationships with other groups Washington was fighting.

It was a contradiction that could not be sustained indefinitely.


The Abbottabad Raid: 2 May 2011
This was one of the most extraordinary covert military operations in modern history.

For nearly ten years after the September 11 attacks, Osama bin Laden had evaded American intelligence agencies.

The prevailing assumption was that he was hiding somewhere in the remote mountainous borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Instead, he was living in Abbottabad, a garrison town north of Islamabad, not far from the prestigious Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul.

This was precisely what made his discovery so shocking.

The CIA had spent years tracing the movements of one of bin Laden's trusted couriers.

By 2010, American intelligence had identified a suspicious residential compound in Abbottabad. The success of the subsequent assault in May 2011 is now history.

Bin Laden's body was later buried at sea from the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson.

The extraordinary fact was that the Americans had deliberately not informed Pakistan beforehand.

Washington feared that advance warning might compromise the operation and allow bin Laden to escape.

This was a remarkable reflection of how little trust remained between the two supposed allies.

It also raised an uncomfortable question: How could Pakistan's powerful ISI have been completely unaware of bin Laden's presence in a town so closely associated with the military establishment?

Was it an extraordinary intelligence failure, or had some individuals knowingly protected him?

Pakistan subsequently established the Abbottabad Commission to investigate the affair. Its findings exposed serious institutional failures but did not conclusively establish whether bin Laden had received official protection.

The question remains troubling.

Relations deteriorated further in November 2011 when a NATO airstrike near the Afghan border killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan responded by closing NATO supply routes through its territory.

By then, the relationship had become deeply strained.


Pakistan's Gradual Movement Towards China
China and Pakistan had already developed strong relations since the 1960s, largely because of their respective strategic concerns involving India.

Over time, China became an important supplier of military equipment and technology to Pakistan.

Chinese assistance also contributed to Pakistan's defence-industrial capabilities, including the jointly developed JF-17 fighter aircraft.

The relationship expanded substantially with the announcement of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor in 2015.

Projects included power stations, highways, port infrastructure and industrial initiatives.

China offered Pakistan something the US had often been reluctant to provide: sustained involvement in major infrastructure development, alongside an extensive defence relationship.

The gigantic dam and highway projects we encountered during our journey are examples of this continuing partnership.

A Pakistan Astronaut in China’s Tiangong Space Station

It will happen during the next crew rotation, reportedly aboard Shenzhou-24 (神舟二十四号). The launch date is scheduled for November 2026.

Muhammad Zeeshan Ali and Khurram Daud have been undergoing training in Beijing. One will be selected for the mission. However, the successful candidate will spend approximately one week aboard Tiangong, rather than the usual six-month rotation of Chinese astronauts. The Pakistani astronaut will serve as a payload specialist, conducting scientific experiments involving biotechnology, materials and other research.

He would become the first Pakistani in space and the first foreign astronaut aboard China's Tiangong station.

There is another interesting development: Pakistan is also preparing a domestically built robotic rover to participate in China's Chang'e-8 lunar mission, currently planned for around 2028.

These demonstrate that China–Pakistan cooperation has expanded beyond roads, dams, ports and military equipment into advanced scientific and space technology.

Top of Form

Bottom of Form

However, Pakistan did not simply abandon Washington.

It continued to maintain relationships with both powers, attempting to benefit from its strategic importance to each.


Remember Operation Sindoor?
India decided to strike targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir on 7 May 2025, following a terrorist attack on tourists in Indian-administered Kashmir two weeks earlier.

Twenty-six civilians were killed, including 25 Indians and one Nepali national. Most of the victims were Hindu men.

India accused Pakistan-based militants associated with a UN-designated terrorist organisation of carrying out the attack. Pakistan denied involvement and called for an independent investigation.

Regardless, India struck.

Sindoor is the red vermilion powder traditionally worn by many married Hindu women, particularly along the parting of their hair, to signify their married status.

India chose the name as a symbolic reference to the women whose husbands were murdered in the Pahalgam attack.

It was therefore both a military operation and a highly emotional political message to the Indian public.

In its response, Pakistan inflicted losses on India's attacking aircraft, including the formidable French-made Rafale fighter jets.

Pakistan's success in shooting down Indian aircraft received considerable international attention. Yet, even after India's military leadership acknowledged aircraft losses, some AI platforms continued to be reluctant to acknowledge the significance of the episode, citing insufficient evidence concerning the precise number and types of aircraft lost. (I wrote about this in my blog in May 2025.)

The ceasefire stopped the immediate fighting. Nonetheless, India celebrated its supposed "victory" regardless.

The confrontation also woke up many armchair military analysts to the capabilities of Chinese military aircraft.

The Chinese-made J-10C, in its export J-10CE version, had demonstrated what it could potentially achieve in modern aerial combat. And that was only the J-10CE. What about China's newer generations of fighter aircraft?


Where Do US–Pakistan Relations Stand Today?
Interestingly, relations between Washington and Islamabad have improved since 2025, following years of friction.

In September 2025, President Donald Trump hosted Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir at the White House.

Pakistan subsequently increased its diplomatic engagement with Washington, particularly concerning regional security, trade and mediation involving Iran.

China remains Pakistan's principal long-term infrastructure and defence partner, while the US continues to be an important market and a significant financial and diplomatic interlocutor.

Pakistan therefore finds itself balancing relations with two major powers whose own strategic rivalry has been intensifying.


Conclusion
The history of US–Pakistan relations illustrates a recurring pattern.

During the Cold War, Washington needed Pakistan to help contain the Soviet Union.

In the early 1970s, Pakistan helped Washington establish contact with China.

In the 1980s, Pakistan became indispensable to America's covert war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

After September 11, it was once again needed for America's war against terrorism.

Yet whenever American strategic priorities changed, Pakistan frequently found itself sidelined or subjected to pressure.

The fundamental problem was that Washington and Islamabad rarely shared the same long-term objectives.

America saw Pakistan through the lens of its global priorities. Pakistan's overriding concerns were its security against India, its influence in Afghanistan and its ability to obtain external economic and military support.

The Abbottabad episode was perhaps the clearest illustration of the contradictions in their relationship.

After decades of military cooperation and billions of dollars in assistance, the Americans did not trust Pakistan sufficiently to inform it before entering its territory to eliminate Osama bin Laden.

And Pakistan, despite being America's ally in the war against terrorism, had allowed militant networks hostile to American interests to operate from its territory.

Now China has emerged as Pakistan's most dependable long-term strategic partner, particularly in defence and infrastructure development.

Yet Islamabad continues to cultivate Washington.

Pakistan has learnt to make use of its strategic geography. Situated between China, India, Afghanistan and Iran, it has repeatedly found ways to remain relevant to competing powers.

Whether it can continue balancing China and the US as their rivalry intensifies is another question altogether.

End






Saturday, October 31, 2026

The Best of Pakistan-ness – Before Tourism Takes It Away

After posting my previous article, “Northern Pakistan – More Than Meets the Eye”, I was left with a lingering feeling that something was missing. There were a few important observations that I thought I should have included.

A Refreshing Lack of Unscrupulousness 

The first is the “innocence” of a child yet to be exposed to the ways of the world.

Tourism is still very much in its infancy in Pakistan, or at least northern Pakistan, since I have not visited the southern part of the country.

Few tourist spots had souvenir stalls, and even where they existed, the operators were not persistent in pushing their wares. Nor were the prices they quoted outrageous, as is often the case in our part of the world.

In short, they were not unscrupulous operators trying to make a killing from tourists' impulsive purchases.

In fact, I felt rather sorry for them. Tourist traffic was thin, and I wondered whether they could make a decent living from their businesses.

Everywhere I went, I tried to buy a thing or two, hoping to do my little bit to support local tourism.

I only hope that as tourism develops, these people will not lose their present innocence and become as commercially aggressive as their counterparts elsewhere.

The Fast-Ageing Phenomenon

Members of our tour group generally agreed that Pakistani children were remarkably good-looking, with sharp features, beautiful eyes and fair skin.

However, we also noticed that by the time many reached adulthood, they seemed to look much older than their actual age.

Their complexions appeared to have darkened under the intense ultraviolet radiation at high altitudes, while their skin had been roughened by hard work in the harsh outdoor conditions.

I suppose few could afford moisturisers or other skincare products. Neither do they enjoy the humidity that helps protect the skin in our tropical climate.

The combination of strong sunlight, dry air, harsh temperatures and demanding outdoor work must take its toll.

It was quite a contrast between the beautiful, youthful faces of the children and the weather-beaten appearances of many adults.

Their Curiosity and Friendliness

Another delightful observation was the curiosity and friendliness of the people.

They were not shy about approaching strangers to satisfy their curiosity. We were often asked where we came from, and their questions seemed to arise from genuine interest, without any apparent envy or ulterior motive.

On several occasions, we were invited to be photographed with local families, without any awkwardness.

At the China–Pakistan border control point, a group of young Pakistanis was delighted when I obliged their request to have photographs taken with me.

The same happened to my wife and me when we encountered a young family at the Centaurus Mall in Islamabad. They were just as delighted to have photographs taken with us.

There was something refreshingly spontaneous about these encounters. No commercial motive, no expectations, just a simple desire to connect with visitors from another country.


Conclusion
These may seem like small observations, but they left a lasting impression on me.

We often judge a country by its scenery, monuments, infrastructure, hotels and tourist attractions. Yet, ultimately, it is the people who leave the deepest impression.

Northern Pakistan certainly has its magnificent mountains, spectacular valleys and extraordinary landscapes. But what I found equally appealing was the unspoilt character of many of its people.

Of course, I am not suggesting that Pakistanis are uniquely innocent or that unscrupulous people do not exist there. I can only speak of what I personally experienced during our journey.

Tourism will undoubtedly bring much-needed employment, income and development to these remote communities. It would be unreasonable, even selfish, to wish that they remain isolated and economically disadvantaged merely to preserve their innocence for the enjoyment of tourists like us.

But development often comes at a price.

As more tourists arrive, commercialisation will inevitably follow. Souvenir stalls will multiply, prices will rise, and the friendly curiosity we encountered may gradually give way to the hard-headed calculations of the tourism trade.

It is a familiar story in many parts of the world.

I hope northern Pakistan can enjoy the economic benefits of tourism without losing too much of the warmth, simplicity and sincerity that make its people so endearing.

That, to me, is the best of Pakistan-ness — something worth preserving before tourism takes it away.

Thursday, October 29, 2026

Northern Pakistan: More Than Meets the Eye

I was a little ambivalent when my wife suggested that we join a Go Holiday 360 tour to northern Pakistan. Some friends had visited this destination, but many others, including my son, were not encouraging. “Why Pakistan?” was the common question. I suppose they were all concerned about our safety. But as usual, I went along with my wife's wishes.

We gathered at KLIA on the 16th. There were only ten of us, including a tour manager who asked us to call him “Cash”. Our departure was badly delayed at KLIA, but besides receiving some generous meal coupons from Thai Airways, we were also invited by our travel insurance company, Berjaya Sompo, to spend the waiting time at a travel lounge at KLIA.

There was not much time to while away in Bangkok before we transited. By the time we reached Islamabad, it was late into the night. We had to catch a domestic flight at around 7 am, which meant we could only rest for a few hours in our hotel room at the Pearl Continental.

The Journey

Our tour began at Skardu Airport, from where we visited a number of tourist sites in the region before proceeding to Karimabad in the Hunza Valley, travelling along the mighty Indus River. From there, we went to Khunjerab Pass, where the China-Pakistan border checkpoint is located.

After that, it was the Hoper Glacier before we backtracked to Gilgit. From there, we travelled to Besham and then to the Swat Valley before returning to Islamabad for our flight home.

A Side Observation: Pakistan International Airlines (PIA)

We flew by Pakistan International Airlines to Skardu. The flight was quite uneventful. However, I felt a little sorry when I saw the PIA livery.

PIA was once among Asia's most prestigious airlines, and it played a significant role in the establishment of Emirates Airline in 1985. It is one of the more remarkable stories in Asian aviation history: an airline that helped launch what became a global aviation giant subsequently experienced a prolonged decline of its own.

PIA was founded in 1955. Under Air Marshal Nur Khan, who became its managing director in 1959, it developed a strong international reputation. In 1960, it became one of Asia's earliest operators of commercial jet services, using the Boeing 707. It was also the first airline from a non-communist country to operate scheduled flights to the People's Republic of China.

In 1985, Emirates began operations with two aircraft wet-leased from PIA. A wet lease meant that the aircraft came with operational support, including crews and maintenance arrangements. Emirates' own 2015 anniversary account records that approximately 100 pilots, engineers, maintenance personnel and other staff arrived in Dubai to help prepare for its launch.

However, over several decades, PIA became increasingly burdened by political interference, management instability, excessive staffing, debt and inadequate fleet investment. By December 2025, PIA's difficulties had become so severe that a Pakistani consortium led by the Arif Habib Group acquired a 75% stake for approximately US$482 million as part of a privatisation exercise.

There is a striking irony here: the airline whose aircraft and personnel helped Emirates begin operations in 1985 eventually found itself losing passengers to the very Gulf aviation industry it had helped develop.

The PIA story illustrates something beyond aviation: a country may possess considerable human talent, technical expertise and pioneering institutions, yet lose its competitive advantage through prolonged failures of governance and institutional management.

We spent eleven days touring northern Pakistan. This is not intended to be my travelogue, but rather a collection of impressions I gathered throughout the journey.

Mountains, Mountains and Mountains Everywhere

The northern region was full of towering, snow-capped mountains. The PIA pilot even pointed out K2, the world's second-highest mountain.

Much of the first eight days of our road journey was along gravel roads. We visited Shigar Valley, passing by the Sarfaranga Desert; stopped by Sadpara Lake and the Lower and Upper Kachura Lakes; and travelled to Karimabad in the Hunza Valley along the Indus River.

The border guards at Khunjerab Pass (4,733 metres) were friendly. However, we did not have the opportunity to visit the Chinese checkpoint.

There was no telecommunications signal along much of the way. Traffic was thin, and I wondered what would happen if our coach broke down!

Some 500 dwellings nestled along the gravel road to Hoper Glacier. For a different experience, the local tour collaborator hired jeeps to bring us there. Conditions in the various human settlements were quite basic. But some parts were very scenic, even though vegetation was generally sparse.

 Along the Karakoram Highway, we also got to see a stretch of the Old Silk Road, a point where the Indian and Eurasian continental plates collided some 55 million years ago, and a junction where three mighty mountain ranges meet — the Karakoram, the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush.

The Chinese are also involved in building two major dams and a new highway tunneling through the mountains tunnels for Pakistan.

There were also gemstone and gold mining activities along the way. One of our tour members, Joseph, obviously a gemstone enthusiast himself, had a field day on several occasions! Our tour manager, Cash, became his convert.

Much of the journey was dusty until we entered the SWAT region, where Shangla Pass is located. Vegetation became lush. This region is said to be the Switzerland of the East.

The local tour agency provided us with a Toyota Coaster, which technically could seat 16 passengers. However, several seats had to be used for luggage. It was really not comfortable for long journeys. There wasn't much legroom, but I could understand why they had to use this model. I suppose they had little choice, since the roads were generally too narrow to accommodate larger tour coaches. But for some strange reason, even the fittings in the coach — the seat's handle bar and the pocket for loose-items — were rendered unusable with a redundant jacket.

Buddhism

This was the most unexpected experience of my journey: the efforts of an Islamic country to preserve the ruins of Buddhism.

Buddhism flourished in this part of the world for many centuries, particularly during the Gandhara period, and survived in some areas until around the 14th century.

While in neighbouring Afghanistan, the Taliban destroyed two enormous standing Buddha statues carved into a sandstone cliff in the Bamiyan Valley, the Pakistanis, with the assistance of UNESCO, have made considerable efforts to preserve their Buddhist heritage.

In Skardu, we visited the ninth-century Manthal Buddha rock carving and inscriptions, dating from the later phase of Buddhism in the Upper Indus Valley.

We also visited the Swat Museum, where an impressive collection of Gandhara art from the Buddhist period is displayed.

En route to Islamabad, our tour guide also took us to see Buddha carvings and the remains of stupas and monasteries at various sites, including Butkara, Shingardar, Takht-i-Bahi and Taxila.

I also learned about the existence of the White Huns, who were instrumental in the destruction of many Buddhist sites. The people I asked could not tell me much about the White Huns, but I wondered whether they were related to the Xiongnu, who had repeatedly raided China in ancient times.

The Taxila Buddhist Museum was most impressive. It houses many relics, including a tooth said to be that of the Buddha.

In it contains a relic of Buddha's tooth

The Gandhara region, covering much of present-day northern Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan, was once a major centre of Buddhism. Places such as Taxila and Takht-i-Bahi were flourishing Buddhist centres long before the arrival of Islam.

Buddhism declined gradually as a result of changing political patronage, religious developments, economic shifts and successive invasions. In Sindh, it had largely disappeared by the 13th century.

Islamisation

Islam first reached the territory of present-day Pakistan through Arab traders and early contacts during the seventh century AD. However, it was not until 711–712 AD, in the early eighth century, that Islam gained its first substantial political foothold when Muhammad bin Qasim conquered Sindh.

Nevertheless, the local population did not immediately convert to Islam. Hindus and Buddhists continued to practise their religions for centuries.

From the 11th century onwards, Muslim rulers from Afghanistan and Central Asia extended their influence into Punjab and northern India. At the same time, Muslim traders, scholars and particularly Sufi missionaries helped Islam spread among local populations.

Under the Mughal Empire (1526–1857), Islam became firmly embedded in the political and cultural life of much of the Indian subcontinent. Nevertheless, the population remained religiously diverse, and the spread of Islam varied considerably from region to region.

The important distinction is that while Islam arrived through military conquest and commercial contact, the Islamisation of society was a much slower process, extending over several centuries.

We visited the 14th-century Amburiq Mosque in Baltistan, said to be the first Islamic religious monument in the Shigar Valley, built by Iranian craftsmen.

This is obviously a Shia heartland. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is revered here. It is estimated that Shias constitute about 10–20% of Pakistan's population, although the proportion is much higher in parts of Gilgit-Baltistan.

Ethnicities

Pakistan is a remarkably diverse country ethnically. Although Pakistanis are predominantly Muslim, they belong to several distinct ethnic groups, with different languages, cultures and historical origins.

In the northern region we visited, the population is particularly diverse. The principal communities include:

  • Baltis, mainly around Skardu and Baltistan. Their language is of Tibetan origin, and the region has strong historical links with Tibetan culture.
  • Burusho, mainly found in Hunza and nearby valleys. They speak Burushaski, a language with no established relationship to other language families.
  • Shina-speaking communities, particularly around Gilgit, whose language has Indo-Aryan roots.
  • Pashtuns, who are prominent in the northwestern parts of Pakistan, especially around Swat and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. They share ethnic and linguistic connections with the Pashtuns of Afghanistan.

This diversity reflects Pakistan's geography. For thousands of years, the region was a meeting ground for peoples from the Indian subcontinent, Afghanistan, Persia, Central Asia and the Tibetan Plateau.

One particularly interesting point: the Baltis of Skardu speak a Tibetan-related language, even though the overwhelming majority are Muslims today. Their language preserves an important part of the region's pre-Islamic cultural heritage. Even some of their buildings reflect this heritage.

For Pakistan as a whole, Punjabis form the largest ethnic group, at approximately 45% of the population. They are closely related culturally and linguistically to Punjabis across the border in India.

Other major groups include Pashtuns, Sindhis, Saraikis, Muhajirs and Baloch, besides numerous smaller ethnic communities.

Overall Impressions

Even though the hotels were generally modest, they were quite clean and adequate. Those operated by the Serena chain maintained a very high standard of housekeeping, especially in their dining table and cutlery arrangements. They could put some of our hotels to shame!

We were pleasantly surprised to be greeted by someone who could speak Hokkien! He turned out to be a Malaysian Indian from Penang!

However, there were one or two hotels which were substandard, particularly in the quality of their bed linen.

The resident guide at Altit Fort in Hunza was a born entertainer. He spoke perfect English and had us in stitches much of the time.

Pakistani food was good, even for my wife, who does not take beef or mutton. However, the Chinese food specially arranged for us before our departure was disappointing.

Nothing particularly concerning was visible on the security front, even though there were many security checkpoints along the Karakoram Highway. In the SWAT region, we were provided with security escorts along the way, even when my wife and I were visiting a local shopping “mall”.

On the whole, Pakistanis are very friendly people. Yes, the region is poor, and there were children who asked us for 100 rupees or so. But they were not insistent.

We also agreed that the children in Pakistan's northern region are very good-looking. Those who are thinking of adopting children might want to visit the region!

End



Wednesday, October 14, 2026

The Damn Haze – Why Is It Always from Indonesia?

 

This year’s haze is particularly bad. And it has been lingering for so long!

And it could have been prevented in the first place!

Blame It on El Niño?

Every meteorological agency, including Indonesia’s own Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics Agency BMKG (Badan Meteorologi, Klimatologi, dan Geofisika) says this year’s El Niño will be severe and could become one of the strongest, perhaps the strongest, in the modern instrumental record.

Yesterday (13 October 2026) BMKG reported that the Niño-3.4 anomaly had reached about +3.33°C in its latest 10-day analysis, while its three-month ENSO (El Niño–Southern Oscillation, which is the overall Pacific climate system) index for August–October was +3.08°C. BMKG explicitly classifies this as “El Niño sangat kuat” — very strong El Niño.

NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the United States) using a somewhat different dataset and baseline, measured Niño-3.4 at +2.1°C in its 8 October assessment and says a strong-to-very-strong El Niño is likely through January–March 2027.

Australia’s Bureau of Meteorology recorded a weekly relative Niño-3.4 value of +2.81°C for the week ending 11 October — the highest in that particular weekly dataset, exceeding the comparable 2015 value. Most models project the peak around November–December and above +3°C on that measure.

The WMO goes further. Its latest forecast expects the October–December Niño-3.4 seasonal anomaly to reach roughly +3.7°C, potentially exceeding previous modern records, with the event peaking around December.

BMKG reports directly to the President and handles weather, climate, air quality, earthquakes and tsunami monitoring. However, it can do all the forecasting with good accuracy, it cannot force a bupati (a regency head) to act, stop a villager from burning rubbish, arrest somebody clearing land by fire, or compel a plantation company to obey the law. Indonesia's ability to convert their warnings into preventive action: much less impressive. It can tell the President three months beforehand that conditions are becoming dangerous. The important question is what the President does with that warning.

Indonesia’s Double Whammy

This is especially important to our earlier discussion about the haze. Indonesia presently has not only an exceptionally powerful El Niño but also a positive Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD). BMKG measured the IOD at about +0.70 in early October. Both phenomena tend to suppress rainfall over much of Indonesia.

The result is quite dramatic. During the first ten days of October:

  • 83.85% of Indonesia experienced low rainfall
  • 87.72% experienced below-normal rainfall

BMKG has issued drought warnings across large areas of Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and elsewhere.

BMKG explicitly says that the combination of the very strong El Niño + positive IOD is reducing cloud formation and moisture over Indonesia and increasing the risk of forest and land fires.

Nature has dealt it an exceptionally bad hand this year.

But the leadership is so ill-prepared!

El Niño creates the tinderbox; it doesn't strike the match.

Peatlands don't ignite themselves simply because the Pacific warms. Human burning, drained peat, poor prevention and weak enforcement determine whether an extreme dry season becomes an international haze catastrophe.

And 2026 is precisely the sort of year in which a government that understood the danger should have been fanatically preventive months before the fires began.

Basically a Failure of Prevention and Land Governance

Much of the fire is burning in peat, not ordinary forest. Naturally wet peat does not readily burn. But when peatlands are drained for oil-palm, pulpwood and other development, the water table falls and metres of accumulated organic material become combustible. Once fire gets into the peat, it can smoulder underground for weeks, reappearing some distance away. NASA scientists say these underground fires can effectively continue until substantial rain arrives. Water-bombing helicopters deal mainly with the surface manifestation.

El Niño explains the severity, but not why the land was capable of burning. Indonesia is experiencing its worst fire season in roughly a decade, intensified by the strongest El Niño in more than ten years. But the important distinction is that drought does not create drained peatlands or start most Indonesian fires. Historically, the overwhelming majority of these fires have been associated with human activity — land clearing, agriculture, plantations and sometimes land disputes.

There has been a serious institutional gap. After the disastrous 2015 haze, Jokowi established the Peatland Restoration Agency, later BRGM. It concentrated on rewetting peat, blocking drainage canals and restoring damaged areas. Its mandate expired at the end of 2024, after which responsibilities became dispersed among different ministries. Indonesian parliamentary research itself warned that this fragmentation could weaken restoration and fire prevention.

Only on 24 September 2026, in the middle of the present crisis, did Prabowo announce a new National Peatland and Mangrove Management Agency. How pathetic!

The economic incentives favour clearing, while enforcement is much more difficult. Fire remains an extraordinarily cheap means of clearing vegetation. I do not believe large plantation interests are involved. The culprits are largely small smallholders and slash-and-burn nomadic cultivators who are oblivious to the danger of haze. Some of the problems can be attributed to overlapping concessions, unclear land titles, national-versus-local authority and uneven or hands-off enforcements. Research on Indonesian peat governance repeatedly finds fragmented responsibility and power struggles between government levels and interested parties.

Reactive rather than Preventive Mindsets

The government is still reacting after fires have become large. As recently as 13 October, Prabowo ordered additional resources as criticism intensified. Malaysia and Singapore have offered assistance, while Indonesia had not, at that point, accepted foreign help or declared a national disaster. Environmental groups estimate 637,000–900,000 hectares may already have burned in 2026. By the time tens of thousands of people, helicopters and water bombers are being mobilised, the crucial battle — preventing drained peat from igniting — has already been lost.

Indonesia demonstrated after 2015 that sustained peat restoration, canal blocking, monitoring and tougher enforcement can sharply reduce the problem. The World Bank specifically credits peat rewetting, zero-burning policies and stronger conservation measures with improvements after earlier crises.

But all was forgotten again!

The present episode suggests something more troubling: institutional attention relaxed, peat remained degraded, responsibility became fragmented after BRGM (Badan Restorasi Gambut dan Mangrove — the Peatland and Mangrove Restoration Agency of Indonesia) disappeared, and prevention was inadequate before this year's drought arrived. Prabowo is now throwing resources at the fires, but aircraft cannot repair the underlying hydrology.

In other words, El Niño lit the fuse, but Indonesia had allowed the gunpowder to remain there.

Misplaced Arrogance and Concept of Accountability

On 10 October 2026, Syahganda Nainggolan, the head of Indonesia’s Government Communication Agency (Bakom), said, “We don’t just send smoke; when there is no smoke, we send oxygen.” He added that the oxygen in Singapore and Malaysia also came from Indonesia’s forests. He was responding to criticism over the current transboundary haze.

He seemed to describe the present fires as essentially a natural phenomenon “beyond human error”. And this is not new. In 2015, then Vice-President Jusuf Kalla famously complained that Malaysia and Singapore enjoyed clean air from Indonesia for eleven months without thanking Indonesia, yet became upset over one month of haze.

An Indonesian minister also said something to that effect in 2013!

To me, that is revealing because it is not merely an unfortunate joke. It reflects a recurring defensive mentality in parts of the Indonesian establishment: when criticised over haze, the response sometimes shifts from “How do we stop this?” to “You benefit from us too, so don't complain.”

That attitude is almost the opposite of accountability.

What can we do if we have a neighbour like that?

Lack of Community Education

Indonesian research on peat-fire prevention identifies not only deliberate burning because it is cheap, but also seemingly casual behaviour such as uncontrolled rubbish burning, campfires and discarded cigarettes. The fact that researchers continue to call for basic community education, village fire groups and behavioural change tells us that this is not merely a problem of Jakarta policy or large plantation companies.

There are communities in Riau and Kalimantan that understand the danger extremely well and actively patrol against fires; indeed, some are now suing their own government over the haze.

In many places, the immediate local calculation can be very different from that of somebody breathing the haze in Kuala Lumpur or Singapore. Burning is cheap and familiar; the smoke may be regarded as seasonal inconvenience; the serious health consequences are delayed or poorly understood; and the eventual haze hundreds of kilometres away feels disconnected from the person who starts a small fire.

That creates a particularly difficult governance problem: weak enforcement from above combined with insufficient social inhibition against burning from below. If setting a fire were regarded locally with the same seriousness as contaminating a village's drinking water, Indonesia's haze problem would already be much smaller.

And this helps explain something otherwise puzzling: Indonesia has been suffering catastrophic haze episodes since at least 1997–98. After nearly thirty years, the country certainly cannot claim ignorance of the phenomenon. What is missing in parts of the countryside is not information that haze exists, but a sufficiently strong culture of prevention and personal responsibility for causing it.

That distinction — knowing about haze versus feeling responsible for preventing it — may actually be the more important point.

Having lived and observed rural and semi-rural communities firsthand, I find the lack of awareness of the health and environmental consequences of open burning widespread enough to be a major cause of the haze problem.

A farmer or villager who regards burning rubbish, clearing undergrowth, or setting a small patch alight as perfectly normal behaviour may not connect his individual fire with the enormous haze cloud eventually hanging over Sumatra, Java, Malaysia or Singapore.

And after decades of recurrent haze, that widespread indifference becomes a governance failure as well. If people still do not appreciate the danger, then public education, enforcement and local leadership have plainly failed.

So I would now add a fifth fundamental cause to my earlier analysis: a deeply inadequate grassroots awareness of — and sense of responsibility for — the consequences of open burning. That is much closer to the point you were making.

Indonesia needs a Lee Kuan Yew

Indonesia’s problem is not a shortage of laws; it is a shortage of consistent enforcement, administrative discipline and consequences.

What I am invoking in Lee Kuan Yew is less the man himself than a governing style: clear rules, competent bureaucracy, relentless follow-through, little tolerance for excuses, and the willingness to impose unpopular measures when public order or long-term national interests are at stake.

On haze, that would mean stopping illegal burning before the dry season, holding local officials personally accountable, prosecuting concession holders regardless of connections, and sustaining public education until behaviour actually changes.

Some argue that Indonesia is vastly harder to govern than Singapore: more than 17,000 islands, hundreds of millions of people, powerful provincial and district elites, deeply decentralised authority, and enormous rural areas where Jakarta’s instructions can become progressively weaker as they travel downward.

I beg to differ. 

A determined leader changes how that machinery behaves. He makes an issue a national priority, appoints people who can execute, removes those who cannot, and makes governors, bupatis, plantation owners and enforcement agencies understand that failure has consequences.

There is actually a useful Indonesian comparison. After the catastrophic 2015 fires, Jokowi personally elevated peatland restoration and fire prevention, created new institutional mechanisms and imposed much stronger political attention on the problem. The World Bank describes the post-2015 period as bringing a new urgency under Jokowi’s leadership.

Prabowo, by contrast, called slash-and-burn clearing “ecological terrorism” on 17 September 2026, but by 13 October, with the haze already affecting neighbouring countries badly, he was still ordering additional resources to fight fires that had been raging for weeks.

LKY did not wait for Singaporeans spontaneously to acquire civic consciousness. He forced behavioural change through leadership, education, enforcement and persistence, until much of it eventually became social habit.

Applied to Indonesia, a sufficiently determined president could say: No more burning. Then make every governor and bupati responsible for hotspots in his jurisdiction; punish officials who look the other way; prosecute politically connected concessionaires; educate villagers relentlessly; provide practical alternatives to burning; and repeat the exercise every dry season until attitudes change.

Indonesia's enormous size makes that harder than Singapore. It does not make it impossible.

And perhaps the most important point from your experience there is this: when widespread public attitudes themselves are part of the problem, strong leadership becomes more important, not less. Institutions don't suddenly acquire determination. Somebody at the top has to supply it.

I always joke with friends about sending recalcitrant officials to firing squads, just like what they do in China.

But literally, no: China does not quite send people to a firing squad nowadays. But it certainly has a reputation for making people fear the consequences of breaking rules. Serious environmental offences can attract heavy fines and long prison terms.

When Beijing decides that something must stop, local officials know that failure can damage careers and offenders know punishment is real.

That changes behaviour very quickly.

And that is precisely what Indonesia lacks on haze: not laws, but fear of the law and fear of accountability. A bupati, plantation manager or villager must believe that if he permits or starts illegal burning, somebody will actually come after him. Without that, annual appeals to “please don’t burn” become almost meaningless.

Indonesia does not need more regulations on haze; it needs a government that makes people afraid to ignore the regulations already there.

What good are speeches, slogans, television appearances, grand announcements if an elected leader cannot produce durable results.

A leader may appear to project decisiveness, yet Indonesia is again struggling with a preventable haze disaster, and he is now mobilising additional resources after the fires have become severe. Communication has increasingly been mistaken for governing. Social media, 24-hour news and personality politics reward the leader who looks decisive immediately. Actual leadership is much more boring: choosing competent people, forcing bureaucracies to perform, accepting responsibility when things fail, pursuing policies for years rather than weeks, and being prepared to lose popularity to get necessary things done.

That brings us back to Lee Kuan Yew. Whether one admires or dislikes his methods, nobody could seriously accuse him of mistaking announcements for outcomes. If Singapore was dirty, he wanted it cleaned. If corruption was the problem, officials were investigated and punished. If public behaviour had to change, the government pursued it year after year until it changed. The test was not what had been announced but what Singapore looked like afterwards.

A politician wants people to believe he is strong. A leader makes the state work.

At a deeper level, leadership is about character, moral courage, historical imagination, legitimacy, judgment under uncertainty, and the ability to shape a people’s sense of direction. A country can be efficiently administered and still be badly led.

The Real Lesson of the Haze

So let us stop blaming El Niño. El Niño explains why 2026 is extraordinarily dry. It explains why vegetation burns more easily and why peat fires become so difficult to extinguish. But El Niño did not drain the peatlands. It did not light the fires. It did not allow decades of casual burning to become culturally tolerated.

Those were human failures. And ultimately, human failures of this scale become failures of leadership. A good leader cannot make the rain fall. But he can prepare for the drought.

He can make sure the peat remains wet. He can make local officials accountable. He can educate his people. He can enforce the law. And, above all, he can create a culture in which starting an illegal fire is no longer regarded as an inconsequential act.

Indonesia has had almost thirty years since the great haze of 1997–98 to learn this lesson. How many more years does it need?

End